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Colombia and El Salvador, two Latin American countries, have developed similar 
counterinsurgency processes and started similar processes of peace negotiations between the 
insurgent armies and the forces of order. One peace process was concluded in 1992, when 
El Salvador ended the war through a political solution (Peace Accords). Salvadoran insurgent 
forces agreed to demobilize its army and to become a legal political party, while the 
government agreed to make changes in the social and political structure. Colombia, after 
forty years of guerrilla warfare and after failed peace talks during the last decade, is still trying 
to set conditions to gain peace through negotiations. 
The thesis, while contrasting both general contexts, emphasizes their differences to 
explain the success of the peace process in El Salvador and the failure in Colombia. After 
comparing the political actors involved - the military and the guerrillas, studying the 
intensity of the conflict, and analyzing the outcomes of the different peace processes, we 
arrived to the conclusion that the Salvadoran model of negotiation cannot be applied entirely 
to the Colombian case. Similarly, no government should try to copy the Salvadoran recipe 
as the remedy for their own social and political problems. Any simplistic interpretation should 
be avoided because it could lead to fallacies that could generate dangerous interpretations 
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A. GENERAL AREA OF RESEARCH 
Colombia and El Salvador, two Latin-American countries, have developed alike 
counter-insurgency processes and started similar processes of peace negotiations between 
the insurgent armies and the forces of order. One peace process was concluded in 1992, 
when El Salvador ended the war through a political solution (Peace Accords). Salvadoran 
insurgent forces agreed to demobilize their army and to become a legal political party, while 
the government accepted to make changes in the social and political structure. Colombia, 
after forty years of guerrilla war, and after some failed peace talks between 1984 and 1997, 
is still trying to set conditions to achieve peace through negotiations. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary: Can Colombia apply the same model of peace process applied to 
solve El Salvador's internal conflict? 
Subsidiary: What was the influence of the armed forces' tenets and traits on their 
attitude toward negotiations? 
What was the influence ofthe guerrillas' nature and characteristics 
on its attitude toward the negotiations? 
What was the influence of the intensity of the conflict on the attitude 
ofboth societies toward the negotiation processes? 
Did the procedures set for the negotiation processes influence the 
outcomes and how? 
What was the influence of the international involvement in the 
negotiation processes? 
C. MAIN FINDINGS 
We found several essential differences in the military of both countries, the 
guerrillas, the intensity of the conflicts, and the peace processes, that may explain their 
different outcomes. 
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1. The Armed Forces. 
These institutions show significant differences in both countries. El Salvador up to 
1984, had a tradition of military interference in politics, while Colombia has had a more 
stable democracy and the military has been under civilian control. In El Salvador all the 
anned forces were transformed into a huge counterinsurgency force and were fully deployed 
to conduct operations all over the country, thus every soldier and officer felt the intensity 
of the conflict constantly. In Colombia, finishing the conflict does not seem to be a top 
priority of the political agenda. The military is not fully deployed and it keeps a conventional 
organization, in spite of the internal transformations for adapting to current public order 
situations. 
2. The Guerrillas. 
They present some essential differences that have influenced their attitude toward 
negotiations. Unity, ideology and sources for sustainment influenced the degree of initiative 
related to the negotiation and seem to be some of the main factors of divergence. In El 
Salvador, in 1980, Fidel Castro turned the movement Frente Farabundo Marti para Ia 
Liberaci6n Nacional (Fl\1LN) into a well-coordinated front with a very well elaborated and 
strategic plan. In Colombia, in 1986, the formation of the Coordinadora Nacional 
Guerrillera (Guerrillas' National Coordinator), which united six guerrilla organizations, led 
to a few joint military actions. However, that organization is still far from the formation of 
a joint Staff which was an achievement in El Salvador. 
The Fl\1LN was heavily supported by the former USSR, through Cuba and 
Nicaragua. When the USSR collapsed, the guerrilla forces lost their main source oflogistical 
and ideological support, and then the peace process was somehow accelerated. In Colombia 
the FARC, the ELN and small remanent ofEPL and M-19 have relied mainly on internal 
resources to conduct their insurgent activities. Up to date the F ARC are the major cocaine 
cartel, while the ELN and EPL have links with the drug lords. 
3. The Intensity of the Conflict. 
The different degrees of intensity (reflected in the amount of people killed or 
wounded, in the destruction of physical and economic structures, and in general uncertainty) 
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Salvador the society was affected more homogeneously. The economic and social impact was 
far more significant. Politicians, landlords, and top military leaders perceived great danger 
anywhere anytime. In Colombia the problem concentrates mainly in the rural areas which 
allows some sectors of society to feel secure in the big cities believing that the situation is 
exclusively a military problem. Their economy has not come close to collapse and the social 
impact is less severe. 
4. The Peace Processes 
These followed different patterns of development. In El Salvador, the process was 
started by some direct talks between the guerrillas' leaders and the President of the country. 
During the process, military representatives were always present in all talks, only as advisers. 
Since finishing the war was a top priority for ~e gove~enr, some essential concessions had 
to be made. The UN played a decisive role during the whole process. 
In Colombia different presidents have made intents in the last three decades for 
reaching peace. Some guerrilla groups (M-19, EPL, PRT) negotiated peace with the 
government through developments that consummated in 1989, leaving only the Marxist 
guerrilla groups (what is most important, the FARC and the ELN) still in arms against the 
government. 
5. The International Involvement 
This factor was more evident in El Salvador than in Colombia. In El Salvador we can 
find some evidence of this involvement in the amount and quality of weapons and military 
advisors sent to both contenders during the conflict, as well as the pressures of the UNO and 
other international organizations, like Amnesty International, the Red Cross, and the Catholic 
Church, among others, for ending the war through political negotiations. In the Colombian 
case, countries like Venezuela, Costa Rica Mexico and the Scandinavian nations have offered 
their services to help the Colombian government to find a negotiated solution. The Caracas 
and Tlaxcala talks with the F ARC and ELN representatives are examples of some 
international commitment to the Colombian peace process. Nevertheless, there is not much 
evidence of .a major involvement of superpowers or any other international instance (like the 
UNO or OAS) in the conflict, so far. 
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D. CONCLUSIONS 
We have come to the conclusion that the Salvadoran model of negotiation (if we can 
call it that) cannot be applied entirely to the Colombian case. Definitely not every action or 
decision taken by the Salvadoran actors should be adopted by the Colombians. This would 
be a supreme act of ignorance. However Colombians should not close the possibilities to 
learn and enrich their perspectives from the Salvadoran conflict. 
1. Evidence in this case supports that the greater the links that the guerrilla 
forces had with social and political organizations, the more likely it was that the guerrillas 
would contemplate a political settlement that allows them to enter the mainstream politics. 
2. From the military perspective, we conclude that the greater the participation 
thelriilitaryh:ave in politics, the more likely it is that the armed forceswill be weakened by,. 
a revolutionary process and the more likely that they will have to accept political settlements 
even against their own corporate and personal interests. The evidence also show that armed 
forces can participate in the building or strengthening of a democratic system, by keeping 
three essential attitudes: first, to avoid interfering in the political process; second to 
modernize their organization to meet the military challenge of armed insurgency, and third, 
not to allow any member to act above the law, which they are supposed to defend. 
3. We also found that the more intensely the armed conflict affect the different 
sectors of society, the more likely it is that the society will be willing to make concessions 
and to participate in a process of negotiations. In El Salvador every sector in society was 
deeply affected by the violence. The negotiations were a national priority and not just a 
political act decided by the central government. In Colombia there are still sectors of society 
that feel that they do not need to negotiate. 
4. International meddling can and will influence the attitude of domestic actors, 
especially when the degree of dependence is high. In El Salvador, the F.MLN was willing 
to demobilized its military structure only after insuring the compromise of the Salvadoran 
government, before the UN, to allow the FMLN to be reinserted into the political and social 
structure, v,.:ithout the danger of being destroyed afterwards, as they feared. In Colombia, 
it seems that the insurgents do not want to become a political movement. They either know 
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that if they do become a political party, they will not have enough support to survive or they 
just have found an attractive way of living which cannot be replaced by any international 
meddling or domestic settlement. 
5. Any simplistic interpretation should be avoided. Pretending to conduct 
simplistic comparisons to suggest that identical solutions could be achieved, might generate 
dangerous interpretations from the key actors in the processes. Since Colombia is the country 
that may benefit from the Salvadoran experience, we will present some potential 
misinterpretations from the Colombian perspective. 
a. From the insurgency perspective. 
A superficial interpretation of the Salvadoran process might create the false 
idea that they 'Can copy the behavior of the FMLN to achieve similar results. In this sense 
they would want to present similar demands in complex matters as the transformation or 
dissolution ofthe armed forces. They could try to increase the intensity of the violence in 
an attempt to bring the armed conflict to a phase of civil war. Then they would try to 
internationalize it and pretend to bring in external pressures on the government to achieve 
their political objectives, as the FMLN did in El Salvador. All this, of course would be a 
terrible mistake, because Colombian insurgency does not have the unity, representativeness, 
and international support that the FMLN had. We need to keep in mind that the FMLN 
invested many years of effort to build that impressive network for political and financial 
support. 
b. From the Colombian government perspective. 
Another misperception may be made. If president Alfredo Cristiani negotiated 
with the FMLN, and made considerable concessions, he could be seen as a weak political 
--leader. He, it could be argued, let the insurgents transform the political system, setting a bad 
precedent to other democratic systems. This would not be accurate, because Cristiani led a 
country where the whole political system was being transformed, not by the action of the 
guerrilla force, but a convergence of national and international factors. Some transformations 
were simply the result of the overwhelming need to modernize the state, yet the FMLN 
claims victory for those changes. The conflict and the dialogues occurred within the 
framework of that process of transformation. 
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c. From the civil society perspective. 
A superficial interpretation of the role played by the Salvadoran society, 
which participated widely during the process of negotiations, might invite the Colombian 
civil society to press for a political solution, obligating the government to make the "wrong" 
concessions in a desperate effort to end the ongoing bloody confrontation. In this manner, 
people could trade short term benefits for catastrophic damage to the democratic system, in 
the long term. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research is to determine whether the model of conflict resolution 
developed in El Salvador between 1984 and 1992 can be effectively applied in Colombia to 
solve the ongoing armed struggle between the guerrillas and the democratically elected 
government, or we could say, between the insurgents and the nation. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Latin American countries of Colombia and El Salvador have developed similar 
counterinsurgency processes and similar processes of peace negotiations between the 
insurgent armies and the forces of order. One process, the Peace Accords, was concluded 
in 1992, when El Salvador ended the war through a political solution. The guerrillas agreed 
to demobilize its army and become a legal political party, while the government agreed to 
make changes in the nation's social and political structures. In contrast, Colombia, after 
forty years of guerrilla war, and failed peace talks is still trying to set conditions for gaining 
peace through negotiation. 
At the beginning of 1990, after seventeen years fighting against the government, one 
of the most belligerent guerrilla groups in Colombia, the April 19 Movement (lvfovimiento 
19 de Abril or M-19), turned over their weapons, in accord with president Barco's plan. In 
1991, president Gaviria signed the negotiation process with three more groups: the Popular 
Liberation Army (Ejercito Popular de Liberaci6n or EPL), the Workers' Revolutionary 
Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores or PRT), and the Armed Movement 
Quintin Lame (Movimiento Armada Quintin Lame or MAQL). These negotiations 
succeeded in demobilizing about 4,000 guerrillas, but were lackluster in light of the 
increasing violence posed by the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia or F ARC), and the National Liberation Army (Ejercito 
Nacional de Liberaci6n or ELN). This has impeded the arrival of a long awaited peace. 
As yet, there is still no peace in Colombia. 
In contrast, the Salvadoran guerrilla National Liberation Front Farabundo Marti 
(Frente Farabundo Marti para Ia Liberaci6n Nacional or FMLN) and president Alfredo 
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Christiani's government signed the peace accords in January 1992 that put an end to a 
twelve-year civil war which cost about 100,000 human lives. The FMLN was successfully 
reincorporated into the political life of the country, and gradually has become a major 
electoral force. In the March 1997 elections, the old guerrilla group, now a legal political 
party, won elections for Mayor in San Salvador and obtained an important number of seats 
in the legislative Assembly. 
In both countries, the negotiations were a learning process, but the conflict situations 
were different. Colombia's conflict is not what El Salvador's was: the former's violence is 
more confused, its society and politics have not been militarized, and its armed conflict is 
less intense. The international environment was different, and in El Salvador, external forces 
such as the United States of America and the United Nations Organization (UNO) had very 
important and decisive roles in the final outcome. The UNO also had the power to exercise 
more pressure. This international dimension has been absent in Colombia . As Malcom 
Deas says, "Colombians have continued killing each other so much and for a long time 
because nobody cares."1 
The Salvadoran guerrilla group, the FMLN, had greater representation than the 
Colombian Guerrilla Coordinator "Simon Bolivar" (Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon 
Bolivar or CGSB), with a well organized and genuine "political rearguard" and a realistic 
political project. The FMLN built an international network for getting political and material 
international support, in spite of the cruel and terrorist war they were waging. In Colombia, 
the CGSB would support international mediation only as part of their "show off," because 
they were aware that their criminal characteristics related to kidnapping, extortion, and 
narcotraffic would make them lose international support. While Colombia faces continued 
confrontation, El Salvador society strives to consolidate democracy, social equity and 
justice, and looks towards a better future. 
The goal of this thesis is not to prove any particular theory, but to consider the 
classical sources of social unrest. Most academic theorists and scholars have already 
explored the socio-economic, political, and ideological factors generating revolutionary 
processes. ·Hugh Byrne has analyzed the strategies of those involved in the struggle and the 
choices they made? In his opinion, their strategies are the ones setting the relevant 
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dynamics of the processes. We believe that understanding the nature of the contenders and 
their patterns of decisions and actions can give us very useful insights to explain the different 
outcomes for the peace processes in both countries. 
All possible socioeconomic, political, and ideological factors characterizing these 
two societies cannot by themselves explain the results witnessed in these two countries. 
Reality cannot be described from an absolute point of view; rather, it must be studied by 
looking at the attitudes and behavior exhibited by the opposing forces. Both the guerrillas 
and the armed forces considered the socioeconomic, political, and ideological factors in 
designing their strategies and to conceptualize the "peace" to be reached. 
We assume that by looking at the participants in the conflict, we are considering the 
effects of those factors or variables. According to our personal experience, peace is a 
relative term and an evolving concept. In the case ofEl Salvador in the early 1980s, peace 
for the guerrillas meant the end of the military-oligarchy rule and the victory of communism. 
For the government, which in 1979 started a profound transformation of the political system, 
including the creation of democratic institutions, peace meant total annihilation of the 
FMLN. The Salvadoran government realized that, in spite of its efforts to change some 
social and political structures to neutralize the eternal grievances of the guerrillas, the FMLN 
did not change its strategies or policies and continued loyal to its objective. The only 
possible solution was the military defeat of the guerrillas and the formation of a genuine 
democratic system. 
At the beginning ofthe 1990s we see a resultant pattern ofbehavior and actions, an 
"emergent strategy," to borrow the term from Mintzberg, from the clash of these two 
visions. 3 For all parties involved, peace meant the construction of a legitimate democracy 
and the end of social injustice. While all agreed in principle, after eight years of negotiation, 
they looked for terms to make their concessions acceptable to their combatants, intellectuals, 
and people in general. 
However, over the last 40 years in Colombia we have not seen a dramatic 
transformation of the political system. The insurgent movements have been attacking 
obvious denciencies in the policies of the government. The primary difference between the 




system in which the military had been under civilian control. Democracy in Colombia had 
been changing, adapting to new realities, especially after the Constitution of 1991. This 
presents a more favorable picture of the estate which has found it more difficult to accept the 
guerrilla movement as a pragmatic, clear, and decisive contradictor. However, the 
Colombian guerrilla movement, in its period of lowest political validity, had experienced the 
highest rates of quantitative growth and the greatest expansion of territorial presence of its 
history. Its proved involvement in narcotra:ffic has provided the necessary financial 
resources for this growth. 
Therefore, peace in Colombia is seen by the government and the majority of the 
population as the destruction of the guerrillas and the strengthening of the democratic 
institutions. For the guerrillas, this concept actually is unclear. They claim they work on 
behalf of the working class and the peasants, and that they seek social justice and a 
legitimate democracy. But they are not representatives of people, as they call themselves. 
The guerrillas use a worn out discourse about social justice, nationalism, democracy, and 
their willingness for peace, while they kill, kidnap, extort, and terrorize the nation. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The main objective of the present study is to explore whether the model used in El 
Salvador can help to make a negotiated solution to political violence in Colombia possible, 
and if not, what issues deserve special consideration for future negotiations. 
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary research question is: Can Colombia apply the same model of peace 
process used to solve El Salvador's internal conflict? The subsidiary questions are related 
to the objectives of the different chapters of this work and are as follows: What was the 
influence of the armed forces' tenets and traits on their attitude toward negotiations? What 
was the influence of the guerrillas' nature and characteristics on its attitude toward the 
negotiations? What was the influence of the conflict intensity on the attitudes of both 
societies toward the negotiation processes? Did the procedures set for the negotiation 
processes, Including international involvement, influence the outcomes and how? 
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D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Scope 
This thesis is applicable to students of social and political problems, to political 
scientists interested in the peace processes in these two countries, and to government 
officials related to political solutions for social problems. The uniqueness of this study is 
that it contains the points of view of members of the military officers' corps from both 
countries who, in different ways, have faced the problems of violence throughout their 
professional careers. 
2. Limitations 
The most significant limitation has been access to official classified documents, for 
obvious reasons. Nevertheless, we did access enough sources to illustrate our main 
arguments. We include figures that have been estimated from the available information 
related to guerrillas' casualties, terrorist acts, and financial resources and based on our own 
experiences. Much of the information was provided by captured guerrillas or deserters, or 
by material seized during military operations. Those data are very difficult to prove. 
3. Assumptions 
We assumed that the majority of literature available this subject has a biased 
perception of the national realities of the two countries, because the scars of the conflicts are 
still fresh on both sides. Some authors have used documents from Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs ), leftist activists or supporters, and opposition parties as their main 
sources of information. We assumed that official data tends to support the governments' 
position. We have tried to present an objective view of the situation with the only intent of 
broadening the analysis. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is based on the study and analysis of valid literature available in both 
countries; official documents and intelligence reports, not available to general public; and, 
most importantly, on the personal experience of the authors. 
Th~ analytical techniques used were based on the continuous interaction of both 
authors for the interpretation of some historical data included in this work. This facilitated 
5 
the comparison between the handling of political violence in the two countries and helped 
to establish the intents and tendencies ofthe contenders about the negotiation. 
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
We found several essential differences between the military, the guerrillas, the 
intensity of the conflicts and the processes of peace, that may explain the different outcomes 
of these processes. One important difference that so far has impeded the end of guerrilla war 
in Colombia is the insurgents' involvement in the drug business. This issue never was a 
concern in El Salvador, but is decisive in any future negotiation process for Columbia. The 
United States of America, and other countries and international organizations, do not 
officially recognize the cartel formed by the Colombian guerrillas. This has an enormous 
effect on international support to the 'colombian government for the annihilation of the 
insurgency. 
We also found many mistakes in the bibliography, not only in dates, figures or 
names, but in the accuracy of some descriptions. This is probably not something done on 
purpose, but rather the consequence ofhaving inaccurate sources of information. Because 
of their profession, the authors of this thesis have witnessed many of the events mentioned 
in this study, from a military and personal perspective. Therefore, throughout this study, 
readers will find personal considerations and value judgments, probably different from the 
general perception. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The following is a brief discussion of the organization of the chapters of this thesis 
and how each provides background to answer the research questions. Chapter II examines 
the Colombian and Salvadoran armed forces' origins and development, their role in national 
security, their relationship with civilian powers and rulers, and their role in the different 
dialogues and peace processes. This will allow us to analyze the causes that facilitated the 
negotiation process in El Salvador, and the failure of Colombian efforts to achieve a steady 
peace with the guerrilla groups, the F ARC and the ELN, which did not accept the 
government proposals. 
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Chapter III provides a general overview of the guerrilla movements in the two 
countries and highlights the differences explaining the divergence between the two outcomes 
of the peace processes. The key question for the chapter is: What was the influence of the 
guerrillas nature and characteristics on its attitude toward the negotiations? We found that 
unity, the nature ofthe political-strategic project, and sources of support, were factors that 
most influenced the guerrillas' attitude toward negotiation. The fall of communism was 
crucial for the Salvadoran guerrilla but it had no effect in Colombia. The former depended 
on the economic support of the USSR through Cuba and Nicaragua. The latter had been 
involved in the drug business in addition to the other sources described in the chapter. This 
issue was decisive in the El Salvador negotiations. 
Chapter IV answers the question: What was the influence of the intensity of the 
conflict on the attitude ofboth societies, Colombian and Salvadoran, toward the negotiation 
process? It compares the intensity of the internal conflicts in both countries in terms of 
violence, physical and moral damage, and the social and economical impact on their 
societies. Some statistical data is used to better explain the scope and the consequences of 
political violence. 
Chapter V describes the different negotiation processes in the two countries, and 
provides an insight to the factors that could have caused the different outcomes. There were 
several attempts to reach negotiated solutions in Colombia and El Salvador, but only in the 
latter did a total peace process made it possible to end its civil war in 1992. In Colombia, 
a partial negotiated solution in 1990 and 1991 permitted the rein corporation of about 4, 000 
guerrillas, but did not end the political violence. The process of pacification does not depend 
solely on the good will of the government. It is a national responsibility in which the armed 
forces, the guerrillas, the labor unions, and the traditional parties have to accept that any 
negotiation process implies mutual concessions. 
Chapter VI presents the conclusions of the research and answers the key question of 
this work. After the analysis of the guerrilla groups, the armed forces, international 
involvement, and the intensity ofthe conflict, we found are some important lessons to be 
7 
learned. Our pessimism towards the outcome in Colombia, and the optimism in El Salvador 
are explained in this chapter. 
We are including twelve appendixes to illustrate graphically or statistically the 
evidence discussed through the chapters. 
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II. THE MILITARY POWER 
After independence from Spain, the military in Latin America continued to be an 
important power group having a decisive role in the area's development. The struggle 
between the central government and its army, on the one hand, and the local caudillos, on 
the other, was a frequent issue during the nineteenth century. Because of this struggle 
between central and local government the Latin American militaries tended to be active in 
politics, believing they had a constitutional mission nobody could fulfill better than them. 
They later played the role of a moderating power rising above fractional struggles, preferring 
that civilians govern but taking over power from time to time when they proved unable to 
do so. In the moderating patt~r:n, P:CCording to Alifed Stepan, the military is repeatedly called 
' ~~ I - " -
into politics to be moderator of political activity, but is denied the right systematically to 
attempt to direct changes within the political system. 1 
In the nineteenth century national military academies were established with the goal 
of introducing professionalism into the military. Through professionalization, the military 
career was designed to be a highly specialized one that taught the skills for warfare but 
eschewed interest in political matters. Civilians were theoretically to have complete control 
of the military. Yet this model of professionalism, imported from Western Europe, never 
fully took roots; the military continued to play politics. Moreover, the economic crisis of the 
193 0 inaugurated the era of military governments throughout the world, especially in the 
undeveloped countries. The military believed that internal order was a priority for these 
countries to survive, before the Communist arisen threat. 
By the late 1950s and early 1960s the role of the military in Latin America changed. 
The success of guerrilla revolutions in China, Vietnam, Algeria, and Cuba led to a new 
emphasis on the military's role in counterinsurgency and internal defense. The military was 
expected to solve the national problems that might lead to insurgency, essentially a political, 
rather than a military task. Professionalism in Latin America led for a time to more military 
intervention in politics, not less. In some countries the "new professionalism" (or what 
others such as Joseph Comblin and Manuel Antonio Garret6n have called the "national 
security" state ideology 2) figured prominently in the military's self-justification of their 
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vastly expanded role in politics. The end result of this process was the so-called 
"bureaucratic authoritarianism." 
Military involvement in politics varies from country to country. Besides the degree 
of military influence there is important cross-national variation in the reasons for military 
involvement in politics, the result of military rule, and the military's internal structure. 
This chapter examines the Colombian and Salvadoran armed forces' origins and 
development, their role in national security, their relations with civilian powers and rulers, 
as well as their role in the peace processes, to facilitate later on the analysis of the causes that 
made possible the negotiation process in El Salvador and the failure of the Colombian efforts 
to arrive at a steady peace with the guerrilla groups that did not accept the government's 
proposals. 
A. ARMED FORCES' ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION 
In this section we will try to show the similarities in the origins of both armed forces 
and how, along with their evolution, they developed essential differences. First, they 
exhibited different degrees of political participation. On the one hand , during the nineteenth 
century and the first quarter of the twentieth century, Colombian military officers played 
partisan politics in a democratic system, while this was not the case in El Salvador. After 
1932 Colombian officers stayed away from partisan politics, remaining obedient to the 
civilian rule. In El Salvador from 1932 to 1979 the military replaced the civilians and 
maintained a military regime, necessary in their view, to guarantee the national security 
objectives. Second, this situation motivated different degrees of military responsibility over 
their respective national situations, which meanwhile produced different perceptions from 
the national and international public opinion. In El Salvador, within the military ranks, there 
was a sense of political threat coming from the national opposition and international 
community supportive of the insurgency. Third, the two armed forces present some structural 




The Colombian Liberation Army of the nineteenth century was one of the most 
experienced and powerful armed forces in Latin America. 3 By 1819 it consisted of about 
30,000 soldiers and more than 200,000 served during that period, that is, a little more than 
10 percent of the population. Because of this military capability, the Liberator Simon Bolivar 
could obtain the two main objectives of the liberation war: Colombia's independence from 
Spain, and the birth of this and other Latin American countries as new states under 
democratic structures, whose security concept was established as a function to protect the 
paramount interests of the nation. 
During the nineteenth century the military had a very clear and fundamental mission 
that remained unchanged since the .promulgation of the. General Francisco de Paula 
Santander's Military Code: to defend national independence, to maintain public order, and 
to support the national law and the Constitution. Active duty members ofthe army, as well 
as retired or non regular armies' generals (regional militias) were candidates and via 
elections arrived to the presidency, not as military but as candidates for different political 
movements. Thus, Colombian electoral history began with the participation of military 
leaders as presidential candidates, because the formation of the republic, as a consequence 
of the independence war, created opportunities for the military officers to enter into the 
political contest. This practice of launching generals to presidential campaigns was 
commonplace through the nineteenth century, and until the first quarter of the twentieth. 
Patricia Pinzon de Lewin, in her historical essay about the Colombian army and the 
elections, quotes Lee Simpson: 
"In Colombia, differently from other Latin American countries, politics has been 
reserved to civilians. Though eight generals served as presidents between 1830 and 
1898, only four out of sixteen presidents between 1898 and 1946 were military men 
and it summed only ten years. In most of Colombian history, since independence 
and certainly since 1900, the elite of power has been civilian." 4 
In the internal political framework the army was considered by the two parties, 
Liberals and Conservatives, as a necessary evil. Its partisan inclinations made the army an 
unstable force, whose ranks changed according to the incumbent government, and 
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promotions were made on the basis of personal courage, in the low and middle levels, but 
on friendship, and partisan or governmental services in the higher ranks. Military instruction 
was mediocre because theoretical military arts and sciences from Europe did not arrive with 
the same celerity as the political ideologies. 5 
The evolution of the modern Colombian military has involved three different phases 
since the administration of president Rafael Reyes ( 1904-1909 ) . The first phase started with 
the installation of Reyes' government, whose central aim was to involve the military as a 
major player in rebuilding the infrastructure of the country that had been in large measure 
destroyed during the civil war known as the War of a Thousand Days (1899-1902). The 
government's purpose was two-fold. First, it was hoped that the people's view of the military 
as a non-partisan and benevolent institution would be enhanced. Secondly, the military that 
Reyes conceived was the only institution that was capable of taking on the task of rebuilding 
roads, bridges, and in general, lines of communication. It was during this phase that the 
Military Cadet School (Escuela Militar de Cadetes) at Bogota and the Naval Cadet School 
(Escuela Naval de Cadetes) at Cartagena, were established as the army and navy academies, 
respectively. This effort was aided by the arrival of Prussian-trained Chilean military 
advisers, who also helped to found, in 1909, the armed forces staff school, the Superior War 
College (Escuela Superior de Guerra). In attempting to generate professional standards, the 
military reform also provided for the regularization of promotions and military pay scales 
based, in part, on the officers' completion of professional training programs. 
The focus on Prussian or more generally European, military philosophy was intended 
to develop a professional military that would avoid political involvement at all costs. In 
keeping with this line of thinking, the government began to develop a national system of 
compulsory, military service, and to open military educational institutions to students across 
the social and economic classes of the country. In January, 1919 the military aviation was 
created as a branch ofthe army. By the mid-1920s, the current compulsory service had been 
adopted and an increasing number of students enrolled at the Military Cadet School came 
from the middle class. 
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The second phase was inaugurated in 1930 by an external factor, the territorial 
conflict with Peru,6 over an area along the Amazon River. This phase involved the expansion 
of the military and a review of its operational practices. This dispute was significant for the 
development of the modem military for two reasons: first, the ranks of the military swelled 
with Colombians united in a national cause. In giving the nation a cause to unite around for 
achievement of national rather than partisan goals, the conflict was in large measure the 
cause for developing a professionally non-political military. The second consequence of the 
conflict was to force the military leadership to realize that the European mode of making war 
was absolutely inappropriate to the jungles of South America, and that the military had 
external security responsibilities for which they were ill-prepared. 
Between 1930 and 1945 the military policy of the Liberal governments moved 
around different civil-military relations models: from the classical liberal model, formally 
materialized in measures such as the prohibition for active duty military to vote, 7 and the 
ideal of the military integration to society, through the "should-be" army as a cohesive 
force for a very highly divided and atomized society, to the government's insistence in the 
army's non deliberating trait. 8 In the late 193 Os and early 1940s, during president Alfonso 
Lopez Pumarejo administration, the military budget was reduced considerably. The main 
reason for this reduction was the no secret presidential disdain for military officers, whom 
he considered to be instrume~ts of the Conservative party, A subsequent Liberal president, 
Eduardo Santos, was more interested in building upon the civil-military relationship. He 
brought a military mission from the United States, offering training and technology in return 
for a joint strategy of defense for the Panama Canal. 
The third period of the military's development revolved around the issues of counter-
insurgency and internal security, and evolved along with the . period of political. conflict 
known as La Violencia. As conflict between Conservatives and Liberals intensified through 
the latter half of the 1940s, it became increasingly apparent that the National Police was 
incapable of maintaining order. The military became more and more involved in trying to 
maintain peace throughout the country. When Laureano Gomez was elected in 1949, he saw 
the military as another instrument to use against the Liberals who boycotted his election. 
Gomez increased the military budget by 81% within the first two years in office, and 
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advanced the view that the military's loyalty to the state rested on its allegiance to the 
Conservative party. The defense allocations represented approximately 17 percent of central 
government expenditures. 
The military leadership was concerned about the politization of the institution, but 
another world event, the Korean War, provided Gomez with the opportunity to give the 
military leadership something else to think about. In fact, the military policy revolved around 
the provision, training, and support of the 3,000 Colombian troops that were committed to 
the UN cause. Meanwhile, however, the military was taking on an increasing role in the 
country's internal peacekeeping activities. This period of development of the Colombian 
military as the institution responsible for public order climaxed in 1953, when army General 
(active duty) Gustavo,. Rojas, Pinilla carried out a bloodless coup under the banner of 
"government ofthe armed forces." 
That was an opinion coup (Golpe de opinion was the name given by former 
president Dario Echandia) in the sense that the politicians, headed by the minister of 
Government Lucio Pabon Nufiez, and taking advantage of the illness of the incumbent 
president Laureano Gomez, turned over power to General Rojas Pinilla, by then 
Commanding General of the Armed Forces. When he was called to presidential Palace on 
June 12th, 1953, he was unaware of the politicians' intentions. He was told by minister 
Pabon that because of the internal political situation, and the inability of the president, the 
ministerial cabinet had decided he had to take over power to end the partisan violence. Rojas 
accepted the offer and next day took office. 
The military benefitted more substantially under Rojas Pinilla than under preceding 
administrations.9 When Rojas announced in early 1957 his intentions to stay in power for 
another four years, the economic interest groups and the Catholic Church already had 
prepared the general strike that would force his resignation. On May lOth, 1957, General 
Rojas selected a five-man military junta and resigned. Some Colombian and foreign political 
analysts and historians, however, affirm that the military removed Rojas from office in a 
bloodless coup, but others consider that he could maintain power and use the military forces 
against the -people because he had the greatest military support a president or a Commanding 
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General ever had in modem Colombian history. However, he would not do it and left the 
country. 
According to plans announced by the military junta, a transitional government turned 
over power to an elected civilian president in August 1958. Since then, the military have 
been outside politics though the senior army general officer used to be the Minister of 
Defense. Moreover, broad military support for the civilian leadership survived the dismissals 
of several popular general officers who had made public statements that challenged the 
traditional limits ofthe armed forces' acceptable political involvement. In September 1991 
president Cesar Gaviria broke the tradition and he appointed a civilian to that office. 
Nowadays, there are no military in the ministerial cabinet and the civil-military relations are 
improving because government officials and ordinary people understand that national 
security is not an exclusive armed forces' issue. 
In the 1990s, the military education system continues to play a critical role in the 
formation of a professional officer corps. All officers are graduates of one of the three 
service academies. The exemption is the administrative officers who are graduates in 
different disciplines like medicine, laws, economics. They are commissioned as first 
lieutenants after finishing a three-month military orientation course, once they have been 
accepted as officers candidates. The courses for promotions are established by law and are 
provided at a number of schools in each service. 10 A selected number of officers and NCOs 
(Suboficiales) also receive advanced training in special programs for foreign military 
personnel, offered by different countries, but specially by the United States' military schools. 
Then it is understandable that the current operational military doctrine in the Colombian 
armed forces is highly influenced by American doctrine, specifically in the realm of 
conventional war. In counterinsurgency, Colombia has developed its own operational 
doctrine. 
The Colombian armed forces comprise three armed services: the National Army 
(Ejercito Nacional or EJC), the National Navy (Armada Nacional or ARC), and the 
Colombian Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Colombiana or F AC). These military forces are made 
up of sonie 119,000 (including 70,000 conscripts) troops in the army, 20,000 (including 
6,000 marine conscripts) in the navy, and 12,000 (3,500 conscripts included) in the air force. 
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They represent, respectively, some 75, 12, and 8 percent of Colombian's total military 
personnel, and 4.2 percent of country's population, one of the lowest in the continent. 
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Figure 2.1 Command Structure of the Colombian Armed Forces (1996) 
Notice that the security forces (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad or DAS), are 
not part of the military forces. 
The war effort is not exclusive of the military, but it is shared, in close coordination, 
with the security forces. The army bears a greater burden than the other services in this war, 
due to its major membe;ship and its positioning nationwide. 
2. El Salvador 
Since 1824 we can identify three different eras iii the evolution of the Salvadoran 
Armed Forces. The first would be the era of the complete control of the economic elite over 
the armed forces (1824-1930); the second, the era of the military in power (1931-1979); and 
the third, the era of the military under democratic' rule (1984-199). We consider the period 
between 1979-1983 a transition period between the military regime and the beginning of the 
democratic process. In this period a provisional civil-military junta governed the country. 
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TheEl Salvador army was founded in 1824 by General Manuel Jose Arce as the 
army ofthe regional federation called the United Provinces of Central America. Arce did this 
by consolidating widely scattered cavalry units, which had fought against the incursion by 
the army of the self proclaimed Mexican emperor Agustin Iturbide, placing these forces 
under a unified command. Since their foundation, the armed forces have developed 
gradually, aided in the late nineteenth century by the French military and in the first half of 
the twentieth century by German and Chilean military influence. The first French military 
mission helped to organize and train the force in 1825. After the federation collapsed and El 
Salvador became an independent country, it inherited most of Arce's troops and by 1850 
the Salvadoran army had developed into a relatively well disciplined force of infantry, 
cavalry, and artillery. 
In 1858, President Gerardo Barrios brought in another French mission. This time the 
militia was reorganized using a European-style model. Barrios also asked Colombia to help 
in this effort to improve the overall discipline of the army and the militia. In 1876 under the 
presidency ofFrancisco Duefias, the French military mission, helped to organize the officer 
training school, which today still exists with the name of Capitan General Gerardo Barrios 
Military Academy (Escuela Militar Gerardo Barrios). In 1890 president Carlos Erzeta 
founded the military hospital, opened the Noncommissioned Officer School and employed 
a German military mission to reorganize and train artillery units. 
In the 1880s the economic elite, commonly referred to as the coffee oligarchy, was 
the ruling class. The post colonial reality reflected a very strong class differentiation: the 
oligarchy and the peasants. The military was indoctrinated to protect the status quo of the 
economic elite, since the real power after independence was at their hands. This elite was 
a legitimate successor of the Spanish .crown. It was then just normal that the armed forces 
at this time supported the oligarchy, which in return protected the military, helping its 
expansion and professionalization, as a way to insure the status quo. Even though the 
military were organized and trained for conventional warfare, up to the 1950s the primary 
function was internal security, that is, the protection of crops and control the rural 
population, according to the interests of the oligarchy. However, in 1906 El Salvador was 
involved in a briefwar against its neighbor, Guatemala. 
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Between 1911 and 1913 President Manuel Enrique Araujo introduced substantial 
reforms which were decisive to shape the national security doctrine. Araujo divided the army 
and police functions. He helped to improve the efficiency of the army by creating a general 
staff, an incipient education system, and a relative efficient reserve system; in 1922 the 
military aviation service was created. 
The great depression of the 1930s caused a critical fall in the coffee prices (the main 
resource of national income up to date) with disastrous impact for the Salvadoran economy, 
sparking off major peasant revolts in 1930-1931. Araujo was overthrown by a group of 
military officers concerned about the increasingly organized activism. In December 1931, 
they turned power over to active duty General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez, former 
vice- president and minister of defense under Araujo. Martinez in tum, led the security 
forces supported by the army, to conduct the biggest mass repression against the communist-
led peasant revolt, known as La Matanza (the Massacre), where according to Thomas 
Anderson between two thousand and ten thousand peasants were killed by the government's 
forces. 12 
Between 1931 and 1970 El Salvador went through a period of violent political 
instability. Salvadoran history records nine military coup attempts, of which seven were 
successful. Eight of the nine presidents in this period were military officers. The one civilian 
president held office for only four months before being replaced by another military officer. 
Apparently, the military had complete control over the government. However, it was 
obvious that both, the oligarchy and the military, were serving each other interests. This 
informal alliance seemed to contribute to maintain the general status quo and also provided 
about forty years of relative political stability and moderate social reforms. 
In 1969 El Salvador was involved in a short war .against Honduras, known in El 
Salvador as La Guerra de las Cien Horas (One hundred-hour war), from which the 
Salvadoran armed forces emerged victorious, although branded as an aggressor by the 
Organization of American States, and with a major problem in the resettlement of thousands 
of Salvadoran emigrants expelled from the neighboring country. This outcome worsened the 
socio-economic situation of the country. The government's inability to manage this crisis 
caused the opposition to raise again. The tensions were heightened by a decline in the coffee 
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prices. 13 This fueled a massive repression and the beginning of a strong communist-led 
subversion movement. The guerrilla activity increased from the mid-70s on and at the end 
of 1978 the insurgency developed into full-scale guerrilla warfare. 
On October 15, 1979, field junior officers (colonels, majors and lieutenants) ousted 
the regime of general Carlos Humberto Romero and established a civil-military junta as a 
transitional government. The Coup Manifesto justified this action as an attempt to defend 
the people's right to take arms against the anarchy, violence and corruption prevailing in the 
country. Restoration of democracy, respect for human rights and solution to social problems 
were promised.14 This coup was the first step in the transition process. The military tried to 
establish an alliance with the democratic opponents in order to broaden their socioeconomic 
basis. These opponents represented mostly the growing middle class and were in the process 
of organizing several peasant groups. However, the effort was not successful because ofthe 
different approaches, civilian and military, to solve the situation. 15 
In 1980 the original junta was dissolved and the government was reorganized 
according to a pact between the armed forces and the Christian Democratic party. The 
increasing number of cases of human right violations could not be controlled by this 
provisional government, eroding their credibility and stability. The junta was restructured 
several times during the internal conflict. However, socio-economical reforms were 
implemented, such as the law of agrarian reform (March, 1980) and the nationalization of 
the banking system (March, 1983). The internal war continued and prevented the solution 
of the human rights issue. 
In 1984 general elections were held and President Jose Napoleon Duarte was elected. 
This was the beginning of the democratic process in El Salvador. From then on, the military 
adhered to its new constitutional obligation to stay away from political deliberation and 
remain obedient to civilian rule. These dramatic changes were promoted by three main 
factors. First, the military understood that its submission to military authority was essential 
to obtain US support to conduct the counter insurgency strategy. Second, a more civilian-led 
political stance was necessary to end the military international isolation. Third, civilian and 
military leadership understood that the best way to neutralize the political appeal of the 
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insurgency was by setting up representative civilian institutions and the infrastructure of a 
democratic society. 16 
Besides the legal frame that Salvadoran operated within, some peculiar 
characteristics due rather to the cultural factor developed. Richard Millet describes, as he 
sees it, one of the most important cultural features in the officer corps, the tanda system. 
"Each year well over a hundred cadets are admitted to this institution, but just 10 
percent graduate four years later. Brutal discipline, at times verging in sadism weeds 
out those lacking strength, determination and ambition. Each class (graduating from 
the military academy), known as tanda, strives to protect and advance its member's 
fortunes. Success for one member means success for all and failure for any, weakens 
the entire group. Hence they protect the less competent, more blatantly dishonest 
among them, viewing those outside the tanda system as unfit to judge the officer 
corps. Under this system, loyalty becomes incestuous, any group advancements 
rather than defense of national interests, become the ultimate goal. Officers in the 
security forces are bound to officers in the army through these tanda bonds, a tie 
which makes virtually impossible to discipline an officer for crimes against 
civilians"17 
Millet also believes that for this reason the US probably had less influence over El 
Salvador Military Forces than any other Central American nation. In our view, Millet's 
analysis describes a real phenomenon, but he ignores some deeper implications and offers 
just a superficial interpretation. He claims complete negative consequences from this 
particularity. However, the performance of the officer corps in combat in the latest war 
against Honduras and its success impeding the taking over of the country by the FMLN 
presented some evidence that this characteristic contributed to defend national interests and 
lately the democratic process. 
It is true that the formation of a Salvadoran officer implies tremendous hardship in 
comparison with some developed countries. The reason is somehow obvious. The armed 
forces of developed countries rely mainly on technology and massive logistical support. El 
Salvador has to rely mainly on manpower and human endurance to counter three bigger 
potential enemies (Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) plus the internal threat. The system 
is designed to make sure that only the most physically and mentally qualified will graduate. 
The class~s were very small and the quality of leadership is very high. As a consequence 
the ties among the classes are very strong and their mutual support used to be almost 
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unconditional. These cohesiveness bothers the enemies of the system and many foreign 
intellectual. However this unity, sometimes responsible for the tolerance of isolated cases 
of abuse and human right violations, was also a guarantee for the institution to survive 
through the obscure and dirty war that the FMLN was conducting. 
"Crimes against civilians" was a very common phrase among the leftist sympathizers, 
of course this would only apply to the military, not to the FMLN. The tempo of the 
operations and the ability of the FMLN to hide among civilians caused considerable 
collateral damage. Evidently many real crimes were committed by the military, which 
became clear after the peace process. However, as we see it, it would have been insane 
during the intense conflict to stop the operations to try every officer that, according to 
speculations of some detractors, committed crimes. The army then, would have been 
paralyzed and the country would have been taken over by the FMLN. Claiming that the 
officers were more interested in group advancements than in national security is hard to 
sustain. In El Salvador, no American troops fought against the FMLN. All the leadership and 
blood came from Salvadoran officers and soldiers. 
The point we are trying to make is that (despite of all the mistakes committed or 
success achieved) this particularities: the tanda system, hard discipline and tight 
cohesiveness were in certain degree responsible for the attitude of the military during the war 
and the way the acted during and after the process of negotiation. 
The structure of the armed forces included, during the conflict, the totality of the 
security forces, which gave even more cohesiveness to the force. On the other hand, the war 
effort was not shared and the armed forces faced all the responsibility for the armed conflict. 
Both the military organic law and article 157 ofthe Constitution named (and still does) the 
president as the commander in chief of the armed forces, consisting of the army, air force, 
navy, the security forces and the active reserve. 
Article 168 of the Constitution empowers the president to organize and maintain the 
armed forces and confer military ranks in accordance with the law. The minister of defense 
and public security, who used to be the same person (in 1992 these responsibilities were 
divided into two different ministries), is in the chain of command and performs the 
president's command functions on a day-to-day basis. A deputy minister of defense and 
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public security was in charge only of fulfilling an administrative role. The Joint Chief of 
Staff is the senior serving officer and also the army commander, and has operational control 
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Figure 2.2 Command Structure of the Salvadoran Armed Forces 
The vice-minister of defense and public security had also the responsibility for 
overseeing the public security forces' joint staff of the three former security forces: the 
National Guard, the National Police, and the Treasury Police. The Salvadoran armed forces, 
which numbered approximately 10,000 in 1979, expanded six-fold during the conflict (See 
Figure 2.3). At the end of the conflict in 1992, the regular armed forces totaled about 47,000 
active members and the security forces some 12,600 personnel. 18 The Army has always 
been by far the dominant service. In 1991, the army had a total strength of 43,000 members, 
while the Air force had over 2,000 and the navy around 1,300. This numbers represented 
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Figure 2.3 Development of the Salvadoran Armed Forces 1979-1992 
B. STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this section is to present another set of differences related to the 
strategy, support and legal issues. During the conflict, El Salvador armed force was turned 
into a counter insurgency fighting force. The whole structure and doctrine for conventional 
warfare almost vanished. The government took the war effort as the number one priority 
which was reflected in the national budget. The Recruiting system had many legal 
inefficiencies; as a result the military had to find ways to get around the legal vacuum to 
sustain the war effort, even when they hurt their own image. 
The Colombian Army still remains a conventional force, but they carry out the main 
effort against the insurgency by using a new organization of light an mobile counter -guerrilla 
units. The Army mainly operates in the rural isolated areas where a police effort can not be 
sustained. The budget in the last twenty years does not reflect a decisive support for the 
army's war effort. In Colombia, the recruiting system has been better organized. The armed 
forces has no need to twist the law, like they did in El Salvador. 
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1. Colombia 
Since 1948 the armed forces, specially the army, have been immersed in tasks to 
control the public order. The demands for the internal security situation occupy the virtual 
majority (but not all) of army activity and considerable part of the resources of the other 
military services as well. 
The readiness for a possible confrontation with Venezuela or Nicaragua, because of 
territorial disputes, is not the first priority, since politicians and diplomats have decided to 
manage the problem; however it is still very important. The counter-guerrilla war, instead, 
has become the main objective of the armed forces, and even more when narcotrafficking 
is the main source of the insurgents' financial support. Army intelligence has analyzed the 
strategic plans of the guerrilla groups and has recommended the necessity of government to 
have presence in each square meter of the national territory. This is an official answer to the 
guerrilla's pretensions of having control of some regions, in order to be acknowledged in the 
international arena as a belligerent force. 
Facing the guerrilla threat, the state has to make its presence felt everywhere in the 
country, using justice as the regulating force of the social relations and public force as a 
servant of the law. Therefore, the armed forces are changing their defensive strategy to 
retrieve the initiative and freedom of action, to anticipate the guerrilla intentions, and to 
abandon the traditional operational mode of reacting after guerrilla actions. 19 As a 
consequence, the current military training is oriented toward counter-insurgency, especially 
for land and air forces. Because the navy has responsibilities on the two oceans and 
particularly in the maritime territorial limits, especially the Nicaragua's pretensions over 
San Andres and Providencia Islands, geopolitics has an increasing interest in the curricula 
of the naval academy and in the Superior War College. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the increased threat to national security posed 
by renewed guerrilla activities and the growing power of Colombian drug dealers provided 
the rationale for considerable increases in military expenditures. Table 2.1 shows the 
financial resources allocated from 1970 to 1996 to the Ministry ofDefense. 
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Year National Total %ofGDP Personnel Expenditures Transfer Investment 
Budget Defense Budget 
1970 17.87 2.91 2.2591 1667.10 0.61 0.40 0.28 
1971 21.84 5.01 3.3179 2075.30 0.61 0.52 1.87 
1972 23.83 3.63 1.9744 2248.00 0.53 0.55 0.38 
1973 29.39 3.98 1.6909 2362.00 0.77 0.67 0.26 
1974 37.54 4.87 1.5604 2941.00 0.77 0.91 0.35 
1975 51.64 6.85 1.7444 3781.70 1.08 1.48 0.63 
1976 55.27 7.83 1.5178 3975.20 1.23 1.56 1.18 
1977 74.32 10.11 1.4574 5299.10 1.63 2.44 0.90 
1978 102.12 13.78 1.1961 6861.20 3.71 2.29 1.13 
1979 151.51 19.85 1.2975 9589.00 4.74 4.03 1.79 
1980 199.18 27.74 1.8131 12253.50 5.70 7.01 3.15 
1981 269.97 33.71 : 1.7546 16517.30 6.45 9.06 2.20 
1982 333.70 41.64 1.7207 22107.60 6.80 11.02 2.39 
1983 406.26 65.74 2.2213 31201.80 12.69 16.44 6.38 
1984 536.51 86.93 2.3262 40175.30 8.98 20.46 18.56 
1985 675.19 99.23 2.0621 48904.30 12.64 23.80 15.40 
1986 946.26 128.09 1.9474 65300.00 11.57 29.38 23.86 
1987 1208.26 169.75 1.9954 85674.00 18.62 38.39 29.72 
1988 1635.89 243.56 2.1426 114408.70 28.03 49.36 55.31 
1989 2218.88 315.56 2.1529 148498.30 30.05 57.85 83.77 
1990 3036.52 355.76 1.8150 195199.80 40.56 28.92 97.13 
1991 4234.10 453.42 1.7924 252601.70 81.30 59.37 67.98 
1992 4959.61 679.98 2.0938 363497.20 127.92 81.73 118.10 
1993 6487.50 1070.05 2.5325 514492.00 248.94 116.99 205.59 
1994 9797.26 1256.01 2.2997 744540.00 244.41 182.46 107.69 
1995 12201.23 1719.96 2.5040 953583.00 298.25 339.11 158.58 
1996 16915.10 2347.20 2.7842 1159607.50 332.56 581.18 309.81 
* This budget was prepared by the Planning Office of the Colombian Ministry of Defense. Figures are in millions 
of pesos and converted to millions of US dollars at the current rate of I ,032 pesos/ dollar. 
Table 2. 1 Defense Budget 
Though the column of total defense budget increases with the years, the percentages 
to GDP do_ not. Moreover, in comparison, during the mid-1950s the Colombian armed forces 
received about 20 percent of the government's budget and in 1996 only 13.88 percent. 
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Colombia has been receiving U.S. aid for its war effort against narcotrafficking, represented 
in equipment for intelligence and operations. Colombia has also been receiving aid through 
the international Funds for Education and training (IMET) and foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
programs. These were canceled last year (1996) due to the decertification of Colombia by 
the U.S. govemment.20 
During the past ten years, the government has been gradually increasing the number 
of professional soldiers. These are chosen from the best regular soldiers, who after finishing 
their compulsory eighteen-month period voluntarily decide to continue in the service. The 
goal in the army for the year 2000 is to attain 3 5 percent of professional soldiers to increase 
combat efficiency. As a matter of fact, the regular soldiers are in the service for a short time, 
a minimum monthly allowance, and their only incentive is the reservist card (libreta militar) 
at the end of the service to open doors in the labor market. In Colombia the reservist card is 
a requirement for many commercial and personal activities. For instance, nobody can buy 
real state properties without that card, and no one can get a passport to leave the country 
without having the legal document. The employers are exposed to high fines if they hire 
males lacking the reservist card. In June 1997 a third counter-guerrilla mobile brigade will 
be activated to operate in the south of the country in areas where the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or F ARC) have large 
coca plantations. 
The intelligence organizations have been strengthened, the mobilization capability 
will be improved, particularly with helicopters for the army, 21 and patrol boats in maritime 
and river areas for the navy. The communications and the electronic systems are also in 
process of modernization. Unfortunely, the bad side of all this program is that it is only to 
balance the operational and financial capabilities of the guerrillas, not to surpass them this 
is very important in counter guerrilla warfare because, with strong military forces, able to 
hit the guerrillas hard, it will be possible to convince their members that the negotiation is 
a better guarantee to their future than the continuation of their business. 
2. El Salvador 
The constitutional and strategic mission of the El Salvador armed forces evolved 
during the conflict, as the military was turning political power to civilian political 
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institutions. Since the end ofthe conflict in 1992 the institution has undertaken an essential 
process of modernization according to the reformed Constitution of 1992. For the purposes 
of this chapter we concentrate in the process of evolution during the conflict, that is between 
the late 1970s and 1990. 
Under the 1983 Constitution the armed force mission was in general to defend the 
national territory and sovereignty, and to defend democracy. However since all the security 
forces were under the direct command of the armed forces, the latter also had the mission 
of maintaining public peace and security. Art. 212 describes the armed Force as a 
fundamental institution for national security, of a permanent character, essentially apolitical, 
obedient to established civilian authority, and non deliberative. It also charged the military 
with enforcing the no-reelection provision for the country's president, guaranteeing freedom 
of suffrage, ensuring respect for human rights, and collaborating with the agencies of the 
executive branch in promoting national development. 
This new constitution sought to change dramatically the role of the military. Under 
old constitutions, active duty military officers could serve as presidents of the republic. The 
1983 Constitution was commonly known among Salvadoran authorities as "The Constitution 
for war", because it reflected the weakness of most civilian political institutions to cope with 
the crisis, thus transferring most of the political responsibilities to the only institution which 
supposedly remained strong before the terrorist attack. 
During the conflict, the El Salvador's armed forces was organized and trained using 
American doctrine. However in 1983, some personnel received training in other Latin 
American countries, particularly Argentina, Venezuela Chile and Colombia; at the School 
of the Americas, in Fort Benning, Georgia; at the Amphibious Warfare School in Virginia, 
and in Taiwan. Also, in 1983 officers and cadets began receiving scholarships from Great 
Britain, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the Federal Republic of Germany. During the conflict the 
armed force was committed to keep the guerrilla forces from taking power by force and to 
preserve the incipient democratic system. 
The Salvadoran Army, according to the JANES 1994's Catalog, is the most efficient 
in Central America. This army has gotten considerable experience in the counter-insurgency 
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operations during the conflict. The counter-insurgency doctrine was conditioned largely by 
U.S. operational and tactical doctrine, modified to fit local conditions and experience. Most 
of the equipment used was provided by the United States, but the necessary direction to 
counter and neutralize the innovative strategy of the FMLN was provided by the experience 
of the Salvadoran leadership. While U.S. military advisors intended to implement their 
known Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) strategy, which was soundly defeated in Vietnam, the 
Salvadoran armed force developed a dynamic operational and tactical doctrine which offered 
important lessons to the U.S. military. After 1980 the armed forces were transformed from 
a conventional force into a counterinsurgency force. Neutralizing the FMLN became a 
national priority. The defense budget reflects the emphasis that the government conceded 
to the military war effort. 
Defense budget military expenditures in the period 1945-1970 ranged from 9 to 11 
percent of the national budget. During the 1980s due to the demand of the counter-
insurgency operations, spending increased rapidly. The defense budget which included the 
public security forces increased substantially from fiscal year 1982 when it totaled U.S.$139 
million, to fiscal year 1988 when it reached U.S.$ 204 millions. In 1986 army expenditures 
accounted for 71 percent of the total defense budget; air force 23 percent; and the navy 4 
percent. The 1986 defense budget constituted 4.7 percent of the national product. By the late 
1980s defense expenditures accounted for over 25 percent of the national budget. This 
numbers reflect the government determination to support the war effort to neutralize the 
communist attack, as shown in Figure 2.4. 
Besides the internal defense expenditures, the U.S. provided large amounts of 
<'• 
equipment and training assistance as shown in Figure 2.5. This created a dependence that 
was used by the government to pressure for reforms and to manipulate the conduct of 
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Figure 2.5 U.S. Military and Economic Aid to El Salvador ($millions) 
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Under article 215 of the 1983 Constitution, military service for a minimum of two 
years was obligatory for all able-bodied male citizens between ages of eighteen and thirty, 
although in practice youth from wealthy background avoided military service. After 1979, 
the armed force had to rely mainly on the forcible recruiting. The forcible recruitment which 
has been many times referred as cruel and abusive by the opposition was the result of lack 
of proper procedural legislation. Recruits were randomly taken by force and by surprise 
while they were in public places or onboard of public transportation vehicles. In the 1980s 
approximately 12,000 young men were forcibly enlisting each year. Most of the affected 
families were from the poor and rural strata. Nevertheless, because of the high rate of 
unemployment due to the critical economic situation, the service was an attractive option for 
many young people. 
Due to a relatively high demand, the army limited re-enlistment to 20 percent. 
A draftee was paid only $80 a month compared to $300 for a soldier who had completed a 
two-year tour. The point is that the armed forces had to act in some instances, not against the 
law but without proper laws, to maintain the war effort. That ambiguity was a vulnerability 
which left the armed forces in many instances without legal protection. However, most of 
the time, Salvadoran people conceded some degree of legitimacy to these actions. For 
example, as stated before, the opposition condemned the forcibly enlisting in an attempt to 
make more difficult for the government to sustain the military effort. Paradoxically, the 
"victims" wanted to stay in the service once they were in. The fact that most of the soldiers 
came from rural families gave the army a considerable strength, when it was combined with 
proper leadership. The peasants were use to the hardship that counter guerrilla warfare 
demanded and they knew very well the areas of operations. 
C. THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE PEACE PROCESSES 
1. Colombia 
During the administration of president Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (1974-1978), the 
government tried, for the first time, to open negotiations with the armed groups in search 
of a solution to the political violence. This effort was frustrated by various factors, but some 
political analysts and leftist writers have blamed the army of blocking any kind of dialogue 
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with the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberaci6n Nacional or ELN), which was 
considered to be on the brink of total annihilation. Moreover, they say that the civil-military 
crisis of 1975, in which General Alvaro Valencia Tovar, then commander ofthe army, was 
relieved of his command, was a consequence of this fact. 22 The real causes of this episode 
are not related to government policies but to internal jealousies between the Minister of 
Defense and General Valencia. Anyway, after this dialogue failed, the country waited until 
1982 to begin this negotiation process in earnest. 
President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) found the country on the edge of a 
generalized confrontation. To defuse the "time bomb", the government tried to implement 
a policy of democratic reform and a peace pact with the guerrilla. The Minister of Defense, 
General Fernando Landazabal, was retired in March 1984 for criticizing the Betancur 
administration's efforts to achieve truces with the country's guerrilla groups and for 
criticizing Colombia's foreign policy toward the revolutionary government of Nicaragua. 
Actually, the Minister advised the president that the guerrillas would have to surrender their 
weapons if they wanted to negotiate. But a president that before the inaugural ceremony had 
showed disdain for the military high command was not going to accept military advise. He 
demonstrated that the military were under the civilian rule. 
For this reason, many authors and political analysts like Timothy Wickham-Crowley 
blame again the military ofblocking the government's efforts: 
"Military violations of the truces were justified because the army high command 
resisted the implication that truce-signing guerrillas should be allowed to maintain 
armed groups independent of the control of the national military, and rumors of 
a coup attempt were specially heavy in late 1984."23 
For the common reader, comments like the following of Alain Rouquie, induced at 
the end of his book about Latin American military, are misleading and deserve a special 
consideration: 
"In November 1985 it was the army that made the decision of attack the Palace of 
Justice in Bogota, which had been occupied by the M-19 guerrillas. The refusal to 
negotiate led to ninety-five deaths, including eleven justices of the Supreme Court, 
anc! to a considerable weakening of the Colombian president's support" 24 (italics 
added). 
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Many Colombian and foreign political analysts, when writing about the obstacles to 
attain peace in violent Colombia, blame the armed forces of being the "Chinese wall" in the 
national reconciliation process. They adopt Rouquie' s position of transmitting to readers 
what they were told, not what they lived or knew at first hand. Rouquie' s sources forgot 
that the order to attack the Palace of Justice in 1985 was given by president Betancur, the 
same person that retired General Landazabal in 1984. Broad military support for the civilian 
leadership survived the dismissals of several popular general officers who had made public 
statements that challenged the traditional limits of the armed forces' acceptable political 
involvement, specifically in reference to public order management. Therefore, the military 
leadership has been submitted to presidential decisions and have complied with the assigned 
role in the government's projects. 
In a vicious circle, either the guerrilla leaders take for granted what politicians and 
analysts say about the armed forces or the latter believe what the former say. However, the 
truth is that presidents have retired the generals that did not want to follow the presidential 
policies, and this is the main argument against those that say that militarism is increasing 
in "one ofthe oldest democracies ofthe continent"25 
The armed forces have to recognize, however, that the emergence of leftist guerrilla 
movements and a hemispheric context of violent anti-communism in the 1960s and 1970s 
produced increasing conservatism and anti-communist ideology within the Colombian 
military. Under this perspective, Colombian armed forces have advised different 
administrations about the danger of negotiating with the guerrilla groups, without demanding 
something in exchange, as it was the case during president Betancur' s term. 
The current Commanding General of the Colombian armed forces, General Harold 
Bedoya, warned in 1988, when he was the commander of the army's seventh Brigade, about 
the link between the F ARC and the narcotraffickers in the departamentos of Meta, 
Guaviare, and Caqueta, and about the possibility that the guerrilla would become directly 
involved in the drug business. Many accused him of being alarmist, but today it is not a 
secret that the F ARC are the first drug cartel in Colombia, after the death and imprisonment 
of the Cali" and Medellin cartels' drug lords. Nine years ago the F ARC denied they were 
narcotraffickers or had links with them because that was against the "Communist ethic". 
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For the armed forces, this is one more argument backing up their reluctance to believe in the 
good intentions of the insurgents. In fact, the evidence recollected during army operations 
prove the F ARC are in the drug business. Appendix A includes copies of part of the 
evidence. 
The military support to presidential decisions was evident during president Barco's 
administration when the April19 Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril or M-19), the Popular 
Liberation Army (Ejercito Popular de Liberaci6n or EPL), the Workers' Revolutionary 
Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores or PRT), and the Quintin Lame 
Command (Jvfovimiento Indigenista Quintin Lame) turned over their weapons and gave up 
the armed struggle. However, because of different interests, somebody has to play the role 
of the villain. Some writers are -use to blaming the Army of blocking the government's 
intentions. 
2. El Salvador 
Before 1984 it was unthinkable to talk about negotiation with the Salvadoran 
guerrillas. The armed forces were convinced that they could control the situation by 
repression. Besides, the guerrilla movement was referred to as a terrorist organization with 
no popular support. Negotiation by that time would have meant showing weakness and 
legitimizing the insurgents. Before 1984 it was easy for the military to sustain the war effort, 
for the military controlled the national resources and the government. 
In 1984 President Jose Napoleon Duarte began a formal negotiation with the FMLN. 
The minister of defense and public security, General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, 
accompanied the president to the October meeting with the representatives of the FMLN in 
La Palma. The military initially had no intention to compromise the military power, but to 
arrange the FMLN demobilization. At the same time the hardliners within the FMLN 
demanded the armed forces capitulation and a substantial share of the power. During this 
period the armed forces was accused by the opposition of blocking negotiations, in order to 
protect their corporate interests. The main argument was that the war was a big business for 
the military. We think that surrendering all the national institutions, especially the armed 
forces, to -the will of the communist movement was out of question. In this period, the 
military influenced strongly the negotiation process, especially because the military was 
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willing to fight and destroy militarily the FMLN and it was not willing to give up all the 
democratic transformation gained at a very high cost in lives and suffering. 
In 1989, President Alfredo Cristiani formed a new commission to retake the 
negotiation process and included two military officers: Colonel Juan Antonio Varela and 
colonel Mauricio Ernesto Vargas. The national and international situation had changed. The 
international community had recognized that El Salvador was in its way to democratization, 
the military had taken a new role in society under the civilian direction and most 
importantly, the military and the politicians had understood that the conflict was a socio-
economical phenomenon, not just a military struggle. 
On the other hand the expectations of the guerrilla had changed. The FMLN, after 
so many failures, knew that they could not take the power by force, but still they wanted to 
weaken the armed forces the most, before they gave up their weapons. This forced the 
military to take a dynamic role in the negotiation process. They tried to avoid the excessive 
damage to the institution and its members, and also to make up for the new politicians that 
knew very little about national security. The negotiations at the end brought severe changes 
in the structure of the society with long term implications. The military, as we see it, 
participated in the effort to make these changes beneficial for the democratic institutions 
including the armed forces and not just to comply with the communist requirements, 
especially related to the disappearance of the armed forces, its worst enemy. 
D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Juan Rial has correctly sustained that the military forces are the guardian of the 
Status Quo that is predominant at the time of their origin.26 Even though we can not affirmed 
.that the armed forces ofEl Salvador and Colombia were born in a capitalistic.society, these 
countries were linked interdependently with the counties ofWestern Europe which were in 
process of building capitalism. 27 So it is nor rare that these armed forces originally defended 
the interests of the oligarchy in the nineteenth century an at the beginning of this century. 
Few civilians dispute that there was a social disorder following the early nineteenth 
century wars of independence. We can also say that alliances were gradually forged 
between economic notables and military leaders to establish what was considered political 
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order. At certain point in history this reality evolved in two different directions. Because of 
social, economic and political factors these alliances took different shapes, developing 
different patterns of civil-military relations. 
There are many dimensions in which we could compare these two armed forces. 
However we need to keep in mind that we are looking for relevant criteria to explain the 
different attitudes toward the negotiation processes. Broadly speaking, we found four 
relevant differences between them: First, the degree of participation in politics, namely in 
the government oftheir countries, and the type of regime in which the political violence was 
generated. Second, because of the different degree of involvement in politics, both 
institutions had different degrees of responsibility for the social unrest, and that situation 
generated different degrees of political attacks against the military. Third the nature of 
internal cohesion and autonomy, and finally the degree of international dependence to 
sustain the logistical war effort. 
1. The Degree of Involvement in Politics 
The degree of involvement in politics of both armed forces, and the respective 
regimes where the violence was generated show remarkable differences. Colombia was able 
to build a democratic system that has been alive for the last thirty years, in spite of the 
multiple problems the nation has been facing, while in El Salvador, the military in alliance 
with the oligarchy did not let the democratic system exist. In Colombia the military has 
been respectful of the civilian authorities situation which will fit the traditional model as 
Nordlinger calls it, and the struggle has been taking place within a relatively stable 
democratic system. There is neither a militarization of the society in the normal meaning of 
the term.28 
In P:,l Salvador, according to the Constitution, de iure the political system has been 
a democracy, but de facto, before 1979, the Salvadoran regime was authoritarian. Thus, we 
need to talk about a process of democratization which started in 1979, because behind the 
democratic facade of 1912 to 1979, El Salvador was an oligarchy-military authoritarian 
republic where political competition took place only among economic elites. The lower 
class was too big and too dependent upon coffee revenues to promote reforms, and the armed 
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forces repressed any disaffection on the part of the Salvadoran people. The oligarchic 
republic needed the presence of the armed forces to survive. 
Colombian society has experimented in the last thirty years, a high degree of 
violence, both partisan and insurgent, without reaching the intensity that experienced El 
Salvador in the 1980s. It might be largely to the attitude of the military in the sense that they 
have been devoted to their profession in this century, and have been subjected to civilian 
rule. The Colombian military has been only an instrumental player in this struggle. On the 
other hand, the Salvadoran military dominated completely the political scene before 1984. 
As a result of these two different behaviors of the military, in Colombia the 
democratic institutions existed and were allowed to learn from the political game . These 
institutions became strong overtime. In , El · Salvador, on the other hand, the democratic 
institutions, were suppressed by the military in an effort to improve the situation after 193 0. 
However the military, not being able to solve the socioeconomic situation, had to govern 
by command and repression. When the social explosion forced the armed forces to step 
aside, the society only had a weaken the political structure and the civilians did not have the 
political experience to undertake by themselves the task of conducting the country through 
a democratic path at once. This situation allowed the military to keep a very strong influence 
over the government even after the elections in 1984. 
2. The Degrees of Responsibility for the Political Crisis 
The different degrees of intervention in politics, gave the military different degrees 
of responsibility for the political crisis, thus the military of El Salvador faced more grave 
accusations from the national and international community. In El Salvador, the armed force 
was the primary target for the opposition, and in some degree for the international 
community and even for the oligarchy of the country. 
During the war, the Salvadoran Armed Force fought two battles: the military battle 
against the FMLN, and the political battle against the FDR and their international supporters. 
This was not the case in Colombia, where the armed forces were just an instrument and the 
politicians who have not assumed their political responsibilities. There was a need of 
political seif- defense for the military in El Salvador. This double battle needed a high level 
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of cohesion and a strong leadership, which brings us to the next difference: the nature of the 
internal cohesion and political autonomy. 
3. The Nature of Internal Cohesion and Autonomy 
The Salvadoran armed forces had to stand alone to overcome all the national and 
international pressures. The only way to survive was to stand with a monolithic unity. The 
same unity that served the purpose of neutralizing the best supported guerrilla movement in 
Latin America, was needed to help the armed force to undertake the storm during and after 
the negotiation process. Moreover, and above all, it would allow the armed institution to 
support government decisions even at its own high cost, as we will see in Chapter V. 
The unity was well kept in the Salvadoran armed force by its structural design, the 
strong indoctrination, and an authoritarian leadership. The totality of the armed forces, 
including the police were under one military command. The tanda system had essential 
implications on this issue, because it provided for almost unconditional mutual support 
among the officer corps. If we add to this the hard line discipline in which every officer was 
indoctrinated, again we have an almost unconditional "loyalty" to the institution. The mind 
set was to obey and that being united was the best way to protect the institution. This turn 
to be true. The Salvadoran armed forces faced very serious accusations, some of them 
justified, many of them unjustified. All the detractors would have been happy if they could 
have divided the institutions and abused its members. This did not happen. At the end the 
institution survived. The armed forces of El Salvador, ignored the formalities of the 
democratic system in an attempt to save the country from the Communism. The lack of 
proper legislation was a weakness and it was fulfill with force. As a result the FMLN was 
defeated, but the armed forces eventually had to pay a price. 
In Colombia, the armed forces proved to be more traditional and obedient. They 
stayed away from political intervention. They also had a more structured organization and 
more well defined procedures and lines of authority. The institution has a strong political 
dependence. They so far have complied with civilian authority. Any hesitance from the 
political leaders to launch and sustain a counter guerrilla effort, result of course in military 
inactivity. We have not seen a civilian determination to push the military permanently to the 
battlefield and to keep a sustained effort to end the war. At the same time, any initiative to 
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end the war had to be supported by a new budget and probably a new structure and 
operational doctrine for the armed forces. But again this is not a military but a political 
decision. The military finds some consolation in saying that the war is not over because there 
is not political will to finish it. Obviously, keeping the democratic system in Colombia is 
matter of keeping the democratic institutions strong. The defense policy show us that the 
guerrilla movement is not seen as a critical threat for the system. According to Colombian 
officers the current modernization process is not enough to neutralize the guerrilla, but to 
balance their operational capabilities. Figure 2.6 shows the different percentages of budget 
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So negotiation is not a priority, nor the military feels it as a critical necessity. Even 
further, we are not sure if the Colombian armed forces would accept a negotiation in which 
the politicians ignore the high cost in lives and suffering that the armed forces have paid to 
destroy the guerrilla forces. In El Salvador the military was willing to pay that price, because 
they were buying the world recognition as a democratic and professional armed forces, and 
in certain degree its own existence. 
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4. Logistical Support 
The other factor that influenced the military attitude towards negotiation was the 
logistical support. Comparing the GDP of both countries in Figure 2.7, it is obvious that 
Colombia, is able to sustain an operational effort with its own means for longer than El 
Salvador. The latter depended mostly on US aid to wage the war. This dependence made the 
armed forces more vulnerable to pressures if it did not move in the democratic direction. 
This dependence was another force that took the armed forces to the negotiation table. 
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Figure 2. 7 Colombian and Salvadoran GDPs 
As a result of the factors discussed, it has become evident that the visible level of 
military presence during the negotiation in El Salvador was higher that in Colombia. For 
several reasons the Salvadoran dialogue commission had military official representation. 
First of all, the military intensity, of the conflict, measured in terms of engagements, 
required negotiations in military matters. Second, the military was well aware that the 
destruction of the military institution was the main objective of the opposition. National 
interests as well as corporate interests required the military presence in the negotiation 
process. 
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In Colombia the military has not participated in the negotiation commissions, in spite 
of the guerrilla's requirements. The military high command never has attended the different 
talks, dialogues, and truces the government agreed with the rebels, though they have advised 
the government about the guerrilla strategy of using these situations to have a breath in 
operations. The truth is that the military does not feel responsible for the chaotic situation 
of the country. They also argue that the military has not been defeated, so they have nothing 
to negotiate with the guerrillas. For the Colombian military, if the negotiation takes place, 
it would be a pure political decision. They hope that this will not affect the military interests. 
We are not sure what would be the reaction of the military if the government decides to 
negotiate and in the process takes some decisions that affect the military institutional 
interests. Maybe the military should consider participating in the negotiation process as a 
,_. 
part of the national power, thinking beyond the institutional viewpoint. This way, they could 
avoid government's possible mistakes when it pacts without demanding something from the 
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ill. THE GUERRILLAS: A DECISIVE ACTOR 
The guerrilla movement is the other main actor in our study, and its characteristics 
are "conditio sine qua non" for the resolution of the conflicts through negotiation. 
Consequently, we believe that understanding their origin, nature, and trajectories is 
necessary to analyze their role in those processes. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to present a throughout description of the guerrilla 
movements in Colombia and El Salvador. Our intent is to provide a general overview of both 
cases and to highlight the differences that, we think, explain the divergence between the two 
outcomes of the peace processes. We are not trying to compare the guerrilla movements in 
Colombia and El Salvador just for the purposes of establishing their differences. Rather, we 
are trying to determine what was the influence of the guerrilla's organization and patterns 
of leadership on their attitude toward negotiation. From our research we have found that 
unity, the nature of the political-strategic project, and sources for support, were the factors 
that influenced the most the attitude of the guerrilla movements toward negotiation. These 
also may be the main factors for differences in the outcomes of the negotiation process. 
This chapter is divided in two main parts: a general description first, and then the 
analysis including partial conclusions. The first part consists of a general description of 
Colombia's and El Salvador's guerrilla movements: social composition, political strategy, 
ideology, and sources of support. The second part contains the comparison and contrast of 
both cases with our interpretation of the analysis to explain the role of the guerrilla 
movements in the negotiation processes. In the Colombian case we try to explain what each 
group's political strategy might be in the future. 
It is important to remember that in Colombia the internal conflict is still alive, so the 
handling of information is more restricted. We present some results of the military 
intelligence analyses, supported by confidential documents of the Colombian armed forces 
about the guerrilla groups' actual intentions. This is very important to determine later 
whether there is a real desire for peace on behalf of the insurgents or whether their strategy 
for taking power makes the peace process only a means to an end. 
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In the Salvadoran case, since the armed conflict ended in 1992, we have many open 
sources from independent authors. Here we focus our analysis on the actual results of the 
guerrilla strategy, to draw some important lessons learned. 
A. COLOMBIA 
1. Origins of the Colombian Guerrillas and their Structure 
The armed movement has passed from being a bit player in national life to becoming 
a central actor in the political scene. Colombia possesses the oldest active guerrilla groups 
in Latin America. Despite the diversity of their origins, they all drew on the legacy of La 
Violencia, the rampant civil war between the Liberals and the Conservatives that resulted 
in some three hundred thousand deaths between 1948 and 1956, and only ended to be 
replaced by guerrillas of the left. Besides, many rebel leaders have admitted in interviews 
that they were influenced by the assassination in 1948 of the populist leader Jorge Eliecer 
Gaitan. 
Moreover, Colombian guerrillas, as most of the Latin American rebels, benefited 
from geographical regions with insurgent backgrounds. These regions offered special 
condition for insurgency due to high levels of poverty, social injustice, and isolation. The 
Colombian guerrilla groups, as Timothy Wickham-Crowley states, "at times even chose 
their foco sites precisely because they knew that those particular regions harbored inhabitants 
likely to be responsive to the guerrillas' appeals for support" 1. 
Colombian political analyst Eduardo Pizarro has noted that the areas in which the 
rebels operated and continue to have a strong presence are largely the same areas in which 
La Violencia was the most intense. 
"The map of the old violence and the map of the new had no substantial differences; 
both coincide with the map of the Revolutionary Liberal Movement (Movimiento 
Revolucionario Liberal or MRL) and the Communist enclaves, forming the map of 
the resistance and of national rebellion"? 
There are external and internal factors that contributed to the birth of the armed 
revolutionary movements in Colombia. We can mention at least two external factors: first, 
the Cuban Revolution made three fundamental contributions to the mechanics of these 
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movements in the country and also in Latin America, by establishing that: 1) popular forces 
can win a war against an army; 2) it is not always necessary to wait until the conditions of 
revolution exist; the insurrectionary enclave can create them; 3) in underdeveloped Latin 
America the field of armed struggles must be fundamentally in the countryside. With this 
doctrine in mind, there were no pretexts for not initiating the revolution. The second 
external factor was the Chinese-Soviet rupture during the early 1960s, which led to the 
Communist party splitting into two wings: the Communist Party of Colombia-Marxist-
Leninist (Partido Comunista de Colombia-Marxista-Leninista or PCC-ML) headed by pro-
Chinese communists, and the Colombian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Colombiano, 
PCC) headed by the traditional and orthodox Communists. Each wing would have its own 
armed branch. 
A very complex array of factors on the internal front made it possible for the guerrilla 
groups to come into existence and, above all, to consolidate themselves. The Colombian 
Communist party's position on the possibility of a peaceful road to revolution created 
opposition of some radical urban groups that criticized reformism and pacifism and favored 
armed struggle and electoral abstention. 
The different origins, their social composition, their ideologies, objectives, strategies, 
tactics, and the very conflicts that served to spark their emergence, all differ greatly. In 
Colombia one cannot speak of"guerrilla movement" in the abstract. Rather, one must speak 
of "guerrilla movements" in the plural, given the extreme heterogeneity and dispersion of 
the armed insurrectionary groups. This is a very important issue that explains why dispersion 
continues to be the guerrilla groups' dominant characteristic, in spite of the efforts for 
unification during almost two decades. For brevity purposes we will call guerrilla movement 
the totality of the guerrilla groups. 
We have selected the four largest and most important guerrilla organizations: the 
FARC3, ELN, EPL, M-19. Other small groups had a very short life and disappeared from the 
national scene because of their internal weaknesses and the government's decisive action. 
The M-19 abandoned the armed struggle in early 1990 to participate in civilian politics. Still, 
in early 1991, the FARC and ELN were able to launch a major military strike, aimed at 
derailing the meetings of a newly elected National Constituent Assembly (Asamblea 
Nacional Constituyente or ANC) which included the M-19 delegates. 
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This is the largest guerrilla group in Colombia. There are two characteristics that 
identify them before public opinion. On the one hand, the group identifies itself with 
peasants' self-defense process, in such a way that it has always been linked to armed 
colonizations. On the other hand, this guerrilla group, since its beginning, has maintained 
a very close link to Communist party, from which guerrillas received direction until the end 
of the Cold War. 
Timothy Wickham-Crowley states that this guerrilla group provides a special case, 
in the sense that it did not need to build bridges between the guerrillas and the peasantry 
because the founding members were peasants. "It is highly misleading to speak of urban, 
upper-class guerrillas trying to establish rapport with rural, lower-class peasants. FARC's 
leadership at this time was drawn largely from peasant leaders thrown up in self-defense 
areas ... ".4 
Army intelligence files state that the F ARC were founded in 1966 by Manuel 
Marulanda Velez, a.k.a. Tirofzjo (Sure Shot) and other members of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC). In consequence, the FARC embraced the PCC's 
Soviet-style Marxist-Leninist ideological orientation. The F ARC's early members were 
communist ideologues as well as non-Communist peasants, many of whom had been active 
during La Violencia. Thus, the FARC did not arise --as it is the case ofthe ELN-- from a 
strict voluntarist decision or as a mechanical effort to transplant the Cuban Revolution. They 
had an insurgent background. 
Their objective has been to take the power through the armed struggle, using all the 
"fighting means", ideological, political, economical, and social. In 1984 they created its 
own political party, Patriotic Union (Union Patri6tica or UP), that won elections for mayors 
in different small towns at the end of the 1980s, but in the last years has not succeeded in the 
political arena. 5 One important reason for its political failure is that it is the political wing 
of the F ARC, and people are afraid of supporting them. 
Since their origins in 1966, when as many as 500 armed militants and several 
hundred peasants were recruited as self-defense groups, the F ARC have increased their 
membership up to 6,500 men under arms and 15,000 part-time activists in the rural and 
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urban areas. They enjoyed a resurgence during president Betancur's administration (1982-
1986). Indeed, those numbers were only exceeded by the Salvadorans, of all other guerrilla 
movements in Latin America in the last thirty years. The main reason for this resurgence was 
Betancur's naivete (in spite of the military recommendations) believing the FARC's good 
intentions. The truces between the government and the insurgents, as well as the 
governmental amnesties permitted this guerrilla group to recover itself at all levels, 
benefiting from Betancur' s orders to the Army of not patrolling certain areas to facilitate the 
process 6 . Figure 3. 1 displays the current organization of this guerrilla group. They grew 
from 2000 men on arms and 18 squads in 1982 to almost 4,500 men on arms and 35 squads 
in 1986. 
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How has the F ARC arrived to their current situation of economical and military 
capability? We have to differentiate two sources of support: external and internal. In the late 
1960s they received some initial organizing help from Cuban and Chinese instructors7. In 
the early years of insurgency, the PCC financed the F ARC through the fees of party 
memberships and the quotas "voluntarily" established by unions', workers', and farmers' 
associations, handled by the Communist party. Some cattle's raisers and farmers gave their 
support "in kind". With the time, the F ARC have come to rely on mechanisms such as 
extortion, kidnaping, blackmail, and drug trafficking to finance their activities. Somehow, 
different sectors of the Colombian economy have been affected by the guerrillas' common 
crimes. Among these crimes, the F ARC's narcotrafficking business deserves a very special 
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mention. In fact, Army intelligence documents reveal that in 1995 this guerrilla group 
received $US 5.25 billion8 under this concept. This is an important source to sustain the 
sixty squads, to invest in the country and abroad, and to finance false organizations in 
countries like Mexico and Switzerland, to obtain support for their cause. This bond with 
cocaine business and, recently, with poppy cultivation is a double-edge weapon because it 
generates huge incomes though reduces legitimacy. Moreover, it has done more difficultly 
the pacification process because it set in motion greater interests and increases the cost of 
demobilization. Table 3.1 shows a summary of the sources of revenues for the FARC and 
other guerrilla groups. 
Source FARC UC-ELN EPL OTHER TOTAL 
Extortion 2,601.50 2,116.00 218.87 227.21 5,163.58 
Rustling 172.50 47.50 45.00 N.A. 265.00 
Assaults 658.50 828.70 0.17 0.49 1,487.86 
Kidnaping 300.00 330.00 22.00 75.00 659.50 
N arcotra:ffic 777.00 216.00 122.20 0.16 1,116.50 
Total Income 1,908.00 1,422.20 189.37 8.15 3,528.86 
Total 24.20 28.20 6.72 0.06 59.57 
Expenses 
Net Income 1.883.80 1,394.00 182.65 8.09 3,469.30 
Investments 133.58 86.58 6.73 0.80 227.69 
* Source: Jesus La Rotta. Fmanzas de Ia Subversion Colomb1ana. (F1gures m US dollars) 
Table 3.1 Colombian Guerrillas' Revenues during 1994 
In 1986, the FARC (their intent was to demonstrate that they were the strongest of 
the guerrilla groups) organized the so-called National Guerrilla Coordinating Board 
(Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera or CNG), which was restructured in late 1987 as the 
"Simon Bolivar" Guerrilla Coordinating Board (Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar 
or CGSB): It reunited six guerrilla groups: FARC, ELN, M-19, EPL, PRT, and Quintin 
Lame. Although they attempted to carry out joint military operations with at least one other 
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guerrilla group, the effort failed, reportedly because of difficulties caused by ideological 
differences. 
The F ARC's role in the peace processes was spelled out in the accord signed between 
members of the group and the Government's National Peace Commission at FARC 
headquarters in La Uribe in March 1984. This was part of president Betancur's attempt to 
reach peace through negotiation. Because of the violation of the truce by various F ARC 
squads (cuadrillas), by engaging in such activities as kidnaping and blackmail, government 
announced that the truce had been broken in some departments. The F ARC have not been 
serious during these dialogues with the government and always have blamed the armed 
forces for blocking the F ARC's "good and patriotic" intentions of arriving to lasting peace. 
In late 1980s, while FARC continue to refuse the government's call to disarm, _an .. 
obligation that never was incorporated in the terms of the truce reached with the Betancur 
administration, "this guerrilla group in tum, called for a lifting of the state of siege, the 
elimination of the death squads, an end to alleged human rights violations by the armed 
forces, and the implementation of a number of political and economic reforms". 9 
The F ARC political and military objectives, thirty years after the foundation of the 
group, have had no substantial changes. Today, they are developing the "strategic plan" 
known as Bolivarian Campaign for a New Colombia (Campana Bolivariana para una nueva 
Colombia), announced in May 1989, whose main points were: to increase the number of 
squads to 80, the number of men in arms for each squad to 400, for a total of 32,000 
combatants through the end of 1996. The document sets the guidelines for "taking over 
power" in the near future. 10 
After 1990 and the demise of Communism some changes occurred inside the F ARC, 
but apparently they continue with their orthodox ideology before the grass-roots, while 
accumulating wealth as any capitalist industry. In the military realm, the F ARC are trying 
to demonstrate that far from being defeated or having converted into simply common 
criminals, they have certain combat and maneuver capabilities to resist for many days, and 
under a unified command, whichever open combat in the countryside with the army. In the 
way they have managed the situation of the sixty army soldiers they kidnaped on 30 August 
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1996, the F ARC want to show a high operational capability that allows them not only to 
have a big number of"prisoners of war" for a long time, but to conduct also military actions 
in different regions of the country. 
In the urban areas the F ARC continues to promote strikes and demonstrations against 
the government, usually through infiltration of guerrillas inside the mobs to conduct 
agitation, sabotage, and shooting in the streets to provoke the public force reaction. 
Immediately after, they accuse the government of being enemy of the people, of violating 
human rights, and therefore they justify their fighting against the political system. 
3. The ELN 
This guerrilla group was founded in the department of Santander del Sur (South 
Santander) in July 4, 1964 by a group ofuniversity students who had traveled to Cuba and 
had become convinced of Che Guevara's joquismo theory. Its first leader was Fabio 
Vasquez Castano, a former bank cashier who had been a victim of La Violencia in the 
department of Caldas. The former Fidelista Worker-Student-Peasant Movement 
(Movimiento Obrero-Estudiantil-Campesino or MOEC), clearly provided the ideological and 
organizational base for the ELN. 11 Of the twenty-four founders, fourteen were peasants, two 
were doctors, one a Spanish missionary and seven students, a distribution suggesting that the 
middle class dominance may not have extended to the rank and the file of the ELN. 
However, whatever the class composition, the ELN generally has maintained strong peasant 
support. 
The group has operated mostly in northeastern and central Colombia and its ranks 
have attracted such notables as radical Roman Catholic priest Camilo Torres Restrepo. Its 
current leader is Manuel Perez (a.k.a. Poliarco), a Spanish-born Catholic priest. The second 
in command is a peasant, Nicolas Rodriguez Bautista (a.k.a. Gabino), well known for his 
cruelty toward soldiers and peasants supporting the regular army. 
While decidedly Marxist (Castrista) in its ideology, the ELN has become closely 
associated with Colombia's petroleum industry and its attacks have focused on disrupting 
the flow of crude oil through the pipelines leading to the coast and in the exploratory drilling 
sites. His allegedly reason is that petroleum is a national resource that should be managed 
as such, not by foreign oil companies. This effective economic sabotage, as Pizarro says, has 
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not increased its political support. The population' acceptance for the revolution is now more 
distant than never. 12 Because of the atrocities it has committed, the ELN is the most radical, 
cruel, and human rights violator of all the guerrilla groups in Colombia. 
In the 1960s the group received Cuban money, advice, arms and training. However, 
one norm in that guerrilla group established that the combatants had to win their first weapon 
in combat, by "recovering" it from dead soldiers. Between 1966 and 1972, in what we can 
call a period of creation and establishment, the ELN consolidated politically and militarily 
as a rural guerrilla group with urban commanders. In 1973, after Army operation "Anori" 
in the country side, the ELN was decimated and the survivors started to operate in some 
cities through the urban support networks, financing its activities in the guerrilla way, that 
is, ,through criminal.activities such as kidnaping, bank robberies, and blackmail. The ELN 
rose phoenix-like out of these ashes after receiving the ransom from a German oil company, 
the Manesmann, which payed about five million dollars in 197 5 to rescue two engineers, 
kidnaped by the guerrilla group. That was the beginning of a new stage. Today, the ELN has 
the same sources of financing as the other subversive groups, as it is shown in Table 3 .1 
The period between 1973 and 1982 is considered a stage of internal reorganization 
(in 1978 there were only about 36 guerrillas in the rural area). A national direction was 
created for preparing the ELN's First National Meeting. From 1983 to 1989 the group 
consolidated and developed its political project. It grew up in members and squads, oriented 
to the conformation of a regular army "to dispute terrain to the enemy". In this strategic 
rectification stage, in December 1986 to be exact, the group launched its key campaign: 
"Awake Colombia ... the oil is being stolen" (Despierta Colombia .... Te estcm robando el 
petr6leo). The squad Domingo Lain operating in the eastern oily region of Arauca, turned 
to be the key element in the development of its new strategy. The region would be the 
biggest source of financial support and political inspiration for the ELN. Its main target 
would be the multinational oil companies working in a joint venture with the Colombian 
Petroleum Company (Empresa Colombiana de Petr6leos or ECOPETROL). 
The ELN was the only major guerrilla group that did not sign the 1984 cease-fire 
agreement13. For the organization, a negotiation proposal is only a complement to global 
tactics of accumulating forces to seize power. Negotiations are only a way to legitimate 
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what they have already gained in the confrontation. Today the organization (see Figure 3.2) 
has 3 1 rural squads or groups, with an average of 70 men each; four mobile companies, 









Figure 3. 2 Organization Chart of the ELN 
Central 
warFront 
These are young people living in very poor communities (barrios) and who prepare 
the logistical and operational support for the terrorist activities. According to the Army's 
available data, the ELN has approximately 3,500 members on arms and about 30,000 people 
considered rural and urban clandestine supporters (See Table 3 .2). 14 
GROUP 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1996 
QTY. QTY. % QTY. % QTY. % QTY. % QTY. % I 
FARC 1,200 1,800 50 4,000 233 5,800 383.33 6,800 466.7 5,700 -16.18 
ELN 190 230 21.05 1,800 847.4 2.600 1,268.42 3,150 1,557.9 2,500 -20.63 
EPL 100 350 250 1,400 1.300 1,250 1.150 550 450 450 -18.18 
-
M-19 750 300 -60 1,200 66.7 1.200 66.7 100 -86.7 80 -20.00 
TOTAL 2,240 2,680 19.64 8,400 275 9,650 330,80 10,600 373.2 8,730 289.73 
Note: Years correspond to the begmnmg (end) of pres1denbal terms. Last nght column md1cates reductwn m relatiOn 
to 1994. 
Table 3.2 Insurgency Growth (Men) 
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ELN's current objectives were established in its First National Military Conference 
in July 1995: 1) Reorganization of the combat units, similar to the regular army. It includes 
the creation ofthe "Officers School" and the "Guerrilla War College". 2) Total reject to 
holding talks with the government because the recent impeachment of president Ernesto 
Samper indicates that he does not represent national interests. 3) To gain an international 
image, they have to improve the so-called War Code, to increase the human rights 
enforcement (for the government, of course, because the ELN has conducted a 
disinformation campaign to blame the government for doing "state terrorism"15). 
4. TheEPL 
The Popular Liberation Army was the only major guerrilla group with a Maoist 
political ideology, which had the central idea of a prolonged popular war. The birth of the 
Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (PC-ML) and later, of its armed branch, the EPL, was 
determined by several factors, common to the pioneer guerrilla groups (radicalization of 
urban sectors, the Cuban Revolution, the exclusion from participation in the National Front 
Agreement or Frente Nacional, which established that the two parties would succeed one 
another in the presidency from 1958 to 1974), but specially for the Chinese-Soviet rupture. 
On December 17, 1967, the first PC-ML guerrilla unit orfoco was formed in the 
northeast of the department of Antioquia, under the leadership of Pedro Vasquez Rendon 
and Francisco Caraballo (the latter in prison since 1994). The period 1972-1978 was a 
difficult time for the EPL. Pizarro says: 
"In subsequent years the PC-ML and the EPL were often on the verge of total 
extinction. This situation was due in part to the scope of the military offensives 
launched against them in the 1960s and in part to the deep schisms that affected 
them internally, resulting in separate groups such as the Marxist-Leninist League, 
the Marxist-Leninist Tendency, and the urban group Pedro Leon Arboleda, PLA."16 
In April1980 the group broke with Maoism and its sequels. In 1984, the EPL was 
one of the groups to sign the ill-fated truce agreements with Betancur' s government. 17 In 
1985, in the third national conference of combatants, they moved to the conception of an 
army. Therefore, they decided to consolidate the 10 rural and urban squads, which made 
them to pass " ... from small groups of30 people, with the strength we could acquire during 
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the truce, we had the possibility of conforming columns of 100 and 150 guerrillas, and we 
began to introduce technical elements ... We grew up to 400 percent."18 In May 1987 the EPL 
subscribed an agreement with the F ARC and in September of the same year participated in 
the creation of the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar (CGSB). In the tenth conference 
of the PCC-ML, in February 1990, they realized the necessity of the political solution of the 
negotiation to legalize the party. But then the contradictions are evident between the fraction 
that supported negotiations and those that opposed them. The split was evident when in 
March 1991, the group headed by Bernardo Gutierrez signed a peace agreement, turned over 
the weapons and entered to civilian political life. They adopted, with the same letters, a new 
name: Hope, Peace, and Liberty (Esperanza, Paz y Libertad). According to its leaders, the 
guepilla group joined to negotiations as the result of an internal and healtl}Y debate atpund 
the dynamics the country was living. They did not join because they were defeated. 
Francisco Caraballo fraction continued in the mountains and joined to the CGSB. It is still 
fighting against the government. 
The EPL has currently a regional staff, three rural squads, and five urban groups, 
with a total of 450 members on arms. It is operating in four out of thirty Three-Colombian 
departments, with special presence in northern Antioquia (banana plantations in Uraba 
region). 
In 1994, after the capture of its leader Francisco Caraballo, the organization faced 
a crisis. At the end of the year, the EPL did its "Fourth National Conference of Combatants" 
with the following objectives: 1) to avoid the demise of the group; 2) to propose the guerrilla 
groups unity in order to receive economic support from F ARC and ELN (it seems that its 
finances are not good, in spite of the figures in Table 1; 3) to support the dialogues with 
government but only as a tactic to handle and solve the internal crisis and to obtain benefits 
without compromising to demobilize or tum over the weapons; 4) to get economic resources 
from kidnaping and extortion to multinational firms (the EPL shows here its nationalist 
label). Table 3. 1 shows that in 1994 the EPL had an income of about $ 310 million dollars, 
derived mainly from common crimes, and $122 million from narcotrafficking. This is more 
than enough to sustain an Army Brigade during a year. 
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5. TheM-19 
This movement traces its origins to the allegedly stolen presidential election of April 
19, 1970, when the National Popular Alliance's (Alianza Nacional Popular or ANAPO) 
candidate, former president General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, barely was defeated by the 
candidate of the Frente Nacional, the conservative Misael Pastrana Borrero. With very 
sound knowledge, because he is the brother ofthe late M-19leader/9 Pizarro states that the 
movement was a merging of one sector that had been expelled from the Communist party 
and the FARC, and a sector that came out of the socialist wing of ANAP0.20 
The M-19 ideological orientation was a mixture of populism and nationalistic 
revolutionary socialism. By 1985 the group was estimated to have about 1,700 members, 
making it the second largest guerrilla group in the country. 21 This group was mainly 
conformed by middle class people and had strong support among the Colombian urban lower 
classes in the early 1970s. During the 1980s, when they conducted operations in the rural 
areas, the majority of the combatants were peasants, Indians, and unemployed workers. 
However, they had also intellectuals and cultivated people. 
With the theft of the Liberator Simon Bolivar's sword and spurs from the exhibit 
in his villa in 1974, the M-19 showed everyone that the movement was not manipulated 
from the outside and that the historical heritage had to be present in all the revolutionary 
activities. In the last week of 1978 the M-19 made a robbery in an army arsenal. Two months 
later, the Army recovered all the material but the publicity for the guerrilla was immense. 
In February 1980 the seizure and occupation, for two months, of the Dominican Republic's 
Bogota embassy, gained to the group international attention. On November 4 and 5, 1985, 
in its most spectacular operation, the M-19 seized the Palace of Justice in Bogota, but the 
forty members of the guerrilla group died after a hard battle with the Army and the Police. 
Pizarro says: 
"By behaving in this manner, the M-19's importance as a protagonist on the national 
level was characterized more by its "lucky hits" than by its shaping of a political-
military movement with grassroots support and a solid organization. A sui generis 
movement, in spite of its ups and downs, the M-19 produced a revolution in the 
heart of the guerrilla movement after the taking of the Dominican embassy." 22 
57 
Finally, at the end of 1989, the group signed a peace agreement with the government 
of president Virgilio Barco. The pact called for national dialogue and reforms (longstanding 
goals of M-19), amnesty, and an end to the M-19's insurgency against the state. Carlos 
Pizarro became a presidential candidate but was killed by agents of Medellin Cartel. He was 
replaced by Antonio Navarro Wolf, who was third in presidential elections. He was offered 
the Ministry ofEducation and accepted. 
Today, there is a small group, which did not accept the peace agreement and who 
kept the arms and is in the mountains fighting against the government. The so-called 
Bateman Cay6n group, with only 120 men under arms, does not have a flattering future. 
To summarize, Colombia's guerrillas have been the weakest political challenge to 
incumbent regimes of what Wickham-Crowley calls the second-wave movements23 . By the 
late 1960s there were already unity talks among guerrillas, and even announcements of 
imminent or actual unification in 1973, 1978, and 1981. In 1988 they formed an umbrella 
group to negotiate with the government over democratization, yet the ELN and EPL 
continued to hedge their commitments to the new organization. After the M-19 turned over 
their weapons in 1990, they participated in that year national elections. There, they 
exceeded by far the expectations of its well-established Liberal and Conservative rivals in 
those elections, which were held to create a constituent assembly. When that assembly was 
about to meet in early 1991, a combined effort ofF ARC and ELN launched a major military 
offensive to protest their exclusion from the political process. Clearly, unity was an 
impossible dream for Colombian insurgents after a quarter century. 
C. ELSALVADOR 
1. Structure and origins ofthe Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (Frente 
Farabundo Marti para Ia Liberacion National or FMLN) 
The guerrilla movement in El Salvador has its origins in two main sources: The 
Salvadoran Communist Party and some radicalized religious activists. The catholic groups 
were rooted in the Christian base communities, and their ideas were sustained by the 
Liberation Theology. After several divisions due to political and ideological differences, five 
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political-military insurgent organizations were formed. These groups had also mass 
organizations and military structures under their control as shown in Appendix B. These 
military structures resembled regular infantry units, as shown in Appendix C. 
The FMLN was the political-military organization that served as the umbrella for the 
mentioned five militant insurgent organizations. The FMLN was directed by a five-person 
directorate. Theoretically each organization was equally represented in this directorate. This 
command structure was known originally as the Unified Revolutionary Directorate 
(Directorio Revolucionario Uni.ficado or DRU) and was based throughout the entire war in 
Managua.24 Later, the name DRU was changed to General Command (Comando General 
or CG). 
In reality, the People's Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo or 
ERP) and the People's Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas Populares de Liberaci6n or FPL) were 
the most powerful and had the most influence in the directorate. The ERP and the FPL had 
the largest and most experienced organizations so this situation was tacitly accepted by the 
other groups. Later in the war, the ERP gained the advice and direction of the Cubans. Since 
then, the ERP controlled the access routes along which arms were shipped to the Salvadoran 
guerrillas. 
In 1980, the Cubans and Nicaraguans advised the FMLN to follow the Nicaraguan 
model of insurrection. However, in El Salvador, some major problems had to be solved 
before Cuba and Nicaragua could play a major role. Perhaps the greatest problem was that 
the insurgent organizations had substantial differences and spent much energy arguing and 
fighting among themselves. In early 1980, the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence 
(Direcci6n General de Inteligencia DGI) the Cuban Intelligence Service, representative for 
El Salvador, organized a meeting of the Salvadoran insurgent organization in Managua, 
Nicaragua. He made a simple, but powerful proposal. The Cubans and Nicaraguans would 
provide the logistical support and massive military training for the Salvadorans, on the 
condition that they unite and form a single, coordinated opposition front as the Sandinistas 
had. The logistical support was supposed to be given by using the same channels that had 
been used for the Sandinistas. 
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In spite of the mentioned differences and bitter feelings among them, the Salvadoran 
insurgent organizations agreed to the Cuba conditions. They quickly formed a united front 
and the name chosen for the front was the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, 
shortened to the Spanish acronym FMLN. To carry out this insurrection, the FMLN focused 
their efforts, in the next few months, to create a powerful military structure, supposedly 
able to defeat the Salvadoran armed forces. 
Some captured insurgents' documents show that they had planned to create a military 
apparatus of approximately fifteen thousand men completely equipped with an entire array 
of light infantry weapons. While there was not shortage of recruits, the FMLN had a serious 
lack of adequate weapons and trained personnel. Cuba agreed to a massive training program. 
Thousands of Salvadoran guerrillas would be trained in Cuba over the next few months for 
the coming insurrection. This would be one the most massive training of Latin American 
guerrillas undertaken by the Cubans in such a short period of time. Several hundreds more 
would then return to El Salvador to provide the hard core of the fifteen thousand-man 
guerrilla apparatus. Training the Salvadorans would be relatively simple, but arming them 
was much more complicated. 25 
There were considerable quantities of weapons stored away from the old Nicaraguan 
revolution pipeline, however, there were not enough to arm fifteen thousand Salvadorans 
and simultaneously other revolutionary organizations in the hemisphere. This quantity of 
weapons was presumably available from the communist block, but there were two main 
reasons for not getting them. First such a massive display of these weapons would 
automatically reveal the involvement of the communist world and provoke the intervention 
of the United States. Second, the ammunition and parts for Western weapons, could be 
conveniently captured from the enemy., So the weapons had to be of Western origin, and 
they had to be on par or better than current-issue weapons of the Salvadoran military. To 
solve the problem, the Randal brothers, Shafick and Farid, representatives of the communist 
party in El Salvador, went on a world tour to secure the international aid and weapons that 
the FMLN needed to rapidly build up the guerrilla and secure the political and financial aid 
to operate this army for several years. Captured documents show that the FMLN was able 
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to secure money, weapons, and offers of training from much of the communist world. Key 
among these was the support offered by Vietnam. Vietnam had large stocks of weapons that 
had been left behind by the US military or captured from south Vietnam in 1975. Vietnam 
offered to deliver large numbers of these weapons to Cuba, which would then insert them 
into the established pipeline to the Salvadoran Guerrillas. Cuba pipeline and the flow of 
weapons and resources from the communists countries guaranteed the FMLN a continual 
logistical support. This support was one of the key elements of the FMLN' s military 
success, and allowed it to continue insurgent operations for twelve years ofwar.26 
The first major action of the FMLN was the January 1981 "Final Offensive". 
However, this offensive failed to be final and it turned to be just the beginning of one of the 
most int~nse internal conflict_s in Latin America history. The military organizational 
structures that emerged from that offensive were essentially those that remained constant 
throughout the entire conflict. 
In 1981, the FMLN was counted on an estimated calculated to twelve thousand 
armed members, three thousand short of their goal. At their peak ( 1983-1984) they may have 
had as many as fourteen thousand armed members. However, through battle casualties, 
attrition, and the changing nature of the war, when hostilities ceased there were only 
between six and eight thousand armed guerrillas distributed among the various factions on 
five war fronts. The different groups were unified under the General Command (CG). The 
five military commanders of each ofthe five FMLN factions made up the General Command 
of the FMLN. General strategy and tactics were established in meetings of the CG, then each 
of the factions' commanders would pass the orders onto their respective organization. In the 
beginning, the different factions were loathed to cooperate with each other, but by the late 
half of the 1980s cooperation was very high, and the distinctions between factions' were 
negligible. However, the factions did maintain their separate command structures and 
organic units through the conflict. 
The DRU had two political organizations that were subordinate to it. The first was 
the umbrella front known as the Popular Revolutionary Block (Bloque Popular 
Revolucioriario or BPR). This front was composed of all the internal political organizations 
that were struggling for a revolution. Essentially, the BPR coordinated the political action 
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of the mass organizations in El Salvador. This included protests, marches, rallies, strikes, 
stoppages and so on. The BPR lost importance soon after the 1981 final offensive, as all of 
the important cadres had been stripped from the various fronts groups to be incorporated into 
the regular guerrilla forces. This left the mass organizations leaderless for several years, and 
the BPR fizzled out of existence. However, mass organization returned in force after 1985 
and played a major role in the FM:LN's strategy through the end of the war.Z7 
The last component of the FMLN was the international political front known as the 
Democratic Revolutionary Front (Frente Democratico Revolucionario or FDR). The FDR 
was composed of supposedly independent political parties and leaders that had left El 
Salvador for a variety of reasons. While they were not directly part of the FMLN, they 
supported the idea of a leftist government in El Salvador. Although they did not openly 
advocate violent revolution, they felt that the FMLN was a preferable alternative to the 
government ofEl Salvador. Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora were the prominent figures 
in this group. These politicians used their contacts and prestige to gain international 
recognition for the FMLN from Western nations, and were responsible for setting up a 
worldwide network of support groups to keep El Salvador in the headlines and pressure the 
United States to cut aid to the Salvadoran government. The FDR was able to attract the 
support of several important governments, such as Mexico, Spain and France. Because of 
this, the FDR was initially a very important ally of the FMLN. However, overtime the FDR 
found itself quickly being coated by the guerrilla and shoved aside as the DRU/CG imposed 
its criteria on the international posture of the anti government forces. By 1988, the FDR 
ceased to exist when Ruben Zamora and Guillermo Ungo returned from exile to El Salvador 
to run in the elections. However, while the FDR ceased to exist, its international network did 
not, and the CG took over this network and continued to use it through the end of the war. 28 
2. FMLN Strategy 
The FMLN had divided the Salvadoran territory into four fronts which they 
considered as their basic military structure. Three of the fronts are named after the leaders 
of the 1932 insurrection and one named after Anastacio Aquino, leader ofthe peasant and 
Indian insurrection of 1832. (See Appendix D). The general term for overall FM:LN's 




revolutionary thought, particularly Ho Chi Minh, did not have the same meaning to the 
FMLN as it did to the Vietnamese. Basically, the FMLN implemented its strategy of 
prolonged popular war with three different operational modes: guerrilla warfare, maneuver 
warfare, and attrition warfare. The FMLN was flexible with these three operational modes, 
and combined all these elements on the five fronts. Basic to all these modes was the idea of 
nonlinear military tactics. 29 
During the early 1970, the insurgent organizations had experienced serious internal 
arguments about which strategy to follow, causing the original separation of the movement 
in the mentioned five factions. Finally, the FMLN's military strategy was a product of three 
major lines of thought on revolutionary processes, corresponding to the three of those 
factions. During this time, the operational mode of Popular Prolonged War consisted of 
violent mass action supported by urban terrorist cells, but every group had its own style. In 
1980, the Cuban ultimatum of unity or no aid, brought the five factions back together. The 
resulting strategy of this unity was the product of the integration and compromise of the 
three major strategic lines of thought of the major FMLN factions. The three major divisions 
of strategic thought within the FMLN were represented by the ERP, the National Resistance 
(Resistencia Nacional or RN), and People's Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas Populares de 
Liberaci6n or FPL). The remaining two organizations (PCS and PRTC) did not have much 
influence in the shaping of the overall FMLN' s military strategy. 
3. TheERP 
The ERP at that time viewed the revolution as a series of stages leading to mass 
insurrection. It also favored making alliances with all the "democratic sectors", including 
workers, peasants, broad sections of the middle class, and the "democratic army officers". 
The ERP tended to be initially fiercely nationalistic and critical of the Cuban presence and 
influence in Nicaragua.30 However, at the end the ERP was most influenced by Cuba, 
Nicaragua, and the guerrillas of South America, especially the Peruvian and Colombian. 
They viewed the government as weak and the population as ready to revolt if given the 
opportunity. All the population needed was an extra shove. To the ERP this shove would be 
shocking rllilitary action that would prepare the way for total insurrection. 
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The ERP did not believe in the necessity to politically organize the masses. Its 
priority was on military action, particularly spectacular military action, capable of infusing 
the masses with revolutionary euphoria to the point of insurrection. For the ERP, mass 
action was only a means of gaining new recruits, and a cover for its military action. 
4. TheRN 
The RN' s line of thought was completely opposed to that of the ERP. The RN also 
viewed the governments as weak, however it felt that the best way to overthrow the 
government was not through military action, but by the masses action. " It based its model 
more on the U.S. civil-rights protests of the 1960s, and on El Salvador's own experience in 
1944 when General Maximiliano Hernandez was overthrown by a broad based public 
protest."31 The most important activity had to. be organizing labor and trade associations and 
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developing alliances between these and newly created groups for mass acts of civil 
disobedience and protest. 
Military action was seen as a means of magnifying the propaganda value of a march 
or protest. Besides, it was used as a means of protecting activities of mass action against 
police or military units trying to control or suppress acts of civil disobedience. The value of 
military action was its enhancement of political action, not so much as a means of destroying 
the enemy. The RN felt that in the face of mass action, the enemy would eventually find it 
impossible to govern and collapse on its own. Purely military operations were relegated to 
a secondary or support role. Of the three strategic lines of thought, the RN strategy was 
probably the least influenced by foreign political thought, and the most authentic 
Salvadoran. 32 
5. The FPL 
The FPL had not developed any indigenous strategy, basically it was a copy of 
Vietnam's guerillas. The FPL was convinced that Central America, and specifically El 
Salvador, would become the United States' next Vietnam. They believed that the United 
States would never allow a second Nicaragua and that before allowing this, it would 
intervene directly with military force. The FPL envisioned the invasion by Salvadoran 
guerrillas in the hills and mountains of Chalatenango and Morazan . "If the war lasted long 
enough, the United States, as it had in Vietnam, would be forced to withdraw because of 
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internal political pressure, and the guerrilla forces could then pick up the pieces and take 
power."33 
The FPL concentrated their efforts in two tasks. The first was to establish the 
infrastructure of resistance in the remote areas. This included creating guerrilla and militia 
units, establishing base camps and fortified regions, organizing the civilians in the area to 
support the war effort by establishing shadow government structures, setting up committees 
of production, and recruits to the guerrilla organization. Often this was done under the guise 
of religious programs that were administered by radical priests. The FPL believed the lesson 
ofVietnam was that if the war dragged on long enough, and public pressure was brought to 
bear on the U.S. government, it could not sustain a counter-insurgency war overseas. 
The second task was to establish international support groups, particularly in the 
United Stated, to disseminate guerrilla propaganda and pressure the U.S. government to stay 
out, or get out ofEl Salvador. The FPL organized a number of support groups in the United 
Stated and around the world for this purpose. These support groups would play a key role 
in the revolutionary struggle. 34 
Bracamonte and Spencer have identified three key factors that assured the FMLN' s 
survival. We think that two of them are relevant for our study: (1) the massive amounts of 
foreign aid, training, and technical assistance received; (2) its operational flexibility. They 
wrote about the support received by the FMLN: 
"The guerrilla effort in the El Salvador was, without comparison, the best-ftui.ded, 
best-organized, and best-supported guerrilla war ever fought on the American 
continent. Literally every guerrilla faction in Latin America, with the exception of 
Peru's Shining Path, contributed to the war with money, weapons, and personnel. 
In addition, the FMLN received guerrillas from the PLO, the Basque ETA, and other 
worldwide terrorist organizations. These efforts were eclipsed by the training, 
money, and weapons provided by Cuba and Nicaragua, but they were still 
significant to the war effort. Cuba and Nicaragua acted as clearinghouses for 
assistance from abroad. Prominent among foreign donators was Vietnam, which 
provided weapons and limited training until late in the war, the Soviet Union, which 
provided funds and political training; East Germany, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, Algeria, Angola, and others, all of whom made donations of 
money, weapons, and advice. 35 
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Operational flexibility refers to the way the FMLN conducted their operations. It was · 
evident that they had learned from many guerrilla movements. The authors have established 
that: 
"Past Latin American guerrilla organizations (with the exception of the Sandinistas 
ofNicaragua) had failed miserably in their attempts to foment revolution. One of the 
main shortcomings was that military operations (strategy and tactics) had been tied 
to the current ideology, and operational failure were viewed as the product of 
externalities, not poorly conceived operations and tactics. The FMLN never fell into 
this rigidity; instead it was dynamic and flexible in its approach. This may have 
something to do with the fact that among the five organizations there were at least 
three different strategic and tactical approaches to guerrilla warfare. After the initial 
failure of the insurrection strategy in, 19,81, tlle FMLN adopted a flexibility rarely 
seen in previous guerrilla groups. All subsequent strategies adopted by the FMLN 
were combinations of the three tendencies mentioned above, the difference being the 
priority given to anyone tendency at a given time. The FMLN would change the 
priority depending on the current strategic situation. This strategy flexibility brought 
with it the adoption of flexible tactics. The FMLN had an enough flexible ideology 
that it could pick and choose between what worked and what did not work; it was 
quick to recognize failure and discard unsuccessful tactics. "36 
D. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
As stated in our introduction unity, the nature of the political-strategic project, and 
sources of support, were the main factors that influenced the attitude of the guerrilla 
movements toward the negotiation processes and they also seem to be some of the main 
factors of divergence for the different outcomes in the two countries. 
Unity was an essential difference. Deciding to negotiate meant giving up major initial 
commitments. In both cases, there were thousands of men and women convinced that the 
armed struggle was necessary and the only way for bringing changes and a better life for 
their people. This perception was build through a long process of political and military 
indoctrination, and the undeniable reality of social injustice in both countries. The tasks of 
reverting tpose minds to accept negotiation was gigantic. The only way to hold together 
these movements under the severed changes taking place in their national realities was 
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trough strong leadership. In El Salvador, in 1980, Fidel Castro turned the movement 
(FMLN) into a well-coordinated front with a very well elaborated strategic plan. 
The F.MLN, despite their differences, had developed a joint doctrine and they were 
used to operating under a unified command structure. When the time came for negotiation, 
their structure allowed the general command to make the use negotiation as another element 
for their strategy and to ensure compliance across the whole organization. According to their 
practice the decision made by their general command was legitimate. The members of the 
FMLN accepted the negotiation as the legitimate best alternative and supported, at the end, 
all terms in which the peace agreement was signed. Comandante Miguel Castellanos 
explains: "At that time, when unity was planned, all the organizations had to make 
concessions, on the political level and in the strategic line, as well as in logistic aspects."33 
When the final cease-fire was accorded, this was never broken, that is a clear evidence of 
compliance in despite of the different possible feelings ofFMLN members. 
In Colombia, in 1986, the formation of the National Guerrilla Coordinating Board 
(Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera) led to a few joint military actions but, the GNC is still 
far from being a joint Staff which was achieved in El Salvador. Colombian Guerrillas have 
never been able to overcome their differences and apparently did not have any incentive to 
come together. When the world situation changed their divergences became even greater and 
particular interests began to arouse. The M -19, believed that the time to negotiate had come 
and accepted to participate peacefully in politics, while the F ARC has become one of the 
most important drug cartels. No single structure for political or military command and 
control was ever recognized. So the Colombian government has to deal with different 
interests and fragmented leadership. Negotiation then, has to be done in different dimensions 
which make them very difficult to succeed. 
The nature of the political-strategic project looks very different. Every organization 
under the general command of the F.MLN had links with political organizations and 
"popular" organizations which gave the FMLN a wide representation within the society, at 
least before the international community. This representation gives to the guerrilla 
movemenf a sense of legitimacy, a sense of a national project seeking objectives beyond 
particular interests. This commitment while made the movement stronger, it also has made 
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the FMLN more vulnerable to the change in the national and international environment. 
Somehow the Government ofEl Salvador started to promote changes under internal 
and external pressures. Little by little, the FMLN abandoned their original positions. The 
presence of leaders like Randal, the secretary of the Communist party, and the contributions 
of non guerrilla politicians Ungo and Zamora --who for a long time during the war were the 
visible, political and "democratic" (as they called themselves) faces--, were important factors 
that helped the FMLN to shift from the military effort to the political struggle. This shift 
was forced by the fact that the armed forces ofEl Salvador defeated all the attempts to take 
over the control of the country by force. At the end the FMLN understood that the armed 
struggle had to be considered, not anymore as the final objective but merely as an element 
of pressure for negotiation. 
The Colombian guerrillas have never had the international prestige of the guerrilla 
movement in El Salvador. The Colombian guerrillas have not built a powerful political 
representation internally nor internationally. Probably this has certainly made them weaker 
but, at the same time has made them less vulnerable to the changes in the world environment. 
The Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera has suffered the demobilization of four of its six 
organizations and the remaining two most important, the F ARC and the ELN, are going 
currently in different directions. It is clear that none of them has a real capability of 
mobilizing serious mass movements nor significant sectors of the Colombian society, not 
even by terror. They are standing as solitary groups with a lot of power for terrorism but they 
are not seen as representatives of the interests of the Colombian society. The Colombian 
guerrilla movements are well aware that if they decide to negotiate they will be only 
negotiating their own interests and probably their own survival. They are not in a position 
to negotiate in the name of the whole society, like the FMLN was seen during the peace 
process and before the elections of 1994. 
Sustainment became a decisive element for the attitude of the guerrilla movements 
toward negotiation. In El Salvador, before 1980 the different guerrilla groups were seen as 
a legitimate hope for change within the country for the lower classes and the main resource 
for sustain.inent came from local support groups and obviously from extortion, robbery and 
from the equipment taken from the armed forces. This was not enough to serve the ambitious 
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purposes of the movement. After 1980 The FMLN was heavily supported by the former 
USSR, through Cuba and Nicaragua. When the USSR fell down, the guerrilla forces lost its 
main source of logistical and ideological support, and then the peace process was somehow 
accelerated. 
In Colombia the F ARC, the ELN and small remanent ofEPL and M-19 have relied 
mainly on internal resources to conduct their insurgent activities. Up to date the F ARC are 
the cocaine cartel number one, while the ELN and EPL have links with the drug lords. The 
changes in the international environment have had no dramatic effect on their operations. 
Sustainment is not a problem for Colombian guerrillas, at least, they can survived 
indefinitely from drugs' revenues. On the contrary, these groups have found their activity 
financially rewarding as a way of living. As long as the Colombian government does not 
pose a real threat to their existence, the Colombian guerrilla, in relation to the sustainment, 
has no incentive to negotiate. 
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IV. THE INTENSITY OF THE CONFLICT 
The intensity of an armed conflict, more than just material destruction, has a moral 
and psychological impact on society. This impact certainly contributes to shape the attitude 
of people to find ways to end the suffering and destruction, especially if they are not 
convinced of the legitimacy and validity of this violence. One important difference between 
Colombia and El Salvador, that is necessary to define, is the society's degree of tolerance 
or supportiveness toward a political negotiated solution. We believe that this attitude is 
closely related to the intensity of the conflict. 
Guerrillas' actions in both cases were means to pressure government and society. 
In El Salvador, the armed conflict was prolonged and intense and it also spread all over the 
country, affecting every single sector in society. Every actor was deeply affected. The armed 
forces was taking heavy casualties and it was also under national and international political 
pressure. The FMLN was also reporting considerable number of casualties and they were 
rapidly losing support of the population, which was vital for their survival. The Salvadoran 
Economy was bordering the chaos and threatened to collapse. The political sector was also 
threatened and the governability of the country was reaching a critical stage. In this 
conditions, one easily understands the society's level of supportiveness of the negotiation 
dynamics, even when they meant making significant concessions. 
Figures about dead, wounded, and mutilated people as well as displaced to other 
countries, indicate whether political violence corresponds to minor clashes and skirmishes 
or to a real civil war. In El Salvador, more than one-million were displaced, about 30,000 
of armed forces and over 30,000 of FMLN members died or were wounded in twelve years 
of confrontation. All this clearly indicates that it was a war, irregular but war anyway, whose 
dimensions have to be judged having in mind that El Salvador's population is one sixth of 
Colombia's. 1 
In contrast, in Colombia, even though the conflict has lasted for more than forty 
years, it has remained relatively isolated. The guerrillas has not been critically damaged and 
they do not really depend on the support of the people. The military is a stable organization 
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which has not reported considerable losses in human lives. The economy and political 
sectors have not been damaged so bad as to say that they are close to collapse. This lack of 
urgency in the Colombian society has allowed them to be more skeptical about the 
negotiation. Politically speaking, both contender seem to believe that there are more benefits 
in continuing the struggle than in setting the peace through negotiation. 
We do not pretend to present an exhaustive description of the conflict's 
consequences. They are both intense. By no means we are trying to capture all the suffering 
of these people. Rather we have selected some relevant data to illustrate a broad image of 
the magnitude of these conflicts, and to stress the main differences in their impact on their 
respective society. 
We will present a general overview of the escalation of the violence, then some of 
the most significant actions and reactions of the contenders and their related consequences 
in human casualties, damages to the economy, and the social and political impact. To put this 
facts in context we will relate them to the strategies of the contenders and to certain 
notorious time frames in every country. 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the intensity of the conflicts in terms of 
violence, physical and moral damage; and social and economical impact on the societies of 
Colombia and El Salvador, to determine the effect their attitudes toward negotiations. We 
intent to demonstrate that the conflict in El Salvador was more intense than it was in 
Colombia, and that this intensity contributed to the achievement of the peace accords 
between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN in 1992. 
A. COLOMBIA 
1. The Escalation of Violence 
During Betancur's administration (1982-1986) there were changes in violence 
dynamics. The armed forces, which were accused of repression during Turbay' s 
administration (1978-1982) and were undervalued by Betancur, frankly disagreed with 
presidential management ofthe peace process. In 1984, the military operations were even 
more intensive than before 1982. The consequence was the escalation of the armed conflict 
as guerrilla's military capability also increased because of the huge resources the rebels were 
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receiving by extorting oil multinational companies. Besides, the signed truce with 
government made them double their membership and augment the number of their squads 
nationwide. 
Throughout 1983 and the beginning of 1984, however, M-19 escalated its military 
actions, notably in southern Colombia, leaving a heavy toll of victims. The F ARC, for its 
part, extended its influence into numerous regions. Claiming thirteen fronts in 1982, it 
established fourteen new fronts over the following months. "All the guerrilla movements, 
says Daniel Pecaut, 2 understood that they must negotiate from a position of strength." The 
FARC was the first group in signing a cease-fire in June 1984. M-19 and EPL signed only 
two months later. The ELN never did. 
The guerrillas' weak willingness to achieve a negotiated peace was broken by 
military pressure and by the rejection of dominant sectors to the camps guerrilla groups 
fostered in urban popular "barrios". Only the F ARC, following their principle of 
"combination of all means of fighting", could maintain themselves between a legal political 
work and their effort to consolidate their military power, in the way they established in the 
Eight Years Plan ( 1983 ), which should lead them to build the revolutionary army and to the 
creation of a provisional government. Patriotic Union party and Casaverde (Greenhouse) 
were the two symbols of this double way.3 In the socio-economic realm, they concentrated 
in infiltrating different sectors, in taking advantage of every urban or rural conflict, and in 
increasing kidnapping and extortion. They also increased their links with narcotraffickers. 
One of the most spectacular guerrilla's action, that measure the escalation of 
violence, was the seizure of Justice Palace by the M-19 on 5 and 6 November 1985, which 
left approximately one hundred persons dead, among judges, military personnel, government 
officials and civilians. 
2. The Self-Defense Groups' Violence 
The guerrilla crimes -kidnapping, billeting, and homicide- which whipped some 
agricultural and cattle raising lands, were the basis to develop a counter- insurgency project 
consistent in the conformation of private self-defense groups. These groups, illegally armed, 
began to be called "paramilitary" by guerrillas. Their mission would be to eradicate any 
issue related somehow with subversive groups. The influence of several factors in the late 
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1970s and early 1980s, however, gradually caused the self-defense groups to shift tactics 
away from defense and toward preemptive attacks against the guerrilla groups, eventually 
earning them the sobriquet "death squads". 
The presence of large narcotraffick organizations in those regions would facilitate 
largely the development of those private groups that assumed by themselves the maintenance 
or the re-establishment of their particular conception of public order. Many paramilitary 
groups, especially those in areas under the influence of narcotraffickers, would developed 
in the next years a varied armed organizations to defend the drug dealers interests. If it is true 
that in the past there was an alliance for cooperation between narcotraffickers and guerrillas, 
the former were subject to extortion by the latter which produced and armed confrontation 
between both criminal organizations. This situation brought serious consequences for the 
maintenance of the public order in those regions they shared, particularly in Middle 
Magdalena and Antioquian Uraba .. 4 
3. Death Squads' Targets and Tactics 
The drug industry is central to the self-defense units' transformation into death 
squads. Leaflets dropped at a Cali soccer match in 1981 heralded the transition from self-
defense from guerrilla attacks to death squads attacks against the rebels. The group making 
the announcement was MAS, or Muerte a Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers), which had 
the avowed intent to put an end to kidnapping and extortion of cartel members and associates 
by guerrillas. Over the next three months, MAS claimed more than 100 assassinations in 
retribution for M-19's kidnapping of the sister of a cartel member. She was released 
unharmed in February 1982. 
According to the Minister of Justice, in 1988 there were some 140 death squads 
operating in the country. During this. time, Colombia was one~ again experiencing what Paul 
Oquist, speaking of la violencia, called a partial "breakdown of the state"5. Simply put, this 
breakdown meant that with a high probability of impunity, individuals or groups could 
pursue their goals (land, money, justice, and so on) through violence. In reference to this 
matter, Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline state: 
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"There simply was little likelihood that the Colombian law enforcement system 
would catch criminals or that the courts system would try them. The lack of public 
order worsened during the Barco years, when homicide became the major cause of 
death. While violence was coming from drug dealers, guerrilla groups, and death 
squads, the majority of the crime was unrelated to any of those groups. Colombia 
seemed to close observers to be in the "abyss", "screwed", or "at the edge of 
chaos."6 
The confrontation between guerrillas and narcotraffickers impacted the armed 
conflict because the parties involved looked for a greater capability to produce human and 
economic damage, by the clandestine acquisition of sophisticated weapons, communication 
systems, and transportation. The phenomenon commonly known as "paramilitarism" brought 
the "anarchyzation" of the conflict as well. If at the beginning its purpose was the 
elimination of the guerrillas and their support networks, little by little it aimed against 
everyone that opposed to narcotraffick such as journalists, priests, members of the armed 
forces, judges, and government officials, among others. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of 
the attacks among levels of the government for the drug industry and the death squads 
before the Gaviria' s negotiation with the traffickers. 7 With the creation of the National 
Police Elite Corps in 1988, and through joint operations with DAS and the Army, the 
government disarticulated those criminal groups. 
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Table 4.1 Assassinations Among Levels of Government 
The violence has been correctly perceived as an attack on the political structure of 
Colombia. But the violence is also an attack on ordinary people. Policemen, security officers, 
union activists,' and people with sympathies for the political left all died in great numbers 
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throughout the latter half of the 1980s. The death squads are by far the most important factor 
behind the rise in civilian murders. They are responsible for more than 90 percent of the 
murders of civilians. Civilians' share in the total of death squads murders climbed from less 
than 5 percent of the total in 1986, and less than 15 percent in 1987, to around 60 percent for 
1990 and 1991. Each year, approximately 85 percent of the civilian deaths occurred in 
massacres. The number of massacres (more than five people assassinated in one action) 
moved upward during the period as they became a more organized and institutionalized 
force. The number of massacres fell only in 1989, the year in which legal and law 
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Figure 4. 1 Death Squad's Massacres 
In contrast to death squads, the drug lords were responsible for only about 6 percent 
ofthe civilian death total. Yet here again, there has been a significant change in tactics. Prior 
to 1989 the drug industry rarely killed civilians because the latter were for the trafficker like 
a shield against government pressure. The change in tactics was the way to terrify the public 
into pressuring political leaders to support drug industry objectives. 
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4. Terrorism 
We define terrorism as the criminal activities set directed to obtain not an economic 
benefit, but to demonstrate the capability of inflicting a considerable social damage in case 
of not giving up to the criminals' demands. According to Martha Crenshaw, "terrorism 
against the state is a specialized form of organized political violence. Terrorist act result 
from decisions made by individuals who are members of identifiable organizations with 
distinctive characteristics. "8 
In the last decade (1987-1997) Colombia has suffered a double kind of terrorism: 
insurgent-terrorism, and narco-terrorism. The latter arose as the answer of drug dealers to 
government's offensive to eradicate this criminal phenomenon. Its initial objective was to 
force society to accept living together with business and negotiations of the narcotraffick. 
The main terrorist tactic was the selective assassination of everyone who spoke or operated 
against narcotraffick interests. 
The social phenomenon of sicarios (hired assassins) appeared and it was just as 
alarming as any other form of violence. They are gunmen at the service of the highest bidder. 
They have no loyalty or adherence to any of the organized groups. They were the material 
authors of the murders of ministers, an attorney general, policemen, military, journalists, 
judges, politicians, and human rights defenders. 
In contrast, death squads murders are concentrated at the local and departmental 
levels. Unlike the drug lords, the death squads less frequently attack security personnel, 
judges and legislators, and more frequently attack local officials such as mayors, union 
heads, and party leaders. Union Patri6tica members were repeatedly targeted for 
assassination and have claimed to have lost more than 2,000 party members since the party 
formed in the mid 1980s. 
Years later and facing the government and society's pressure, narcoterrorism 
modified its objective: to force the government to derogate the extradition treaty with the 
United States. They mixed the selective murder with the use of explosives in populated 
urban areas to cause massive deaths. The target were common citizens totally unrelated to 
governmental, judicial, or military business. The damages affected mainly private property. 
But the drug lords also wanted to initiate talks with the government in the same conditions 
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as the guerrilla groups. They were looking for negotiation, pardon, and reinsertion. To obtain 
this they appeal to a third terrorist tactics: kidnapping relatives of government's high 
officials with influence over their decisions. Appendix F shows the behavior of terrorism 
from 1987 until 1996. The valley or decreasing in 1990 was due to the expectations of the 
traffickers about the new government's offers, which included a guarantee against 
extradition in exchange for a confession of all crimes. 
The government never seriously considered a negotiation process with the drug 
barons. These barons had to take the only possible way: to surrender to be prosecuted by 
Colombian justice, avoiding their extradition to the United States. Some went to jail, but 
others died fighting against the government. Neutralization of narcoterrorism left a by-
product: many criminals that used to receive high pay, when realized that they were alone, 
without leaders, without organization, began by themselves to commit crimes that required 
good training and skills like bank robbery and kidnapping. 
The insurgent-terrorism is used by the guerrilla groups that conform the CGSB as a 
means or negotiation tactics within their strategy of revolutionary war against the state. Or 
the government accept their demands or they start a terrorist campaign against the 
infrastructure and the economy. As the state cannot agree with everything they ask for, then 
guerrilla's answer has been a series of terrorist acts which have made difficult government's 
efforts to negotiate peace. 
During Barco's administration (1986-1990) Colombia faced two wars: one against 
guerrilla groups and the other against narcotraffick (see Table 4.2). 
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Table 4. 2 Colombia: Two Wars (1988-1991) Armed Actions 
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In 1989 and 1990 drug cartels were the main agents of violence, above guerrilla 
actions. Patriotic Union (UP) members were killed by rightist groups (paramilitary) in 
retaliation for guerrilla attacks. Though most of these crimes were committed by common 
citizens, guerrillas blamed the army as responsible for them. However, this never was an 
institutionalized or official policy of the armed forces or the government, but isolated cases 
that were punished by the army itself through the standard procedure of court-marshals.9 
The possible connection between elements of the police and the armed forces with those 
bands is not a matter to be treated lightly, nor can be easily proven. For a variety of reasons, 
however, the public has been anxious about the matter, especially for the guerrilla groups 
accusations. Therefore, it behooves the government to make every effort to clarify the 
situation if it wants to avoid the definitive failure of the pacification process. It would have 
•' ' . . ' ' 
incalculable consequences for the generalization of a dirty war. 
Political assassinations continued during Barco's administration. Three presidential 
candidates were killed: Liberal Luis Carlos Galan, ADM-19 Carlos Pizarro, who had 
participated in the peace process, and UP's Bernardo Jaramillo. In each case the murderer 
was a sicario under narcotraffickers' orders. On the other hand, the growth of guerrilla 
squads consolidated. The income from criminal activities allowed them to improve their 
military equipment and to increase the number of combat units. In operational terms, ELN 
began to make terrorist acts against national economy in the oil sector. This turning in 
tactical procedures put it in thresholds of terrorism. (See Appendix F). 
5. From Dialogue Intent to Frontal War 
Gaviria's government (1990-1994) began with many projects for the guerrilla groups 
and for the narcotraffickers. He convoked the National Constituent Assembly (Asamblea 
Nacional Constituyente or ANC), which would be an argument against the armed struggle. 
He invited the belligerent guerrilla groups to negotiate and offered concessions such as 
the ratification of Geneva Protocols I and II, and accepting an international supervision of 
the peace process. The CGSB answered with an open letter to public opinion where they 
threatened with the initiation of a violent political stage, if the National Constituent 
Assembly -is convoked without "consulting" the guerrilla movement. Moreover, they 
conditioned their participation in the negotiation process to their participation in the ANC. 
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Gaviria also began negotiations with Medellin cartel's narcotraffickers, which 
allowed reduction of the most significative violent actions. Political assassinations reduced 
slightly, but fighting against guerrillas increased, in spite of the negotiations with the four 
groups M-19, EPL, PRT, and MQL. The proposals did not mean suspension of military 
operations. Armed forces had respected the concentration sites for those groups in the 
peace process, but simultaneously had developed operations against the F ARC and 
ELN. The army increased its efficiency mainly through the two Mobile Brigades, whose 
operational results included more dead guerrillas and the siege of some guerrilla squads in 
the countryside. 
The CGSB stroke back army operations by attacking infrastructure and economy, 
especially after the army raid against Casa Verde (Green House) on 09 December 1989. The 
increment of war actions in 1991 was notorious, exceeding 1988 top figures. In 1992, the 
average guerrilla actions would be 100 a month. (See Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2 Guerrilla Actions 
In January 1990, the FARC made public some documents that reflected the 
ambiguity of their political position. In one document they proposed that the president call 
people on a plebiscite to convoke a National Constituent Assembly for the preparation of 
a new Constitution. In another document which filtered to public opinion, the F ARC 
announced a plan called "Bolivarian Campaign for a new Colombia" where they established 
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FARC's preparation for a total offensive to seize power in 1997. 
Between January and August 1990, the F ARC had maintained a low operational level 
when compared with the ELN (an average of 14.6 actions per month). This situation changed 
in September when they increased to 25 actions per month, until November. Finally, 
guerrilla military operations increased in December, after the Casa Verde raid, up to 56 war 
actions. ELN, on the contrary, was more active year along, especially in the first semester, 
with an average of34 actions per month; during the second semester reduced to 26.6 actions 
per month, having December the least number of operations. In the case ofELN its intense 
military operating war related to electoral process. In fact, February, March, and May were 
the months with the largest number of war actions. The increment once Gaviria took office 
in August 1990 was due to the pressure both guerrilla groups exercised to be accepted in the 
ANC. 
November 1990 was the starting point for the intensification of guerrilla actions, as 
the expression of its tactics of combining all the "means of struggle". As guerrilla movement 
was ousted from democratic fight, it increased armed struggle as a way of gaining presence 
at national level, and of making government fell its military capability. The CGSB, they 
said, was not a defeated guerrilla, ready to negotiate under any condition, as M-19 did 
previously, and other groups were doing at that time. On November 10, guerrilla attacked 
the advanced headquarters of an infantry battalion and assassinated its commander, a 
lieutenant colonel, and other commissioned officer, NCOs, and soldiers. Some other were 
taken prisoners. On the next day, in the south of the country, they perpetrated the most cruel 
and barbarian action by killing nine children while traveling in a bus. Reaction of the 
media, the citizenry and the government was immediate. The Guerrillas looked like 
assassins. The war they were waging never would be won by killing innocent people. 
Government stopped direct negotiations and conditioned any dialogue to the liberation of 
the civilian and military kidnaped by the guerrilla, and to the unilateral cease-fire. 
With the always same discourse, guerrilla spokespersons blamed the government for 
the deteriorated order public situation; they blamed also armed forces of conducting 
aggressive-operations against peasants in different areas nationwide. Some days later, the 
CGSB insisted in a bilateral truce for an indefinite time. They said that disagreements about 
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the kind of truce to be adopted to initiate the talks have frustrated the dialogue possibilities. 
The Minister of Government (currently Minister ofthe Interior) reminded guerrilla groups 
that the due date for those interested in participating in the ANC was close. The CGSB 
leaders said that they wanted to have serious talks with those members of the Assembly who 
would be elected on 9 December 1990. 
The same day of the elections, the army launched a great offensive against Casa 
Verde, the guerrilla headquarters. The government established in this way that the 
constitutional reforms would be initiated with the guerrilla groups that turned over their 
weapons and quit fighting. Those who continued on arms would be reduced by force. The 
government wanted to beat F ARC leadership to consolidate by force the strike that by the 
facts (de facto) guerrilla received in its legitimacy. Next day guerrillas manifested publicly 
that they understood that the government had canceled the possibilities of a negotiated 
solution, and that it would be responsible for that. They, of course, announced the begin of 
a war with unpredictable consequences. 
From then until mid January 1991, the CGSB carried out 84 criminal acts in 18 
departments, where 64 members of the armed forces and 26 civilians were killed by the 
rebels; they caused large damages to national energetic and communications infrastructure. 
The national petroleum company, or ECOPETROL, valuated its losses during January in 
$130 million because of insurgent-terrorism. During the year tactics of insurgent terrorism 
consisted of criminal acts against petroleum industry, --especially destruction of pipelines 
and installations--, crude oil spilling with its sequel of exports reduction, ecological damages 
against electric, transportation, and communications sectors. 
In May they seized Venezuelan embassy in Bogota to pressure the government to 
initiate a direct dialogue. During the Caracas talks on 3 June the CGSB representatives 
warned that the purpose of the negotiation was not guerrillas' demobilization in exchange 
of political concessions, but the search of solutions to Colombian problems. In other words, 
they spoke "on behalf of' the people. But who gave them this right? Nobody. In July, while 
the nation celebrated the promulgation of the new Constitution, the CGSB launched a 
terrorist offensive that destroyed electric towers, bridges, gasoline and oil pipelines, and 




about 90,000 families were left without natural gas, and big regions in the Eastern plains 
were isolated from the rest of the country for the blowing of bridges. One runway in 
Cartagena airport was made useless by a bomb. 
The citizens in most of departments made popular demonstrations against the 
guerrilla's terrorist actions. In early August, Manuel Marulanda a.k.a. Tirofijo (Sure-Shot), 
chief of the F ARC, sent to Colombian Communist Party a videotape where he said: 
"Comrades, we are close to the seizure of power. Guerrilla is ·still valid, and by using our 
weapons we will take power."10 These declarations were in the opposite direction to the 
Caracas talks and negotiation process. In September, the CGSB attacked the escorts of the 
president of the Congress and killed seven persons in his party. In the following months they 
kidnaped former ministers and politicians, 11 blew several financial institutions allegedly in 
favor of economic openness. Appendix F show the tendency of kidnapping between 197 6 
and 1992. Appendix G presents statistics about Colombian guerrillas' actions. 
Government set 15 March as the due date for the demobilized groups participated in 
the ANC. The CGSB understood this legitimacies game, and therefore, increased its war 
actions in the eve of the inauguration of the Assembly. On 5 February 1991, they conducted 
about 50 simultaneous actions nationwide, with the neat objective of sabotaging the 
legislative corps. Facing this situation, civil society began to pressure to find a negotiated 
solution with the rebels. There was a rising tendency in terrorism. From 1987 to 1990 it was 
mainly N arcoterrorism; in 1991 and 1992 it was predominant insurgent. 
In 1992 there were 1104 cases ofterrorism, which represented an increment of 19.22 
percent when compared with the 926 cases in 1991. During the two periods the operational 
characteristics are the same, and the groups involved are organized crime and guerrilla 
groups. Therefore, the most affected areas were those where guerrilla, private justice groups, 
and narcotraffickers were present and conducted operations. 
6. National Strategy against Violence 
On 19 May 1991, the government made public its strategy to face armed violence, 
on the basis of three main purposes and five very broad policies. The purposes were: 1) to 
guarantee government's armed institutions the monopoly of the use of force; 2) to recover 
the state's capability to administrate justice through the investigation and punishment of 
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crimes; 3) and, to broaden nationwide the institutional presence of the government. 
The general purpose of this presidential initiative was to invalidate political violence, 
especially armed struggle. The plan had objectives covering different areas: social, political, 
economic, judicial, and military. Somehow, it intended to resolve some problems 
government recognized as its duty and not the result of a negotiation with insurgent groups. 
With the annihilation of the Medellin and Cali cartels, terrorism reduced considerably 
in the big cities. However, it is not an overcome problem because insurgent "urban militia" 
have taken the place. In fact, "conflict urbanization" has been one of the main objectives of 
the insurgents, and therefore, this kind of terrorism is not going to disappeared in the short-
term. In 1994, terrorism cases increased in 84.19% compared with the previous year (1352 
cases in 1994 versus 734 cases in 1993). Some bomb-cars in Bucaramanga and Cucuta in 
March 1997 were a work ofELN's urban militia, trying to create confusion in the citizenry. 
The F ARC and ELN have continued strengthening their influence over local 
authorities, at municipal level. Killing and resignation of mayors have been two modes 
guerrilla groups threaten population in the countryside, especially in those very far areas 
with no presence of public force. Through these methods guerrillas try to demonstrate, in 
violent way, the validity of the armed struggle. In the last three years (1994-1997) 
government has lost its legitimacy because of the well known "Process 8,000" that linked 
narcotraffick financial support to Ernesto Sam per's presidential campaign. All this has 
benefited the position of guerrilla groups about corruption in politics, and made insurgent 
leaders declared that they were not going to negotiate with the incumbent government. Thus, 
the possibility for peace in Colombia is, at least on the guerrilla side, closed until 07 August 
1998 when the new president will take office. 
B. ELSALVADOR 
The intensity of the conflict in El Salvador cannot be described by just looking at 
numbers. The human and economic loses were significant, but the conflict also attacked 
and damaged the deep roots of society, its values, its faith. However, the Salvadoran people 
were never_ brought to theirs knees and they not only said no to communism but also to any 
kind of illegitimate repression. 
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The conflict in El Salvador needs to be seen from the social and economical 
perspectives, because their impact was decisive to shape the negotiation process and the 
future of the republic. We will present these perspectives using two frames: the escalation 
of the violence and the social-economical impact upon Salvadoran society. 
1. The Escalation of Violence 
El Salvador death and injury rate climbed to over 36,000 people by 1982, and by 
1992. almost 100,000 people had lost their lives The war precipitated a variety of forms of 
violence which are important in understanding the effect of the protracted conflict12. One 
type of violence, in the one generated directly by insurgency and counter-insurgency-
operations, when the government troops clash against guerrillas. The purpose of these 
operations is to win ground, control the populace, and eventually win the war. When 
guerrillas clashed with troops, many people died, both, intentionally and accidentally. 
Terrorism was a second and more widespread type of violence used by the left wing 
and right wing extremists. Terrorism was used as a tactic for killing trained personnel of the 
opposite side and for forcing the adversary into submission. The FMLN used terrorism to 
force excesses on the incumbent government to erode their public support. In El Salvador 
a death threat from the guerrilla was enough to make people flee. This type of violence also 
was intended to paralyze the economy. The FMLN, blew up electrical power grids and 
bridges, destroyed crops, burned buses, blocked highways, ambushed railroad cars and 
bombed buildings. Salvadoran guerrillas also used terrorism to frighten away foreign capital 
and businesses, to encourage flight of money from the nation's economy, to cast an aura of 
fear over soldiers and security forces, to persuade villagers into supporting revolution, and 
to encourage defection from the armed forces. 
A third kind of violence is the crime of opportunity, which accompanies all unstable 
situations. Just as looting inevitably follows natural disasters; theft, kidnaping, and holdups 
had followed the political chaos in El Salvador. Personal and impulsive crimes were easily 
committed when large quantities of guns are accessible, and law enforcement is almost 
nonexistent. The existence of this type of violence is what makes very difficult to keep an 
accurate record of specific terrorist activity. 
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In El Salvador the areas of operation of the FMLN and the armed forces were 
superposed and the whole country was witnessing combat and destruction, especially in the 
last years of the conflict. As we stated in Chapter III, the guerrillas in El Salvador presented 
a united front after 1980. They developed a unified military strategy considering the whole 
territory as the theater of war. The military strategy of the armed forces and FMLN changed 
over time and every phase developed different degree of military intensity, however the 
society as a whole was kept under continuous and increasing pressure and terror. 
Before the violence escalated to take the dimensions of a civil war, there was a period 
of systematic repression from the old guard of the government, which was trying to suppress 
a communist revolution. Later the armed forces, with the aid and the pressure of the U.S. 
government evolved into a professional counterinsurgency force holding democratic 
principles. 
The FMLN developed its own strategy over a period of twelve years of armed 
conflict, and not only did it apply the lessons of such conflicts as Vietnam, Angola, 
Rhodesia, and others, but also provided with modem weaponry from individual riffles to 
ground-to-air missiles. It developed a sophisticated communication net and secrets codes that 
gave it a greater command and control ability. This is also allowed it to developed an 
efficient logistical apparatus, which sustained the organizations throughout the course of the 
war. 13 The military strategy ofProlonged Popular War went through important changes, a 
product ofthe actions ofthe armed forces. 
We have divided the conflict in four phases or periods. These phases are directly 
tied to the change in the military strategy. Death Squads terrorism, war of movement, war 
of attrition and peace negotiations. 
a. Death Squad Terrorism and Organization ofthe FMLN, (1970-
1980) 
After the military coup of 1979, the military-dominated junta saw elections 
and political and economic reforms as the key to legitimate government but it was either 
unwilling or unable to call a halt to the repressive measures that were being employed to 
staunch the war. 14 The efforts of these reform-minded officers to demand fundamental 




and more conservative officers who, on the back of the government, initiated a campaign of 
terror and assassina~ion against activists of the reform movement. Hundreds of corpses 
turned up every month. These killings were charged to the government security forces and 
paramilitary death squads . According to Linda Robinson, the coup by reformist officers had 
convinced many in the wealthy class that the military had abandoned the as the protectors 
of their privileges, so they looked elsewhere for protection. Landowner, she says, funded 
these death squads to fight the expropriation of their lands, which had been mandated by the 
1979 coup-makers. 
The Maximiliano Hermindez Martinez Anti-Communist Brigade (named after 
the general who led the matanza in 1932) and other such groups claimed the responsibility 
for many of the deaths, which peaked at about eight hundred a month in the early 1980s. 
This group claimed to have executed five leaders of the FDR in November 1980 and warned 
"the priests who have an affinity for the terrorist Marxist bands that they will have the same 
fate if they insist in their sermons on poisoning the minds of Salvadorean youth". 15 
The levels of abuse correlated closely with the rise and fall of the war's 
intensity. In 1980 an 1981, the threat was insurrection, with the cities as the main battle field. 
The Right's reaction resulted in the deaths of a majority of the nearly ten thousand who died 
in 1980. 
The National University, which is autonomous by law, was occupied by the 
National Guard in 1980 and remained closed until 22 May 1984. During 1983, three 
professors were killed and twenty students were captured or disappeared. 16 This had a strong 
impact on the intellectual national and international community which accused the 
government of violating the right to free press and expression. 
The operative model in this period was guerilla warfare that basically 
consisted of the means by which to organized the insurgent structure. Every combat action 
was oriented toward the organization of the military cadre and the support infrastructure 
b. War of Movement: Conventional Tactics (1980-1984) 
During this period, the war in El Salvador reached its operational peak. In 
January 1"981 the newly united guerrilla front, the FMLN, launched a military "final 
offensive" designed to trigger a popular insurrection to overthrow the conservative regime. 
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The main cities of the country came under attack, but Salvadoran Armed Forces was able 
to beat back the offensive, and the lack of popular support was the main factor of failure. 
After this failure, the FMLN concentrated in building its guerrilla armies and securing 
sanctuary. When the left next attempted national mobilization (combined with significant 
military actions) in 1983 and 1984, its adherents again met with widespread repression. Thus 
far from being unpredictable or continuous, right-wing abuses escalated only when the threat 
of insurrection arose. 17 
The operative model in these period was the war of movement. This model 
was based on concepts of regular warfare. During this time, the military side of the insurgent 
organization was made up of platoons, columns or detachments, battalions, and brigades. 
The strategy of the FMLN during this time was to liberate territory through what it called 
decisive battles, where the military side of equation predominated, particulary in rural areas 
of the nation. However, at the same time, acts of terrorism in urban areas zones also 
increased. All the military effort was aimed at liberating territory to support a diplomatic 
effort gamer support and international recognition for itself as a legitimate belligerent. The 
units which faced each other were large size. At the same time, the Salvadoran armed forces 
reached their peak in terms of growth and professional development. 18 The armed forces 
were able to neutralize the brigade and battalion size elements of the FMLN. 
The terrorism continued to punish Salvadoran society, the government 
repression was also considerable, however some changes took place especially because of 
international pressures. According to the data presented to the University's Center of 
Information of the Universidad Centroamericana (Central American University), located 
in San Salvador, for 1983 and the first months of 1984, in comparison with 1982, there 
were quantitative changes.19 (See Table 4.3) 
YEAR KILLED KIDNAPPED/DISAPPEARED 
1982 4,419 1,045 
1983 2,375 1,336 
1984 (to 31 May) 496 322 
Table 4.3 Victims of the Left and Right Extremists 
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The government and the F1\1LN, blamed each other for these victims. One way or the 
other, the Salvadoran society was victimized by the high levels of political violence. 
During this period the economic sector of the society suffered considerable attacks 
from the F.MLN. This situation affected indirectly the general population. This effects were 
rapidly translated into hunger, poverty, unemployment and more general unrest. During the 
early 1980s, for example, the economic production declined dramatically. The growth rates 
achieved between 1984 and 1988, could not even equal the level of economic activities 
experimented in the 1970s, in despite of the massive aid coming from friendly countries. In 
the agriculture sector, the main resource income of the country Coffee and Cotton suffered 
important losses. In 1984 the coffee harvest saw a 3 5 percent decline in production. The 
main coffee grower association said there was U.S. $360 million less for taxes and salaries, 
and a 49 percent reduction from the previous year. The cotton harvest declined by 34 
percent.20 In August 1983, the Planning Minister informed the Assembly that the cost of the 
damage from the armed struggle had surpassed U.S. $597 million. The Chamber of 
Commerce issued a report recounting the social losses due to violence between 1979 and 
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Source: "Costos Sociales" Procesos review 135, San Salvador, UNSA 
Press, Dec 1983. p. 34 
Table 4.4 Damage Caused by FMLN's Terrorist Actions (1979-1983) 
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The urban insurrection was quelled in 1984, and war moved to the countryside as 
rebels found refuge in the northern and eastern parts of the country. This year, President 
Jose Napoleon Duarte took office, the military with the aid of the United States had achieved 
a high degree of professionalism and the military leadership was committed to respect 
human rights and democratic values. However, many sectors of Salvadoran society still 
resented the past violence it had witnessed and suffered from the old military tendency. 
c. War of Attrition (1985-1989) 
After the armed forces neutralized the large units of the Fl\1LN, the guerrilla 
rethought its war plan within Prolonged Popular War and basically adopted attrition warfare. 
The main targets of this strategy were the army and the most important national economic 
zones. Attrition warfare consisted largely of mine warfare in which the massive use of 
explosives caused an unprecedented development of homemade weaponry, which was within 
the means of any guerilla and militia unit. These weapons became a forces multiplier in both 
the rural and the urban areas. 
To develop this operational change, the Fl\1LN implemented what it called 
the "Strategic Dispersion", with the objective of diminishing the great number of casualties 
the armed forces had been inflicting. Battalions and brigades dispersed into platoon-size 
units in the areas of the greatest guerrilla persistence. During this time, peace talks were 
more frequent, but were used as a diversionary tactic to allow the rebuilding and rearming 
of the guerrillas with weapons that caused even greater escalation. Such was the case with 
the acquisition of ground-to-air SA-7 and SA-14 missiles, weapons that curbed the use of 
the Salvadoran air forces and army mobility. At the end of this period, the Fl\1LN launched 
the long-awaited Strategy Counter-Offensive,"Until the limit,"with the objective ofwining 
a significant victory. However, this offensive was contained by the ability of the armed 
forces, but especially because of the lack of popular support. 22 
In 1985, the new air tactics developed by the air force encouraged a shift in 
guerrilla's tactics, such as movement into urban areas and an increased resort to 
kidnapping. 23 Militarily, the move to the cities meant creating urban organizations that could 
attack soldiers (including U.S. personnel), officials and installations. This kind of combat 
reduced the effectiveness of air warfare but, it was likely to escalate the intensity of violence 
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and counter violence in the major cities.Z4 
The urban activities of the FMLN fell into three categories: attacks by urban 
terrorists on military targets, attacks on high profile civilians, and non-violent strikes an 
other protests. We offer just some of the main terrorist actions to illustrate the FMLN 
activity during this period. 
In June 1985, guerrillas raided an outdoor cafe, in the capital, killing four 
marines from the U.S.Embassy, two American businessmen and seven Latin American 
civilians. The most dramatic kidnapping was of President Duarte's daughter in September 
1985. The insurgent exchanged the president's daughter and twenty three kidnapped 
Christian Democratic mayors for rebel prisoners-including a number of important leaders-
that had been captured by the military.Z5 The cafe raid followed a number of other guerrilla's 
attacks including one on a prison near the capital in which guerrillas freed scores of people, 
many of them political prisoners. 
In 1989 the FMLN increased its political warfare. The guerrilla launched 
widespread terrorism against the electorate in the 1989 presidential election. In an attempt 
to destabilized the government, the FMLN assassinated 8 mayors in 1988 and sent word to 
the others that the same thing could happen to them if they remain in office. By early March 
1989, 131 out of262 mayors had resigned, leaving 50 percent ofthe Salvadoran cities and 
towns without municipal chiefs. The FMLN has also targeted justices of the peace for the 
same treatment.Z6 
Beginning in November 1988, the FMLN launched terrorist attacks (mostly 
bombings), in San Salvador, against the headquarters of the National Guard, the Armed 
Forces Joint Staff, the Treasury Police, The National Police, the Navy Command, and the 
Presidential House. During this period ~he FMLN forces also attacked guard posts and 
garrisons around the country. Most of the attacks caused minimal damage and few 
casualties, although thirty five people- mostly civilians were wounded in the attack to the 
Joint Staff installations. 
In May 1989, after an attack on a bus in which eight civilians were killed, the 
FMLN issued an apology but also warned civilians to stay clear of military and security 
facilities. While not military successes, these attacks signaled an escalation in the war and 
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raised the level of tension among the populace. The FMLN also stepped up its assaults on 
high profile civilians associated with the government or conservative circles. 
In January 1989, the house of former Defense Minister Carlos Eugenio Vides 
Casanova's mother was attacked. Shortly thereafter, on February 16, a former top FMLN 
commander," Miguel Castellanos" (his real name was Napoleon Romero Garcia) who had 
defected from the FPL four years earlier, was killed. 
On March 15, Francisco Peccorini Letona, 27 a conservative Jesuit intellectual, 
was murdered. The editorial Director of the conservative journal Ana/isis Carlos Ernesto 
Mendoza, lost his arm in April 5 bomb attack on his house while he was having lunch with 
his family. On April 12, the Attorney General Roberto Garcia Alvarado was killed by a 
sophisticated explosive affixed to the roof of his car directly above him. In the same month, 
the home of Vice President and Interior Minister Francisco Merino, was also bombed. 
Merino was in the United States at the time, but a child in the house was wounded. 
Most of the killings were not widely reported in the United States. But on 
June 9, 1989, Antonio Rodriguez Porth, the cabinet-ranked minister of the presidency and 
top intellectual of ARENA (the party in government), was machine-gunned, along with his 
bodyguard. The killing did receive the attention of the media, and some U.S. congressman 
began to focus on the pattern of assassinations in El Salvador, which suggested that there 
was a campaign to strike at the brain of the Right. 28 
On June 30, the head of the Institute oflntemational Relations, ARENA party 
leader Edgar Chacon, was shot while driving in San Salvador with his wife. On July 19, 
another director of Chacon's Institute was shot and wounded. Col. Robert Armando Rivera, 
the Chief of the Fire Department, was assassinated on June 26. The FMLN said that Rivera 
qualified as a military target since the former head of the National Military Academy was 
performing covert intelligence functions. 
Almost six months after the ARENA Government took office--on November 
11, 1989-- the FMLN launched a massive offensive that clearly had been planned well in 
advance. The guerrillas took over many neighborhoods of the capital and other major cities, 
obligating the government forcess to engage in block-by-block fighting. As the scope of the 
offensive became apparent, the government restarted the use of massive but selective forces. 
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However the FMLN hid behind the populace causing hundreds of civilian casualties. The 
guerrilla withdrew after about a week, only to reappear in the wealthy neighborhood of San 
Salvador, as it to make the high class to feel closely the effects of the war. 
By launching those generalized offensives in the main cities and conducting 
the assassinations of political figures. The rebels had tried to demonstrate their strength, but 
they also realized lack of support for a generalized insurrection. As many as one thousand 
people died and thousands more were wounded. The assassination of prominent 
conservatives resumed with the murder of former Supreme Court President Francisco Jose 
Guerrero on November 28. The guerrilla offensive did not bring the government to its knees 
as expected by the FMLN but it did demonstrate that, while both sides could continue 
inflicting damage, neither could win the war by the military means?9 
d. Peace Negotiations, 1990-1992 
This period was characterized by the search for a settlement to finally end the 
conflict. This was motivated by lack of popular support and because of the effects of the fall 
of the communist model took away the ideological foundation of the Salvadoran 
revolutionary movement . During this time period the FMLN continued its military actions 
using rapid concentration to attack an isolated target, and immediate dispersion after the 
action to avoid the army reaction. This period was also characterized by the increase in 
sabotage ofthe national economy and the illegal occupation of property, and an increase in 
kidnapping and other terrorist acts. Despite all of the FMLN' s strategic adjustments, it was 
never able to carry out its dream of a violent revolutionary triumph and total control of the 
state. 
2. The Social and Economical Impact 
Besides the cost in lives and injuries, the conflict was responsible for the deepening 
of the problems of poverty, unemployment and the impossibility to fulfill basics needs of the 
population. According to the data offered by the Salvadoran Ministry ofPlanning, at the 
beginning ofthe 90s, two third ofthe Salvadoran population, around 3.5 millions were poor, 
and about a third of those, about 1.5 millions lived in conditions of extreme poverty. 
The pattern of social behavior had also suffered deviations due to the armed violence. 
The disintegration of the Salvadoran families is one of the main effects of the conflict, with 
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its multiples social and educational consequences. Another phenomenon was the external 
and internal migrations of families which abandoned their original homes, mostly children 
and housewives, trying to run away from violence. 
The economy crisis reached its deepest crisis in 1988. Analysts believed that a 
catastrophic collapse was imminent if a process of stabilization did not begin immediately, 
overall peace was an urgent necessity if the economy was to be recovered in a short term 
and a long term development was to be possible. Due to the conflict and the consequent 
reduction of the levels of investment, the labor market was very limited to absorb the 
increase in the labor supply, especially in the urban areas. This provoked an unprecedented 
increase in the informal economical activities, increasing the levels of underemployment. 
The conflict struck directly the level of production of goods and services, and also the 
normal development of the activities of the society, in general. This was due not just to the 
destruction of the physical, productive and social, infrastructure; but also by the of unstable 
climate generated, which limited the savings, the levels of investment and consequently, the 
capacity of generating employment and production. The damage caused to the infrastructure 
during the period 1980-1990, is estimated a over U.S. $1.5 billion. (See Table 4.5) 
Another social impact was the degradation of the value system, because of the failure 
of the church to remain out of the conflict. The Salvadoran society has had a Catholic 
tradition, this was the main source of ethical strength. During the conflict, this particular 
characteristic of their value system weakened very intensely. The Church and religious 
persons in general were supposed to offer spiritual hope. Far from this they turned into 
instrument to wage the war. 
In El Salvador, as in the rest of Latin America, the Roman Catholic Church has 
always played a significant role in politics. Father Jon Sobrino, a Jesuit priest affiliated with 
the Jesuit University in El Salvador, wrote a fascinating piece called "Death and hope for 
Life". In it, he indirectly argues for the legitimation of insurgency, the prolonged struggle, 
and the war ofliberation by elements of the Catholic Church. This was an important factor 
in the guerrilla strategy of prolonged conflict because it gave moral sanction to the process. 
Moreover; the world had paid little attention to El Salvador until three momentous events 
occurred: the killing of San Salvador's Archbishop Oscar A. Romero on 24 march 1980, the 
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murder of four American church women on 3 December 1980, and the killing of several 
Jesuit priests and two lay women at Jesuit University in November 1989.30 
SECTOR DIRECT INDIRECT TOTAL RECONSTRUCTION 
COSTS COSTS COSTS COSTS 
Electric Energy 63.7 19l.ll3 254.813 310.590 
Telecommunications 84.768 242.269 327.037 340 
Water supply 5.768 351.910 357.891 375 
Railroad tracks 25.270 66.393 91.663 77 
Bridges and roads 65.364 233.342 298.706 285 
Airports ---------- 26.152 26.152 36 
Seaports ---------- 26.554 26.554 26 
Transportation 43.637 50.704 93.341 66 
Education 2.125 8.9 11.025 12.5 
Health .125 17.5 17.625 17.7 
Municipal facilities .25 1 1.250 1.250 
Housing 5 15 20 23 
Agriculture 32.75 20 52.750 57.5 
TOTAL 328.757 1,250.837 1,579.807 1,627.54 
Source: Ministry of Planning. El Salvador's Government (Millions of U.S.$) 
Table 4.5 Accumulated Cost of the Damages of the Armed Conflict 
Rafael Menjivar, 31 in his analysis of Salvadoran politics, sees the church as a tactical 
instrument in the Central American war."The CIA," he observed,"counsels not to attack the 
church as an institution, but instead to establish a division between progressive and those 
who are not." In his view, "having identified communist priest who are betraying the 
evangelical message of Christ, the CIA would then be able to kill or persecute the clergy in 
the name of the Unification Church founded by the intent of wining the war against 
communism". Thus, religion came to be a moral sanction for the justification for prolonged 
struggle for both sides, the government as well as the guerrillas. 32 This was another element 
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that eroded the value system of the society. This damage can not be measured, but it 
undeniably, exists.At the end of the 90's it was clear for the armed forces and the FMLN that 
a military victory was not possible. However they felt threatened, not just in the battlefield, 
but in their homes. The battlefield indeed was found everywhere within the country. 
The political and economic elites have experienced the intensity of the struggle, and 
of course the lower classes were tired of violence. They all realized that it was time to make 
concessions and saw the negotiated peace as the only alternative to survive and bring the 
country back on its feet. Even though there are still problems related to social injustice, the 
people of El Salvador decided to look for solutions in the democratic process instead of 
continuing with a fratricide war that far from improving the living conditions, was only 
offering more terror, destructicm a~d fear. 
C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The intensity of the conflicts in Colombia and El Salvador has to be analyzed from 
the perspective of the several groups in every society: the armed forces, the guerrilla 
movements, the political sectors, the economic sectors and the people in general. After all, 
some of these groups were the ones responsible for the violence generated, suffered from it, 
and pushed, supported or resisted the peace negotiations. 
Before analyzing these groups, we need to consider some general factors affecting 
the development of the conflict, namely geography and population. These important factors, 
although not directly related with the intensity of the conflict, they contributed to shape the 
effects' magnitude of the war over the population. 
Colombia has an area ofapprox. 1,138,914 Km2 and a population of33,424,000 for 
density of 29.3 h/km2. In its southern territory Colombia has large extensions of virgin 
jungle inhabited mainly by Indian tribes. El Salvador has an area of 21,040 km2 and a 
population of 5.5 million for a density of 256 h/km2. There are no jungles and no Indian 
tribes in El Salvador. 
With and area about 54 times larger, with jungles and a population only 6 times 
bigger than-El Salvador's, Colombia has more space and conditions for a guerrilla forces to 
develop in isolated areas, thus allowing military operations to take place mainly in those 
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areas which are evidently more protective for the guerrilla groups. In despite of urban 
terrorism, most of the military operations are conducted in the jungle. The Colombian Army 
was small compared to El Salvador's during the conflict, in relation to the territory. The air 
mobility of Salvadoran armed forces was very much higher than Colombia's, considering 
the number of helicopters available, given that this is an strategic capability to conduct 
modern anti-guerrilla warfare. El Salvador had over 50 helicopters fully operational while 
Colombia had just about 25. 
This relative isolation of the military action, has prevented in high degree the number 
of innocent victims among the populace. In El Salvador, most of the military actions were 
developed close to populated areas, besides the fact that the FMLN brought the war to the 
cities in an attempt to achieve a general insurrection and to pressure the government to make 
.·. - - . ~ ·- ·. '- -
concessions. 
Table 4.6 presents a summary of the main variables we have discussed. The numbers 
are estimated from the several sources consulted. Authors differed in the exact numbers, but 
overall, according to our experience, this figures are a fair representation of the two realities. 
Refer to appendix E for a detailed report on human casualties. 
VARIABLES COLOMBIA ELSALVADOR 
Guerrillas' Offensives None Two major offensives 
Location of the action Generally isolated Affected all the territory 
Military casualties 10,000 (10% of the forces) 30,000 (49% ofthe forces) 
Guerrilla casualties 18,000 30,000 
Civilian casualties 16,000 60,000 
Economic Impact High but not critical Close to collapse 
Social impact (displaced) 150,000 1.5 million 
Governability Acceptable V e_IY difficult 
Table 4.6 Comparative Perspective of the Conflicts in Colombia and El Salvador 
99 
1. Violence from the Right's Extremists 
In El Salvador during the late 70s and early 80s, the society experienced high levels 
of violence from the left and right extremists. The old guard of the military and the some 
government officials, in an attempt to prevent general insurrection, punished the society with 
systematic and in some instances, brutal repression. This polarized the society and 
contributed to increase the levels of violence. Colombia has not developed this massive 
level of repression, as it happened under the military dictatorships of the Southern cone and 
Central America. The dirty war has functioned outside the executive, though the 
government's enemies blame it of tolerant. The massacres had been a retaliation form for the 
guerrillas or death squads, but unfortunately they have involved civilians. Though we can 
argue that the war had been kept between the armed forces and the guerrilla. However, the 
people have began to understand that the counter-insurgency war commits every citizen, not 
just the armed forces. In El Salvador, from the beginning of the conflict most of the people 
were affected in one way or another and they were also terrorized by both the right and the 
left extremists. 
2. The Military 
In El Salvador, all the members of the armed forces, faced the enemy in the military 
operations and also in the cities, and their families were threatened and attacked. That is a 
pressure soldiers can not get used to. For more than ten years the military units were taking 
casualties, living in the field and facing the dirty mine warfare. In 1989 the armed forces had 
to fight in the main cities with no rest for about 12 days. Even though the battle was won 
those images of damage and death of innocent people, relatives and friends; caused an 
important impact in the attitude of the armed institution which was trying to minimized the 
effects of the war on the population and the economy. The balance ofthe conflict left around 
30,000 between dead and wounded, that is equivalent to 40 infantry battalions neutralized 
in 12 years (See Appendix E). Many officers and enlisted were killed at home and many 
families were hurt while their relative military was chasing guerrillas. Every operation was 
a new hope to finish the conflict, and they ended up every time with more casualties and no 
trace of a· military victory. The weaponry and equipment became scarce. Gradually the 
military, came to realize that this was not a military struggle exclusively but a social 
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phenomenon. This conflict had to be resolved by other means, it demanded social reforms, 
economic growth and political settlement. The members of the Institution were tired of 
uncertainty, because the load of the armed forces was not just the violence itself, but all the 
national and international pressures. Military leaders decided to support the political 
attempts to solve the problems even though they knew that the armed forces had to pay a 
high price in the short run. Eventually all the concessions would pay off by increasing the 
prestige and professionalism of the armed forces in the long run. 
In Colombia, due to the size of the country, most of the time, the main areas of 
guerrilla operations have not been close to the main cities. The military has the assignment 
for its members of"Public Order" as a especial category which means counter insurgency. 
Not all the mi!itary_personnel is in that category, so we may argue that not all the military 
personnel are under continuous pressure. The anti-guerrilla operations are being conducted 
by a small percentage ofthe Army and the casualty rate so far has not reached the level that 
it did in El Salvador. The guerrilla groups in Colombia, as a general rule, does not target 
military families in the cities. We may argue that the armed forces is not placing all its 
potential to defeat the guerrilla, probably because it has not become a national priority as it 
had in El Salvador. The Colombian Armed Forces have faced the government's lack of 
political willingness to finish this bloody war, which have been reflected in the cuts of the 
military budget. 
3. The Economic Sector 
The economy in El Salvador was hurt really bad. The only reason because id did not 
collapse was the massive economic aid coming from the outside. The agriculture sectors and 
all the public services were reporting huge damages that could not be sustain any longer 
without international support. This support was not certain and the. destruction had to be 
stopped. The economic classes view the peace negotiations as the best way to avoid 
economic collapse and also to start increasing profits. As we will see in chapter V they got 
involved and started to support those negotiations. In Colombia the economy has suffered, 
but not with the magnitude ofEl Salvador's. 
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4. The People 
In El Salvador, the people were victimized by the three types of violence described. 
Guerrilla war, terrorism and common delinquency. They were in the middle of crossed fire 
during the major offensives launched by the FlMLN. They witnessed the assassination of 
respected and loved citizens, children and many innocent people, knowing that anyone 
could be next. The FlMLN when it did not find support among the people did not care 
anymore about hurting them, as long as they pressure the government to negotiate. The 
people in the countryside was living in terror due to the mines used indiscriminately by the 
guerrilla which caused about 3, 000 victims among civilian population. Both the FJMLN and 
the government were finding difficult to get support to conduct any kind of violence. People 
wanted peace desperately and they demanded it through the media, and through civil 
organizations which also got involved in the process. 
In Colombia, regular people have never been exposed to these levels of violence, and 
they are somehow indifferent, in relative terms, to the political game, even to the war itself 
4. The Guerrilla 
The high mobility and effectiveness achieved toward the end of the conflict, posed 
a permanent and credible threat to the guerrilla forces in El Salvador. The geography and 
the size of the country did not offered advantages to the FlMLN. Insurgents felt threatened, 
they were taking casualties every day and during the last battle for the capital they lost 
hundreds of men, and several tons of weapons. They were a exhausted guerrilla movement 
and they knew that they could not have defeated the armed forces, especially when the lack 
of popular support was so evident. 
In Colombia, the size and geography of the country is advantageous for the guerrilla 
forces besides they do not depend on popular support to exist. They can coexist with the 
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V. THE PEACE PROCESSES 
To be successful, any negotiation process should begin with a genuine will of 
reaching a real solution based on mutual confidence. Negotiation requires a willingness to 
compromise, and both sides must make concessions. Neither side should expect to get all it 
originally wanted, not even if the objectives are modest. Ifboth sides negotiate in good faith, 
they can always find a fair solution, especially when the negotiators represent broad interests 
within a given society. The trade off between peace and justice will be always present in 
social conflict resolution, and there is always a point where the contender can agree. 
Negotiation denotes a process that is different from tacit bargaining or other behavior that 
regulates conflict. As Charles Ikle puts it "negotiation is a process in which explicit 
proposals agree on an exchange or on the realization of common interest where conflicting 
interests are present". 1 
The peace processes in Colombia and El Salvador are very complex. There are many 
political and social variables involved. This is obviously not an attempt to analyze in detail 
all the variables that came into play. We are offering a general overview, and hopefully 
emphasizing those elements which allow us to illustrate the main differences that led to the 
different outcomes in the two countries' negotiation processes. In both countries there were 
several attempts to reach negotiated solutions. 
In Colombia, there have been several attempts to stop political and guerrilla groups' 
violence. The fact that the guerrilla movement has not demonstrated a monolithic unity, has 
made the government to negotiate in different places, under different circumstances, and 
with different people. The first attempt to negotiate was made in 197 4 and it was not 
successful. In the following years other attempts were made, some of them with a successful 
outcome and others with failure. Periods of negotiations are easily identifiable because 
they are related to presidential terms. The incumbent president and the guerrilla leaders have 
talked about negotiation as the way to stop violence but without arriving to an agreement. 
The former has been concern about his defense before the accusation of financing his 
presidential campaign with narcotraffickers' money. The latter have been busy trying to 
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develop their insurgent plans and committing the crimes they are used to. Therefore, in 
1997 Colombians are still waiting for a lasting peace, after the imprisonment of terrorist 
narcotraffickers and the dismantling of drug cartels. However, remaining guerrilla groups 
continue killing soldiers, and civilian people, and posing a threat for the normal development 
of individuals and the country as a whole. 
In El Salvador, on the other hand, definite periods can be identified. These periods 
coincided with two different presidents' administrations, in which successive efforts were 
made to reach peace accords with a one definite and unique contender. The nation is now 
trying to consolidate little by little its democracy and the old guerrillas are in different ways 
part of the establishment, looking for the achievement of their objectives by the legal and 
political means. People enjoy today a peace that after five years seems to be. durable. 
. . • l 
Every process developed their own dynamics, which we will try to describe. 
Different factors have been critical for the outcome in the Salvadoran case and for the four 
completed negotiations in Colombia. Other factors have avoid the attempts to sign peace 
with the F ARC and ELN in Colombia and today they still remain critical. The international 
involvement and Catholic Church mediation were important in El Salvador to arrive to the 
final solution, while in Colombia only the second has maintained a standard profile and has 
been always ready to help in the negotiation, especially because the leader of the ELN is a 
former Spanish Catholic priest. 
A. COLOMBIA 
Colombian history since the 1930s has been marked by almost continual violence, 
which one could argue is the by-product of the repeated and generally frustrated attempts 
by the country's marginalized sectors and emerging social forces to gain a greater share of 
Colombia's abundant wealth. A major part of this struggle has been the inability of these 
social forces to gain significant access to the political system. With legitimate channels 
closed off, many Colombians from 1960s on resorted to violence in the form of the 
revolutionary groups we analyzed before, to gain their objectives. The consequences have 
been negative in the economic, political, and social realms, both in the national as in the 
international arena. Many attempts have been made to stop this fratricide struggle. Even 
106 
though, the Colombian conflict has not become a civil war, this is unfortunately the 
international perception. 
In this section we describe the different attempts made by Colombian presidents in 
the last twenty years to stop violence, mainly the subversive violence that is responsible for 
the country's lagging in the economic and international realms. There were truces, 
negotiations, amnesties, and incorporation into democratic life of some guerrilla groups. The 
FARC and ELN groups have been reluctant to do so. 
1. The First Intents to Negotiate 
During the administration of president Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (1974-1978), the 
government tried, for the first time, to open negotiations with the armed groups in search of 
a solution to the political violence. Accprding to sociologist Eduardo Pizarro/ various 
factors frustrated this effort. Among them, he mentions the systematic blocking of the 
military to any kind of dialogue with the ELN, a group considered being on the brink of 
total annihilation, after "Anori" operation in 1973-1974. We described this episode in 
chapter II. After this dialogue failed due to the inflexibility of the military establishment, the 
country would have to wait until 1982 to begin this process in earnest. 
During the government of president Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala (1978-1982), guerrilla 
actions, especially those instigated by the M-19, reached new, unexpected levels compared 
with the previous decade. It was during this period, for example, that the M-19 stole 
hundreds of weapons from an army's arsenal in northern Santafe de Bogota and engineered 
the taking of the Dominican embassy. The government sought to resolve the situation 
through an authoritarian response. It put into effect the draconian National Security Statute 
that expanded the arrest powers of the armed forces, and placed punishment for a variety 
of crimes under the jurisdiction of military tribunals. In addition, in an attempt to impede the 
guerrillas' use of the press to gain publicity for their cause, the media was subjected to strict 
censorship. Finally, Turbay invoked the state of siege provision ofthe Constitution. 
Throughout 1979 and 1980, politicians opposed to government, independent writers, 
leftist organizations' spokespersons, the guerrilla groups themselves, and Amnesty 
International charged the government policies allowed the military to carry out arbitrary 
arrests, torture, and "disappearances" in the campaign against subversion. In 1981 Turbay 
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extended an offer of political amnesty to the guerrillas; despite public disavowals and 
continued fighting, government and guerrilla leaders held secret amnesty negotiations until 
March 1982. Because it imposed too many conditions to the insurgents, the terms of the 
amnesty were finally rejected by the guerrillas. 3 On the other hand, the military also rejected 
it because they reportedly feared that it would demoralize the troops. Nevertheless, the 
government lifted the state of siege on the eve of the presidential elections in 1982. 
2. The Betancur's Peace 
a. Background 
In August 1982, most of the M-19leaders were in jail, the FARC had only 
twenty-seven armed bands, the ELN was almost disappearing and the EPL conducted a 
limited activity. Conservative president Belisario Betancur (1982-86) was ,elected on a 
platform that included a commitment to peace. He immediately declared his willingness to 
reach a truce with the guerrillas. 
b. The Government's Offer 
To accomplish its objective, the government tried to carry out a policy of 
democratic reform and a peace pact. The presidential idea, according to Pizarro, 4 was to be 
developed in five steps. At the beginning of his term, 5 the president convoked a multiparty 
political summit (September 8, 1982) to discuss political reform. Subsequently, he formed 
a peace commission (September 19), and he passed an amnesty law (November 19). The 
government signed a truce agreement with the main guerrilla movements (March and 
August 1984), and, finally, during 1984 and 1985, a series of legislative proposals was 
presented to the Congress of the Republic, oriented toward cementing the democratic 
advances. Thus, the new president opened the doors to a larger political participation by the 
insurgents, gave them many guaranties, and broke all the regulations in security matters. His 
former Minister ofDefense, army General Fernando Landazabal would write later: 
" ... tolerating in every action the subversive boldness and arrogance, 
(Betancur) amnestied, forgave, pardoned all the insurgents; he took away 
the reasons and arguments for their armed struggle but did not ask anything 
from them .. " 6 
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Law 32 of 1982, best known as the Amnesty Law, did not, however, require 
the guerrillas to disarm. This was a major point of omission that would doom this first stage 
of the peace process though it initially appeared to hold enormous potential. The law offered 
unconditional amnesty for all acts of rebellion and all acts connected with it. It excluded 
only the murder of defenseless persons, atrocities such as indiscriminate murder or 
disfigurement, and gratuitous acts of violence such as rape. The line to be drawn between 
ordinary criminal activity and actions connected with the rebellion, was an issue of some 
debate. Combat actions presented no problem, but murders and kidnaping were a hot issue. 
If they were excluded, the amnesty would not be acceptable by the guerrillas who have 
routinely engaged in both. To solve this obstacle, the law excluded the murder of defenseless 
persons. Nevertheless, the government had tacitly recognized that the assassinations of 
government officials had been part of the guerrillas' efforts to take power, and might 
therefore be considered as part of the rebellion. 
Government had also recognized that murders of ordinary persons have been 
carried out in the course of bank robberies, to extort money and to eliminate informers. Thus 
these murders were committed by the guerrillas to obtain economic support, money and 
weapons, and to maintain clandestinity. Therefore, they had to be considered as connected 
with the rebellion. 7 The government decided to include kidnaping, recognizing that the 
guerrillas used the ransoms to finance the purchase of weapons. Kidnapping was deemed to 
be a political act because it had a political motive. Recognizing assassinations and 
kidnapping as political acts and part of the armed rebellion was a way to legitimize them. 
While these political and legal issues were the daily subject of the people's 
talks, the general concern was the negative response of the guerrilla groups. The agricultural 
industry was clearly in a crisis, and rural investment was low due to the insurgents' activities 
in the countryside. In the opinion ofthe National Association oflndustrialists (Asociaci6n 
Nacional de Industriales, or AND I), one of the most influential economic groups in the 
country, the elimination of the illegal farming and rural unemployment could be possible 
only after the guerrilla problem had been resolved. 8 At that moment, the drugs trafficking 
industry was consolidating and introducing about two billion dollars per year into the 
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country, but this was considered a minor problem when compared with subversive violence. 
It would be necessary the assassination (30 April 1984) of the minister of Justice by the 
narcoterrorists to force the government to recognize the challenge to its authority posed by 
them. 
In 1984, the ANDI supported the agreements between the government and 
the FARC and M-19 groups. Its main concern was the condition ofthe national economy, 
because foreign investment was stagnating, industrial development was very low, and 
therefore, the foreign debt and the deficit were growing. In October, the International 
Monetaiy Found (IMF) asked the government for drastic adjustments if the country expected 
additional loans. As a consequence, the industrial groups considered that the national interest 
demanded long and painful measures to recuperate the economy and to maintain the 
autonomy ofthe country. 
Betancur's initiative was a disaster. He was a political maverick who never 
enjoyed the support of the country's elite or the military. The army was hostile to the process 
from the beginning and most business elites and the majority of the traditional politicians 
came to share this view.9 The main reason for the position of the armed forces and 
especially the army was the arrogance and disdain Betancur showed before the military 
perception of the internal security. From the perspective of the Colombian military, the worst 
feature of the agreement was that it did not obligate the guerrillas to surrender their weapons. 
We can also add all the political, legal, and moral considerations around the crimes 
included in the Amnesty Law. 
One year after Law 32 of 1982, about 200 allegedly M-19 guerrillas and 
others taking advantage of the situation, after recovering freedom traveled to Europe with 
government's support. 10 Another guerrillas who were in jail went back to the mountains, and 
few remained in the big cities as the political wing of the guerrilla. A new party and legal 
organizations appeared in the political arena: Patriotic Union (Union Patri6tica or UP) as 
the legal branch of the F ARC; To Fight (A luchar) as a political group of the ELN; and 
People's Front (Frente Popular) as the political representation ofthe EPL. The FARC sent 
two gueriillas to the Congress as member of the parliament, and the security agency 





besides the authorized guerrillas bodyguards who were also amnestied. The government 
never knew exactly the number of allegedly amnestied guerrillas because the procedure lack 
of enough control mechanisms. Meanwhile, in the mountains and in the countryside, 
guerrillas continued with the usual crimes though they tried to blame "unknown groups" as 
the authors of violence because they wanted people believed their good intentions towards 
peace and respect for the agreement. 
c. The Response 
What did the guerrillas give to the government in exchange? The guerrillas 
response to this project was the gradual development of two different strategies by the 
F ARC and the M-19: "democratization" of the war, and "guerrilization" of democracy, 
respectively. In spite of their differences, in both cases one can find a qualitative and 
quantitative leap beyond earlier positions. Table 5.1 shows a comparison between these two 
strategies. 
FARC M-19 
Strategies 1 . Growth in the countryside 1. Growth in the cities. 
Goals 
2. Movement from the agrarian to 2. Movement from the urban to the 
the urban through political action rural through military action. 
3. Appeal to social sectors excluded 3. Appeal to marginalized social 
from access to land, credit and sectors in the city, especially 
commerce. professionals and underemployed 
1 . Control of territory as key to control 1. Impact population regardless of 
of population. territorial control, 
2. Political route, including 2. Use politics to mobilize population 
participation in elections. to military action regardless of 
3. Involvement of people in politics to position on electoral politics. 
move on later to other forms of 3. Involve the guerrilla in the nation in 
struggle. order later to involve the nation 
4. Maximum use of the principle: with the guerrilla. 
'War is continuation of politics 4. Use of the principle: "Politics is 
using other means". continuation of war using other 
means" 
Source: Vladimrr Zabala's scheme, quoted by Hernando PJ.Zarro, Violence in Colombia, p.l86-187 
Table 5. 1 Guerrillas'Strategies and Goals 
Two factors converge to explain this phenomenon: primarily, the guerrilla 
groups were very active in the political arena, after passing from the limitations of the 
"armed propaganda" to the generation of political proposals to the society, which was 
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expecting the guerrillas' performance. Secondly, there were during the last decade many 
social movements in the process of organization, such as the Community Action's National 
Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional de Acci6n Comunal), and the National Organization 
of Colombian Indigenous Peoples ( Organizaci6n Nacional Indigena de Colombia, or 
ONIC), among others. In other words, guerrillas were going to take advantage of these 
organizations that were at the stage of national organization by that time, to use them as 
vehicle for their own maneuvers. 
In July 1984, government officials and M-19 guerrilla leaders signed a cease-
fire agreement in Corinto, in Cauca department. It did not mean the demobilization of the 
guerrillas. It was only a period to explore possibilities for peace. By late 1985, however, the 
accord unraveled. Charging the government with, among many other things, a systematic 
violation of the truce provisions and failure to implement key political reforms that were part 
of the cease-fire agreement, the M-19 returned to the armed struggle. In October 1985 
guerrillas wounded the incumbent Commanding General of the Army, General Rafael 
Samudio Molina. The end ofBetancur's peace plan came dramatically when the M-19 
seized the Palace ofJustice on 5 November 1985, and about a hundred people died including 
11 Supreme Court Judges, army and police members, and the whole guerrillas inside the 
building. After this operation, recognized as a failure by the M-19 itself, this group reduced 
its activities. Some analysts surmised that its membership base had declined. 
In the aftermath, only the F ARC clung to the moribund peace process, but its 
twin strategy of pursuing both political and military objectives left the Patriotic Union (UP) 
militants vulnerable and hundreds of them --including two presidential candidates-- were 
killed. The F ARC eventually cut its ties to the UP and intensified guerrilla warfare (in fact, 
they never stopped fighting during the process, but reduced, apparently, its operations) 
arguing that they had learned a bitter lesson that to this day has left them reluctant to enter 
into negotiations that require cease-fires. 
To sum up, during the term ofBelisario Betancur the guerrillas increased their 
power under the auspices of the government. The armed forces were forbidden to patrol in 
certain zones of the country, and, as a consequence, the billeting (boleteo), extortion, and 
forced recruitment of peasants by the guerrilla groups became a daily happening. Insurgents 
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continued to demand a unilateral cease-fire by the armed forces while using the dialogues 
to gain time and reorganize. Guerrilla movement used the bilateral truces of 1984 and 1985 
to double its squads and the areas where the insurgents had influence over the population 
(see Table 3.2 ). 
Publicly, and according to their old and worn discourse, they reaffirmed their 
political will to negotiate, but blamed the armed forces and "other obscure forces" of 
being the enemies of the peace process. From the military point of view, the president tied 
the hands of his best legal support, favored the escalation of violence, and was primarily 
responsible for the social and political situation of the country. They saw the most obvious 
result of this amnesty in the increase ofF ARC guerrillas from 18 armed bands in 1982 to 
3 5 in 1986, which represents the highest percentage (51%) of increment this group has 
never had; the other groups had the growth we showed in Table 3 .2. The desired objective, 
peace, never was achieved, in spite of the truces, cease-fires and amnesty. The FARC, 
however, had created their political branch, Union Patri6tica, that would be for them the 
Guinea pig that would permitted this insurgent group to participate in politics without 
turning over weapons. , 
3. Barco's Peace Process 
a. Background 
Liberal President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990), like his predecessor was 
interested in stopping the chronic and endemic violence by eliminating what he believed 
would be its main cause: absolute poverty. He designed the National Rehabilitation Plan as 
the expression of government's political will. It was the solution for some national 
problems and basic necessities so citizens could rely on civilian authorities and on 
institutional actions. The Plan intended to create development opportunities in those regions 
where economic disarticulation, institutional absence and poverty developed a lack of social 
balance that very often was expressed in conflicts carried out through non institutional ways. 
Although the Barco administration committed to the peace process initiated 
by Betancur, Barco de-emphasized dialogue with the guerrillas and --in October 1987--
centralized the peace program in his office by making his new peace commission that was 
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called Permanent Advisory Council on Political Rehabilitation, Reconciliation, and 
Normalization. 
The government's intent was to prove the guerrillas that there was an official 
will to cooperate in the pacification efforts and that the government was given a positive 
response to the requirements of subversive groups. Thus the guerrilla, one more time, was 
committed to stop kidnapping, robberies and other crimes. The government was concerned 
about its public image and for the press editorials, as well as the guerrilla conditions to begin 
peace talks. One of the guerrillas' conditions was the destruction of self-defense groups that 
they began to call paramilitares. This way, the guerrilla would obtain two things: first, to 
stop their enemies through the governmental action, and second, to recover the areas they 
used to control before the self-defense groups' birth. 
As a consequence, the armed forces received the additional mission of 
fighting narcotraffickers and the self-defense or paramilitary groups, as their priority. This 
was a strategic and tactical gain for the guerrillas, who began to recover morally and 
physically, because all the military effort was addressed toward their enemies. This period 
corresponds to the growing of the F ARC and ELN, mainly. 
OnMay29, 1988, the M-19 kidnapped the former presidential candidate and 
active Conservative politician Alvaro Gomez Hurtado, as a way to pressure the government 
to open talks. By that time, the M-19 was leading the CGSB and had conducted a campaign 
called "Peace to Armed Forces and War to Oligarchy." Once they released Gomez on July 
20, the Colombian Independence Day, the M-19 obtained from the government the summon 
for a national dialogue summit. This was a compromise for all the political, social, and 
economic organizations ofthe country. 
b. The Peace Processes 
The government, on September 2, 1988, published its peace initiative, 
consisting ofthree phases: Reduction of tension (Distension), Transition, and Incorporation 
into democratic life. Only the M-19 accepted the government plan. Government talks with 
the F ARC made little progress, however, owing to the F ARC 's unwillingness to disarm, and 
to its continued guerrilla and terrorist attacks. 
The Reduction of tension phase consisted of the following issues: A 
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government proposal to Congress of the Forgiveness Law, beginning of dialogue between 
the government and the M-19, temporary location of the guerrilla, cessation of billeting 
(boleteo) farmers and landowners, cessation of extortion, and kidnapping by the M-19, as 
a requirement to continue to the next stages, and the beginning of congressional public 
hearings to discuss constitutional and parliamentary reforms. 
The Transition phase established deployment of guerrilla groups to the 
selected location, cessation of terrorist operations by guerrillas, and cessation of patrolling 
by army troops during the guerrilla deployment. During this phase the government selected 
the village of Santo Domingo, in Cauca department, as the place for concentration of 
guerrillas during the talks. 
. The Incorporation into democratic life phase included stimulation. for 
political activity, protection measures for the guerrillas for the possible retaliations by 
relatives of those people killed by M-19, temporary financial support, forgiveness 
application, lifting of the state of siege, and constitutional reform. This initiative was 
designed for all subversive groups, and the government could negotiate with each group, 
independently. The Ministry of Defense was in charge of designing the structure of this 
phase. 
c. The Response 
After many difficulties, this plan was executed. In early 1990 the M-19 
guerrillas, who had often been intransigent in previous negotiations with Colombian 
governments, turned over their weapons to representatives of the Socialist International and 
gave up the armed struggle, while planning participation in the next national elections. A 
new party, Democratic Action M-19 (AD M-19), was born. The former guerrilla obtained 
a relative success in March 1990 elections, exceeding the results of the other leftist 
organizations, demonstrating the popular acceptance of its submission to peace process. 
After the assassination of its leader Carlos Pizarro, his second-in-command Antonio Navarro 
Wolf was a presidential candidate and the AD M-19 party converted into the third political 
force in the country. The new president appointed Navarro as Minister of Health and he 
accepted. The M-19 face then the challenge of fulfilling the political space of a democratic 
left, but at the same time it had the exigence of turning itself into a political apparatus 
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capable of responding to the increasing expectations about its performance. 11 
The EPL, the indigenous guerrilla Quintin Lame, and the PRT followed M-
19 example in the next months. They would sign the final agreements during the first 
semester of the next presidential administration. Only the Marxist guerrilla groups, most 
· importantly the F ARC and the ELN, continued fighting against the government. 
President Barco finished his term on August 7, 1990, leaving the country with 
one guerrilla group incorporated into democratic life, and one additional political party. He 
left also three other guerrilla groups ready for the surrender of their weapons. At least, in this 
aspect of his initial peace program, he could offer a positive result, increasing the hope of 
ending violence. Nevertheless, the armed forces were deprived of the operational and a legal 
frame they needed to win the war against subversion. In fact, by forbidding the military to 
judge subversives as it used to be the procedure, the government and the Congress 
permitted the release of guerrillas and supporters once in the hands of civilian justice. 
The presidential attempt to fight the narcotraffickers' violence was not 
successful, and the endemic plague of violence would not end. On the contrary, Colombia 
would see the beginning of a new terrorist violence by the F ARC and ELN guerrillas. This 
would be the' challenge for the new government. 
4. President Cesar Gaviria's Strategy against Violence 
a. Background 
On August 7, 1990, Liberal party candidate Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, the 
youngest president in Colombia's last 150-year history, took office. In his inaugural 
address, he offered dialogue to violent groups seeking their demobilization and disarming, 
and their incorporation into civil society so they might pursue their political objectives 
through peaceful means. In other words, he wanted to continue the peace process policy 
initiated by his predecessors. In relation to narcoterrorism, he said that he would take the 
direction of all actions of the military forces, the Administrative Department of Security 
(DAS), and the National Police, to deter the terrorists and to stop their barbaric acts. Besides, 
Gaviria reinforced his strategy by convoking and organizing the National Constituent 
Assembly, io produce the reform ofthe 1886 Constitution that would serve as an argument 




political system, providing space for groups who have resisted the lure of traditional parties. 
Colombia would have in place a constitutional framework that would permit the 
institutionalization of a more representative, participatory, and equitable political system. 
b. The Government's Offer 
Meanwhile, the EPL signed the peace treaty similar in many respects to the 
one that successfully reined in the M-19. The other two groups, the Quintin Lame and the 
PRT, also turned over the weapons. Flushed with success, Gaviria attempted to complete 
the peace process by renewing talks with the F ARC, a dissident EPL front, and the ELN, 
who had united in the CGSB. He made also the following unilateral offers to guerrilla 
movement: ratification ofProtocols I and II of the Geneve Convention, the acceptance of 
international supervision, the creation of political guaranties' climate for demobilized 
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guerrillas, a high-level and direct negotiation, and the conformation of a prominent-persons 
commission (La Comisi6n de Notables). 12 Its function would be exploratory, to prepare a 
temptable agenda for the negotiation. 
The government in turn, conditioned the beginning of the talks to the 
suspension by guerrillas of all criminal and terrorist activities, --particularly kidnapping 
and extortion as a sign of good faith. These two crimes had, by the late 1980s, become a 
major source offunding for the guerrillas, and the government's insistence on their cessation 
became the principal sticking point. Drug trafficking was also a growing revenue source for 
the guerrilla groups. 
c. The Response 
The CGSB's response came immediately. They said that if the National 
Constituent Assembly (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente or ANC) is summoned without 
consulting the guerrilla movement, they would initiate a stage of political violence. They 
also conditioned their participation in the negotiation process to their participation in the 
ANC. In September 1990 the CGSB held the First Summit of Guerrilla Coordinating Board's 
Commanders. During this meeting, FARC's ideologist Alfonso Cano sent a message to the 
government saying that they need a wider participation in the ANC, and that some points for 
the negotiation would be in the agenda for the Constituent Assembly. These points were: 
demilitarization of the country, end of the dirty war and the paramilitarism, the purge of the 
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the armed forces, nationalization of the natural resources, and creation of mechanisms for 
an economic and international policies without dependency. 
In the summit conclusions, the CGSB decides to concrete a war proposal by 
creating a unified guerrilla army with only one strategy but multiple commands. This project 
will reunite 48 FARC squads (5,800 guerrillas), 22 ELN columns (1,800 guerrillas), and 
the dissidentEPL (100 guerrillas). There are, however, some squads that did not share these 
conclusions and were interested in negotiating peace. 
The proposals from both sides, the government and the guerrilla, did not mean 
that military operations were canceled. Between September 25 and November 20, 1990, 
there were 53 F ARC and 48 ELN guerrilla attacks. That made it clear that subversion was 
not interested in stopping.its violence. Each time they offered a cease-fire the country 
awaited a new offensive. They wanted to show their military power to the government and 
the nation, because they were not a defeated guerrilla ready to negotiate for anything, as with 
M-19 and the other groups. Nevertheless, government established clearly before the public 
and the F ARC and ELN guerrillas that the armed forces will be positioned throughout the 
nation, and that the government would never accept the insurgency requirement of taking 
troops out those places under guerrilla influence. 
Consequently, on 09 December 1990, the same day of elections for the 
National Constituent Assembly and the anniversary of Colombian infantry, the army 
launched a big operation against the F ARC headquarters in the place known as Casaverde 
(The Green House), where many times not only the presidential committee for dialogue but 
other guerrilla leaders had assembled to plan strategies about peace or war. The army 
achieved only a marginal success because no important guerrilla leader died or was captured 
during the operation. However, it proved that the F ARC were vulnerable and that the 
guerrilla groups could not continue using indefinitely their old strategy of asking for peace 
while waging war. Government established that it would begin the institutional reforms with 
those groups that had signed the peace agreement, and that it would reduce by force those 
who insisted in war. 
The military operation caused a violent response by F ARC's squads in 
different places of the country. From December 10, 1990, to mid-January 1991, the CGSB 
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committed 84 terrorist actions in 18 departments where 64 members of the armed forces and 
26 civilians died; several pipelines were destroyed, there was a blackout in several villages, 
and some communications and patrol boats were dynamited. ECOPETROL, the national 
petroleum company, calculated its loses during the first month of 1991, because of 
guerrillas' terrorism, in $13 0 million dollars, equivalent to the loses in the pipeline Cafio 
Lim6n-Covefias (the longest in the country) which was blown up several times. Tirofzjo 
(Sure Shot), the legendary head of the FARC, asked for suspension of the military operations 
and the return of the army to the barracks, as the condition to initiate talks. 
d Caracas and Tlaxcala 
After many intents, government and guerrillas, agreed to initiate the talks in 
Caracas starting on June 1, 1991. From then to Nov,emberl991, there were four rounds of 
talks. Negotiations were difficult and slow, and in between there was an increment of the 
armed struggle in the country. In two rounds of talks, held outside Colombia for the first 
time, the CGSB adopted and stuck to a list of 12 demands that included a suspension of the 
"dirty war", a halt to military expansion, international verification of any accord, personal 
guaranties for any guerrillas who wished to joint the political process, and a national 
dialogue on economic and social reforms. 
The reason for negotiating in a foreign country was to avoid a cease-fire 
situation that neither the guerrilla wanted nor the military. In fact, the guerrilla on one hand 
argued that the past experience of 1984 and 1985 had left them lessons for the violations of 
the truce by the armed forces. The military, on the other hand, remembered the growth of the 
guerrilla during the Betancur' s administration. 
There were two key obstacles in the Caracas negotiation rounds. The first was 
the arrogance of the guerrillas that permanently under esteemed the government's 
unilateral proposals, arguing that they would consider only those things that would be the 
result of a bilateral negotiation or agreement. The second obstacle was the bilateral cease-
fire. The government wanted to have guaranties that the cease-fire was not going to be used 
as an element to obtain strategic advantages by the guerrilla as in 1984 and 1985. 
The first round of the talks (June 3-15) made it clear that the guerrilla's good 
will, was dubious. Guerrillas clearly used negotiations to show off instead of arriving at 
119 
convenient agreements. They did not want to give up in what is their strength, that is, their 
mobility. Therefore, they did not agree to locate in fixed places, and the negotiators could 
not arrive to an agreement in the cease-fire issue. 
In the second round (June 20-25) the parts arrived to an agreement about 
the ways (national and regional) to verify the cease-fire, and to find the international 
verification ofthe process. Because it was convenient that the ANC approved some points 
of the agenda, and to make some consultations, the official negotiators went back to 
Colombia. During the break in July and August 1991, the government decided to stop the 
individual and regional initiatives to negotiate peace with guerrilla groups. In fact, it forbade 
those initiatives, recalling that the only two persons authorized for this process were the 
Minister oflnterior and the Peace Advisor. Besides, the government conformed an advisory 
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commission with representatives of all political parties and groups. To complete his reforms 
and to show good will for the peace negotiations, president Gaviria appointed a civilian as 
Minister ofDefense. This had been an old requirement of the guerrilla movement. 
In the third round (September 4-1 0), the guerrillas made clear the thesis that 
they were negotiating with the government at the same level, power to power, on the basis 
that there were military and political stalemates (several political writers call empate militar 
negativo the military stalemate), and convinced that they were equivalent powers. 13 The 
CGSB insisted in being ready for the cease-fire, but in two stages: first, to end hostilities and 
offensive actions, and second, to localize the squads in the "distension areas". The 
government, however, was not ready to discuss a cease-fire formula that would not infer 
some degree of localization. Besides, it discounted any possibility to exchange persons in 
hands of guerrillas for political prisoners, that was the guerrillas' proposal. 
In the fourth and last round (October 30- November 10), without arriving to 
an agreement, the government and guerrilla representatives made a balance of the 
negotiations, which was written in two documents: one analyzing the general process of 
Caracas talks, and the other, a compromising act with the agreements and the divergences 
still existing in the process. In a cease-fire accord, the disagreements are related with the 
war logic: paramilitary, kidnapping, place for the concentration of guerrillas, and presence 
of public force. In fact, these issues are source of disagreement because in a covered way 
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each actor continue betting to war. Therefore, mutual resistence to make concessions appear 
to avoid reduction in the respective military power. In the guerrilla case it is clear in its 
mobility issue. In the military, the exigence to have physical presence nation wide. (Annex 
A shows the differences between the government and the guerrillas' representatives in the 
Caracas talks). 
In 1992 there were changes in the official peace policy, with the presidential 
appointment ofHoracio Serpa Uribe as the new Peace Advisor and the creation of the Social 
Policy Council. That was an important card for the government that put the prestige of Serpa 
on a stake. He won his prestige when he was Minister of the Interior and member of the 
Constituent Assembly, and therefore, president considered Serpa's political ability could 
be helpful in the relationship with the guerrilla spokespersons and with .the politicians who 
were ready for a greater protagonism after the Constituent Assembly. 
By that time, the Salvadoran negotiation represented a pressure, as positively 
as negative for the Colombian process. It was positive, in the sense that it showed the 
possibility to arrive to an agreement in spite of the differences. However, it has a negative 
sense because that negotiation would represent an invitation for the Colombian guerrillas to 
escalate the internal conflict to reach a military equilibrium that would permit the guerrillas 
to negotiate with advantages. That is the reason the guerrillas have always wanted to 
mitigate the costs of a confrontation policy at the national level with regional agreements 
that would permit them to consolidate their local presence and control. 14 
When the conversations restarted in March 1992 in Tlaxcala, Mexico, in 
spite of the large concessions of the government to the guerrilla movement (acceptance to 
change the agenda, acceptance that the discussion of the agenda could not be conditioned 
to the actual cease-fire), the guerrilla attitude revealed two things: first, that there were deep 
and internal discrepancies between the F ARC and the ELN guerrillas because of the whole 
negotiation process, which threatened the military unity of the Guerrilla Coordinating Board 
(CGSB). Secondly, the CGSB, betted to the deterioration of the social climate while waiting 
that the social unrest it forecasted would tum into a favorable element to its negotiating 
position. 
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The government became particularly intransigent on the kidnapping issue 
after former :Minister Argelino Duran Quintero died while being held captive by the dissident 
front of the EPL. Gaviria suspended the talks indefinitely in October 1992 and ordered the 
military to begin a major offensive against the guerrillas: his defense minister even boasted 
that the rebels would be defeated in 18 months. This did not occur and, with the change in 
government in 1994, came a change in policy. The pendulum swung once again back in the 
direction of a negotiated settlement. Refer to Appendix H for detailed information. 
In summary, the end of the dialogues in Tlaxcala made evidently the 
exhaustion of the model of negotiation opened during Barco's administration. The model 
exhausted itself from both perspectives of the government and the guerrillas. From the point 
of view ofthe government, because the official programs supporting the peace proposal had 
limitations. The new Constitution (1991), though it was a great advance, was not going to 
solve all the problems of legitimacy neither the political openness, as the government 
intended. Reinsertion of demobilized guerrillas had presented problems, the Rehabilitation 
Plan bureaucratized, and some other policies were not working properly. There were, then, 
a great distance between the political discourse and what had actually achieved. From the 
guerrillas' perspective, the socialism crisis and the negotiation in El Salvador made them to 
bet to the military option which day by day is less legitimate. 
5. The Samper's Peace Policy 
Liberal president Emesto Sam per Pizano ( 1994-1998) made peace a prominent plank 
in his platform and on 17 November 1994, he unveiled a new peace initiative; he predicted 
it would lead to permanent peace. The most significant difference between Samper's 
proposal and those of his predecessors was his decision to negotiate without first having a 
cease-fire in place. He said: 
"Colombians should be advised that, as long as the peace process lasts, acts of 
violence will continue to occur ... the day that acts of war cease together, peace will 
have been achieved". 15 
Samper also announced new negotiations would be discreet and could involve neutral 
mediators. As a sign of good faith, he said he would ask Congress to pass legislation putting 
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Colombia in compliance with the Geneva accords and the 1977 protocol on human rights. 
1996 arrived with new air for peace process, because the government was promoting a new 
negotiation model with the insurgents, where demobilization and cease-fire were not 
conditions to talk as in the previous negotiations. Law 104 of 1993, that included this issue 
and some political and judiciary changes, was extended in December 1995 for three more 
years. 
Thus, in January 1996, while the Peace High Commissioner Daniel Garcia-Pefia tried 
to contact dissident M-19 fraction "Bateman Cay6n", the Minister of the Interior made the 
announcement of governmental decision to talk to so-called paramilitary or self-defense 
groups. One of these groups, the one operating against guerrillas in department of Cordoba 
and Uraba banana region, proposed a "trilateral" . dialogue among government, guerrillas, 
and self-defense groups. Moreover, they invited F ARC and ELN guerrillas to sit down at the 
negotiation table. The eternal Colombian Communist party's secretary, Gilberto Vieira, 78 
years old, said the proposal was a nonsense and that it would be, if accepted by the 
government, the legalization of those groups. 16 
In 1996 the ELN already said it was willing to enter negotiations, and for the first 
time it has made known its demands. In a radio message intercepted by Colombian 
intelligence, ELN second-in-command Nicolas Rodriguez Bautista, alias "Gabino", listed 
12 demands, including a reduction in military spending, the elimination of military impunity, 
and the replacement of neoliberal economic policy with a "model of industrial stimulation." 17 
Other points deal with foreign debt, illicit enrichment, and foreign petroleum contracts. 
The F ARC also has expressed its willingness to negotiate, although it has not made 
known its demands in similar fashion. With the attack to a military base in the south of the 
country ,on _30 August .1996, and the kidnapping of sixty soldiers, the FARC intent to . 
pressure the government to negotiate with the intervention of international organizations. 
They want to be recognized as a belligerent force in order to achieve a status similar to the 
FMLN in El Salvador, and to gain international support to their cause. 
6. The Government and the Regional Talks 
Government has always been reticent to regional or decentralized dialogues in 
matters related to political (insurgent) violence. It forbade many years ago the regional 
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authorities (governors, mayors) to negotiate with armed movements about peace processes 
or the armed struggle itself They were allowed to deal with the economic and social 
matters, meanwhile these proposals would come from legal and legitimate representatives 
of civil society. It meant that guerrillas' proposals cannot be accepted in isolated way. In 
other words, direct conversation would be a privilege ofthe central government that wanted 
to have the reins of the process. 
In fact, the government has argued that because each guerrilla group has a central 
command and the fractions always comply the orders of their heads, the negotiation has to 
be built at that level. To accept the regional talks is to give the insurgents the opportunity 
of handle or manege the local authorities to obtain the guerrilla group's objectives for a 
specific region. Nevertheless, who guarantees that the neighbor guerrilla is not going to that 
region to commit crimes if the negotiation were made with another group? Or who 
guarantees that the guerrilla that negotiates in one region holds its promise and does not 
commit crimes in that region but sends its members to the next region? Appendix I is part 
of president's Barco program lniciativa para la Paz (Peace Initiative) where government 
fixed its position in this issue. The following governments have maintained the same policy 
in this matter. 
Many scholars and political analysts do not share the government's position about 
regional dialogues. In some way, they favor the guerrilla persistence in this matter when they 
say that the problem is very complex, because it is not only the armed struggle but also the 
social and economic problems of each region which is on stake. They forget, however, that 
the guerrillas' strategy in the different negotiation processes has always been: 1) to pretend 
the negotiation table provide them with the audience they have been incapable of gaining 
after many years of fighting the government; 2) to pretend that the civil society make them 
spokesmen of its interests; and 3) to obtain by force the summoning capability they have 
been unable to build through political means. 
According to Jesus Bejarano, a former Peace Commissioner and Colombian 
ambassador to El Salvador government, the regional talks can be suitable to climates peace 
in order to attenuate the local social conflict factors. 18 But the point is if the local authorities 
should convene with the guerrillas, via regional talks, the government's decisions at national, 
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departmental, and municipal level, as if the guerrillas were a counter power. We can think 
of the consequences of doing this, for example, with the allocation of public investment, 
which would end, indubitably, legitimizing the armed struggle without any compromise on 
behalf of the guerrilla side. It would be like looking for a temporary tranquility but not for 
the definitive and permanent peace. 
To summarize the Colombian situation, we can say that there have been many 
attempts to bring peace to the country during the last twenty years but the government has 
had to negotiate with different groups separately. The conformation of the CGSB was more 
a publicity issue to show the strength of the guerrilla movement than the exhibition of a true 
and internal unity. During the last fifteen years, since the agreements signed by Betancur 
administration, interaction between government .and guerrillas has been done in two levels: 
that of negotiation and the that of the war, crossed at the same time by the variable of public 
opinion and legitimacy. The negotiation processes with M-19, EPL, Quintin Lame, and 
PRT, were the demonstration of political will by all the actors and especially ofthe guerrilla 
leaders that went to the end in spite of the obstacles represented by the murders of many 
guerillas. But it obeyed also to the fact that those groups were decimated, and tired of 
waging a war they were losing. 
Some personalities of national life like politicians, industrialists, the Catholic Church, 
unions and ordinary people have helped in different ways to make possible peace. They have 
been always present in the different commissions conformed in different administrations. 
However, the results have made people oscillate between optimism and pessimism, because 
it is clear that there are social forces and dynamics that tend to consolidate the way toward 
peace but there are also other forces that set the obstacles to achieve it. The F ARC and ELN 
continue to fighting systematically against whichever government and every time they have 
arguments to commit crimes, to destroy natural resources, and to appear before the public 
opinion as the only answer to all the evils of the country. Their actions speak for them and 
people do not believe their worn out discourse. The peace process in Colombia, therefore, 
has been a partial solution to social and political unrest. After the political failure ofM-19 
in the last five years, the F ARC and ELN have more arguments to continue within their 
strategy of a protracted war. 
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B. EL SALVADOR 
In early 1980s it was unimaginable that El Salvador's armed conflict would end 
through a political negotiated solution. The physical and psychological damage was so huge 
and deep that the two contenders were thought as unwilling to walk away with all its losses 
and forgive and forget all the hate and pain caused by its enemy. However, that peaceful end 
became a reality. Every body had to pay a price for this unique ending of the war. This 
process of peace was not made of just the good will of the Government and the FMLN (we 
will use FMLN-FDR to stress the presence of the recognized political component of the 
movement), but it was shaped by many variables that were not under the absolute control of 
any actor. 
In 1984, President Jose Napoleon Duarte began a formal negotiation process with the 
FMLN-FDR to bring all Salvadorans together to find a peaceful solution to the armed 
conflict. Over a period of four years, President Duarte tried unsuccessfully to consolidate the 
peace talks. After the first meeting, several other meetings took place, but essentially they 
were merely continuations of the one in La Palma. 
When Alfredo Cristiani, the candidate of the right-wing ARENA party, was elected 
president in March 1989, many observers feared that hope for El Salvador's peace and 
democracy had to be postponed, if not abandoned. This fear was related to the historical 
hard-line anti communist reputation of this party. 19 In his inaugural speech, President 
Cristiani belied those fears and indicate that he, personally, wanted a political settlement 
with theFMLN-FDR A series of wide ranging negotiations between Cristiani's government 
and the FMLN-FDR began in 1989 and culminated with the peace accords signed in Mexico 
City on January 1992. 
InEl Salvador, two negotiation periods took place: President Duarte's negotiations 
(1984-1988), and Cristiani's negotiation period (1989-1992). 
1. President Duarte's Negotiations (1981-1988) 
Duarte's election brought the first era of formal peace negotiations . With the support 
of the military and the involvement of all segment of society, President Duarte invited the 
FMLN-FDR to the negotiating table to discuss the end of the Salvadoran armed conflict. The 
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most important meeting of this period took place in 1984 in La Palma, a small town in the 
Department of Chalatenango. Its importance resided in that for the first time since the war 
started, the government and the FMLN-FDR came together to debate over a negotiating 
table. 
a. National Factors 
From the government standpoint, an open, flexible and enthusiastic attitude 
was kept. Despite the unsuccessful outcome, Duarte had many political triumphs, such as 
the accords to "humanize" the conflict, as a direct result of the meeting of Ayagualo/0 the 
exchange of prisoners, and the declaration of amnesty during the civil war. 21 However, 
Duarte failed to create a completely trusting environment and a dynamic peace process in 
which both sides felt comfortable with the other's negotiating positions. This distrust. was 
somehow promoted by the presence ofU.S. military advisers in the country, the influence 
of national and international actors in the government decision-making process, and the 
divided position of the FMLN. Duarte's final achievement was the signing of the Esquipulas 
II Accords in 1987, that later changed the context of the negotiation process. 
The position ofthe FMLN-FDR's negotiating commission was divided, little 
consistent and kept a very negative attitude throughout the peace talks. The FMLN wanted 
a military solution and the FDR wanted a diplomatic-political solution. These two tendencies 
prevailed every time they came to the negotiating table. Probably the FMLN and the FDR 
promoted each other's position. This attitude was seen for the first time after the 
unsuccessful meeting of Sesory in 1986.22 
As we discussed in previous chapters, during this period, the military had 
taken a different role in the government. Political decisions were left to civilians, the 
presence of the military in the negotiating meetings, technically speaking, was meant to 
provide military advice to the president. Obviously, the military still had strong influence 
in the president's decisions for two main reasons. First, at this point, the military was 
playing th~ most important role in the nation's effort to defend the democratic system. 
Second, most of the civilian institutions had been weakened by the terrorist attacks. 
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The military position was heading toward the strengthening of the democratic 
system. They had understood that the causes of the national crisis had deep social-
economical roots, and truly believed that the solution of the conflict was not going to come 
through a military victory alone. In that sense, the advice of the armed forces at this point 
was to continue building the necessary democratic institutions and to force the FMLN to 
participate into them. The government invited the Catholic Church to participate in the 
negotiation process. They payed a role of mediator in the negotiation process and formulated 
and developed schedules, agendas and conditions for each party before they came to the 
negotiation table, and offered proposals to overcome the negotiation barriers. 
b. International Factors 
El .Salvador was caught in the. snowball effect created by the East- West 
confrontation. The Cold War, which had fueled the continuity of the armed conflict, came 
to a dead end. The endless support of the Communist Countries and the European Union for 
the FMLN, and the millions of dollars in support from the United States for the armed forces 
and the government created a stalemate. These factors will be further discussed in this 
chapter. 
c. Reasons for Failure 
Duarte's peace efforts failed due to several factors. The negotiating 
commission of the insurgent movement was a vicious circle of internal disputes between the 
FMLN and the FDR, making their position inconsistent over the negotiation table. The 
armed conflict was clearly part of the classic East-West confrontation causing the war to 
come to a stalemate. Neither the government with the U.S., nor the FMLN with the 
Communist party wanted to give up their commitment to the military solution. The FMLN-
FDR was not cooperative,' they believed that the military victory was possible and they could 
not overcome their internal conflict. Most of the political soc!ety remained uninvolved, 
leaving the governmental party, the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Dem6crata 
Cristiano or PDC), alone in the politics. Neither elite consensus nor unity occurred in this 
period. 
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2. President Cristiani's Negotiation Period (1989-1992) 
When Cristiani came to office in 1989, many political events were taking place 
around the world that created a favorable negotiating environment. Some of these events 
were the fall of the Berlin wall; Gorbachev' s controversial Perestroika; the election of the 
President George Bush; and the beginning of the end of the Cold war. During the first year 
of the ARENA Government, the negotiation process experienced major changes. In his 
inaugural speech, President Cristiani promised the Salvadoran people that his government 
would stop the expensive and bloody war. He also offered to immediately resume the peace 
talks with an adequate negotiation method and within a constitutional framework, as 
intended previously by Duarte. The Cristiani proposal had basically five negotiation points?3 
• To analyze feasible mechanisms to generate a permanent, and serious debate 
between the democratic sector and the FMLN-FDR. 
• To create a government dialogue commission with democratic personalities. 
This commission would contact those persons designated by the FMLN to 
formulate a work plan. Also, they would discuss the necessary aspects to 
achieve the incorporation of all social sectors to the democratic process , and 
the mechanisms for a better representative democracy. 
• Once the debate started, it could not cease unilaterally by any motive; until 
a concrete solution to the conflict was presented to any organization of higher 
political decision (i.e., the U.N. or the O.A.S.). 
• The Government, at all the stages of the negotiation process, would be in 
constant conference with national socio-political forces, such as political 
parties, worker organizations, the Church and others. 
• To propose that the peace talks take place outside El Salvador, especially in 
other Central American nation. 
Cristiani's dialogue was similar to the President Duarte's. The difference was 
that Cristiani' s negotiation procedures made the peace talks more dynamic and flexible to 
agreement. Additionally, this framework allowed for popular acceptance of a political 
solution and participation by both parties. As a result, the peace talks resumed in 1989. The 
procedures and proposals were almost identical to those used by Duarte, but again, several 
national and international factors influenced the outcome of Cristiani' s peace process. 
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a. National Factors 
National and international organizations feared that Cristiani government 
would reject a political solution to the conflict and push for a military victory. On the 
contrary, Cristiani convinced the far right, the FMLN moderates, and the United States that 
he was sincere, honest, and capable of imposing his political decisions. His attitude 
motivated the FMLN to come to the negotiation table, even though they still had doubts 
about his right-wing political tendencies, meaning, extreme anti-communist and pro-military. 
Cristiani recognized that El Salvador's economic hopes for recovery were tied 
to U.S. Congressional support. Therefore, he and his government continued to push for a 
political solution. Cristiani knew that a political solution was the only way to continue to 
receive economic aid from the United States . even when political and military events 
challenged the peace talks. 24 
Important changes also occurred in the FMLN-FDR In 1988, the leadership 
of the FMLN began to seriously evaluate its politico- military goals and strategies. The 
conditions that took them to conduct a reevaluation were the chaotic results of the general 
offensive of 1989 and the negative outcome obtained by FMLN' s delegates, who visited 
different countries to obtain support for their cause (Mexico, France, Nicaragua, and Cuba). 
The message to the FMLN was that a military victory was far from imminent 
and that the FMLN should adopt and stay supportive of a political settlement. Internally, the 
FMLN realized that their military power and political influence was declining. 
The fall of the Berlin wall, the economic changes under Mikhail Gorbachev, 
and the crumbing of the Marxist-Leninist political system also sparked two changes in the 
FMLN. First, Joaquin Villalobos said that "the rebels were not dogmatic socialists but were 
demanding solutions to the country's problems within a Western style democracy". This 
statement gave way to a drastic shift in the ideological perspective and direction of the 
FMLN general command. For years they used the classic Communist discourse, where the 
only alternative was to achieve the "dictatorship of proletariat", suddenly they were talking 
about democracy as a viable solution. Second, Soviet international policies shifted extremely 
when the Soviet government said that it would not continue to support any revolutionary 
movement. This gave even more reasons for the FMLN to question their capability to 
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continue their military operations. Villalobos' modified positions made evident an 
ideological division between two tendencies of the FMLN' s general command: Orthodox 
communists and Social-Democrats. Two symptoms of this division were that: 1) the FMLN 
openly defied Villalobos' attitude and continued its military operations; and 2) the 
negotiation process was seen by some FMLN commanders as a political instrument to 
prolong the war, and by others as a way to obtain full power of the government. 
Military actions, such as the 1989 and 1990's offensive, showed the 
government that the FMLN-FDR was trying to negotiate from a position of strength. Clearly, 
the FMLN continued to use military actions every time their interests were threatened by the 
peace process. When the armed force made efforts to stop the escalation of the conflict, the 
FMLN took a harder and less flexible position over the negotiation table. They retaliated by 
pressing the issue of the purge and reduction of the armed forces. 25 This created uncertainty 
and confrontation between the two negotiating commissions and caused a stalemate in the 
peace talks. 
Changes also took place in the military. There was a philosophical split within 
the military between moderates, who showed flexibility toward the peace talks, and others 
that look at the negotiation as a kind of weakness. This division became evident after the 
signing of San Jose I, II, and III in July- September, 1990.26 Despite this potential division, 
the armed force's leadership recognized that a conflict resolution must have had a social 
basis and that a military victory was going to be too expensive in every sense, if possible at 
all. Consequently, the original military strategy was expanded to a national strategy to reach 
a peaceful resolution of the conflict . A military commission advised the government, mainly 
on issues related to the military element of the counterinsurgency war. At this point the 
military had committed terrible mistakes, as the assassination of the Jesuit priests in San 
Salvador in the first week of November 1989, and the alleged corruption among high 
ranking officers. The influence of the military had been weakened by national and 
international pressures. 
The civilian sectors had changed their attitude also and the FMLN continued 
their efforts to mobilized the masses. The insurgents created the Permanent Committee of 
the National Debate (Comite Permanente del Debate Nacional or CPDN) in an attempt to 
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bring in all those national organizations that had rejected their communist ideologies in the 
pasts years. This committee also sought to promote civil society's involvement in the 
negotiated settlement through violent demonstrations. Most of the Salvadoran civil society 
had different view. They went to the polls on five different occasions (1989-1991) and 
believed that military actions were not the appropriate solution to the socio-political 
problems of the country. The Salvadoran people reaffirmed this position after the 1989 
offensive when they did not support the Fl\1LN' s armed attack on the Capital. By 1990, after 
this armed offensive in November, most of the Salvadoran people pushed the government 
and the Fl\1LN to end the armed conflict through a peaceful negotiation. During this period 
the Church was replaced in its role of mediator by the United Nations. The Catholic Church 
opted to support the left and the CPDN. They all were inspired by the Liberation theology. 
Opposition parties, in a natural effort to weaken the party in government came 
to support the negotiating position of the Fl\1LN and pushed for political reforms in the 
peace accords. The government obtained limited support, but it managed to demonstrate 
its serious effort to attain political and judicial reforms in the accords. Political parties 
played a vital role during the negotiation period. The most relevant evidence took place in 
September 1990 with the Inter-Party Dialogue Commission Agreement, which asked for a 
revision of the rules governing the March 1991 legislative and municipal elections. These 
changes expanded the size of the legislative assembly from sixty to eighty four seats and 
created more openings for the leftist candidates. The Salvadoran political parties supported 
the negotiations in April 1991 and proposed a constructive formula for the role and function 
of the truth commission, and stood together to ward off Fl\1LN efforts to change the 
procedures for constitutional amendment.27 
, b. International Factors 
In January 1984, the Kissinger Commission's report 28 provided a consensus 
framework for U.S. policy toward El Salvador. The report had different political emphases 
within Washington, D.C. (Congress stressed Human Rights considerations and the Reagan 
administration emphasized support for the Salvadoran Armed Forces). This consensus held 
until 1989 when new administrations took office in El Salvador and the United States. The 
Bush administration clearly announced to the Salvadoran Government that a negotiated 
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Bush's administration clearly announced to the Salvadoran Government that a negotiated 
solution was the only way to stop the armed conflict. 
After the leftist military offensive of 1989, the United States also admitted 
that the civil war did not have a military solution. Assistant Secretary of State Bernard W. 
Aronson stated at a congressional hearing that "El Salvador needs peace, and the only path 
to peace is at the negotiating table."29 Those words showed a significant shift in the U.S. 
position toward the Salvadoran armed conflict. Aronson recognized that the Reagan policy 
of isolating the FMLN militarily had failed and that it was time to pursue peace through 
dialogue. Many other United States officials agreed with Aronson. In testimony before the 
Senate, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, stated that "In El Salvador, we believe that 
this is the year to end the war through a negotiated settlement that will guarantee a safe 
political space for all Salvadorans". 30 A week later, General Maxwell R. Thruman, 
Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command, endorsed talks between the Salvadoran 
government and the FMLN to end the armed conflict, and stated his belief that the parties 
were on that course. 31 
Changes in the former Soviet Union played a larger role. In January 1989, the 
former Soviet Union announced to the FMLN that they could not afford military and 
economic aid and that the FMLN should pursue negotiations with the Salvadoran 
government.32 The Soviet Glasnost and Perestroika seemed to reinforce this trend. Mikhail 
Gorbachev's determination to improve relations with the United States prompted a dynamic 
withdrawal from Central America. The Soviets halted arms shipment to the Nicaraguan 
government in January 1989 and called on the FMLN to seek support from western nations. 
This convinced the FMLN to come over to the negotiating table. 
During the offensive of 1989, the FMLN competed with the collapse of the 
Soviet Empire for world attention. The Eastern block was moving away from totalitarian 
regimes and centralized economies. Cuba, a key FMLN ally, was becoming increasingly 
isolated from its communists allies and the Soviet Union's new thinking was prompting the 
FMLN to moderate its ideology even further. The November 1989 Malta summit showed 
Washington, D.C. how Far Moscow was willing to go to assure that it was not militarily 
supporting the FMLN. According to a French news report in late 1989, the Soviets told 
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Cuban and Nicaraguan high ranking officials to stop supplying arms to the FMLN.
33 After 
the Malta summit, President Bush accepted Soviet claims that they were not directly 
supplying the FMLN and were pressuring their allies to stop arms shipment to El Salvador. 
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The turnabout in U.S. policy toward El Salvador was accomplished by 
Congress in 1990, after the United Nations committed itself to play a major role in the 
negotiated settlement of the Salvadoran civil war in April 1990. Consequently, in October 
1990, the U.S. Congress tied any military and economic aid to El Salvador not only to 
human rights issues, but to progress in the negotiation process. After this shift in U.S. policy, 
both sides tried to sell their positions to the U.S. Government and to other governments 
around the world. Cristiani's administration tried to distance itself from the right-wing party 
foundation and said they were committed to a negotiated solution. The FMLN offered to talk 
and to moderate their negotiation position. The Bush administration, at the end of 1980 and 
the beginning of 1990, put El Salvador on the back burner, due to events in Panama and 
Nicaragua. Events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe occupied the spotlight ofU.S. 
foreign policy. In the end, the United States played a helpful but tangential role in support 
of the negotiation process. 
The U.N.O also played an important role. Throughout the negotiation process, 
the U.N.O. was actively involved and acted, at least in theory, as an impartial arbitrator. 
They helped set the deadline for the signing of the peace accords and the schedule for their 
implementation. The United Nations Observers Mission for El Salvador (Misi6n de 
Observadores de las Naciones Unidas para El Salvador or ONUSAL) would have the role 
of overseeing and supervising the implementation phase of the peace accords. 
In Sl.ll11l11alY, with the limited support received by the mentioned national and 
international factors in the first period, the outcome of the process was unsuccessful. With 
the positive change in the behavior of those factors, the second phase of the process 
managed to be a successful event ending in the signing of the peace accords in Mexico on 
16 January 1992. The Salvadoran conflict brought in many outside actors such as the 
United States, the former Soviet Union, regional influences (especially Venezuela and 
Mexico), rebel supporters (Cuba and Nicaragua), and some western European powers. 
These external actors often overwhelmed the locals with their own concerns, interests, and 
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agendas. Some of these actors, if not all, tried to micro manage the Salvadoran crisis through 
diplomatic, economic and military means but, in the end, it was the Salvadoran people who 
determined their own fate over the negotiating table. 
C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
From the preceding information we can draw an interesting comparison between the 
two negotiation processes. As we stated in our introduction, there are three dimensions in 
which these processes can be analyzed: The definition or unity shown by the contenders, the 
degree of participation of the civil society and finally, the degree of international 
intervention. 
The unity of the Salvadoran guerrilla allowed the process in El Salvador to be 
clearly defined as one. The only insurgent organization that the Salvadoran government had 
to deal with, was the FMLN-FDR. Despite of their initial differences, they consistently kept 
coming to the negotiation table as one movement. On the side of the government, there were 
only two tendencies one under Duarte's and the other under Cristiani' s administration. This 
situation gave continuity and a defined direction to the process. In contrast, in Colombia, 
the negotiation had been fragmented in relation to the insurgent organizations represented 
in the various processes, and also trough the time the negotiations has been taken place. In 
this sense, in Colombia there has not been one negotiation process, but at least nine, which 
has taken several directions. During the President Betancur' s administration., there were 
negotiations with the FARC, the M-19, EPL, ADO and some detachment ofthe ELN. 
During Barco and Gaviria's administrations there were negotiations with the M-19, 
EPL and Quintin Lame. This fragmentation has not allowed the Colombian government to 
get a final and total peace agreement. It has been extremely difficult for the Colombian 
government to accommodate and respond to multiple demands, especially when the table is 
being used by the guerrillas to strengthen its image and definitively not to end the conflict. 
Some analysts argue that the Colombian government has not been able to identify and 
exploit the essential differences among the guerrilla groups. But on the other hand, the 
misguided-management of the peace process disconnected the armed movement, in large 
part, from intellectuals and from volatile public opinion. 
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Currently, government and guerrillas let know each other their peace intentions. The 
military also want to participate in order to obtain the release of 60 army soldiers and 10 
marines, kidnaped by the guerrilla in August 1996 and January 1997, respectively. The 
former Colombian Attorney General Alfonso Gomez Mendez argues that peace processes 
have failed in Colombia because of the lack of active participation of the armed forces, the 
lack of societal conscience (no "civil" society as ifthere were a sharp split between civil and 
military societies) about the problem, and because neither human rights nor socio-
economical scopes of peace agreements are included as subjects of the negotiation agendas.35 
The second difference is the degree of participation of the civil society in the very 
process. In El Salvador, in the second period, during Cristiani administration (1989-1992) 
a high degree of participation of domestics actors, other than the government and the armed 
forces, existed. Political parties, the Catholic Church, some important economic sectors and 
other sectors of civil society, represented in non-governmental organizations participated 
in the process. These organizations added new dimensions to the process, either to support 
the government side or the insurgent side. Colombia has not experienced this phenomenon. 
As we analyzed in chapter IV, in Colombia the political, economic and religious sectors of 
society has not been affected in the same degree as in El Salvador. The civilian sectors in 
Colombia do not feel the urgent need to participate, we argue, because they do not feel the 
threat that they felt in El Salvador. 
The process of pacification is not dependent solely on the good will of the guerrillas 
or on the offensive military operations. It is a national responsibility in which labor unions, 
traditional parties, and the rightist groups have to accept that the negotiation process implies 
mutual concessions. 
Colombia's current process, resembles the first period ofDuarte in El Salvador 
( 1984-1989) when the government and the military were left alone in the negotiation 
process (even though they should be seen as one actor, we stress that differentiation, because 
the military in this period, enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and they were not so 
convinced that negotiation was the best alternative). 
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During the period of President Cristiani (1989-1992) the domestic actors changed 
their attitude, which made possible the end of the conflict. The military understood that the 
conflict was a social phenomenon, and contributed to design a national strategy, instead of 
pretending a sole military victory, which proved to be virtually impossible. The Church step 
aside to let the United Nations serve as a mediator, hoping to obtain more international 
credibility for the process. Civil society also understood that the end of the war was a 
national responsibility and decided to pressure and contribute to gain the peace trough a 
national dialogue. They had a common and vital objective: survival. In El Salvador, a failure 
of the negotiation process was unacceptable, because after the failure, the next step could 
have been serious disintegration of vital institutions and arguable catastrophic damage to the 
economy. In this sense, in Col~mbia, the domestic actors has not sufficient ,incentive so far 
to change their attitude. 
The third element is the degree of international intervention. Both countries were 
affected by the United States foreign policy on the one hand, and the communist influence 
on the other. However the degree of these influences were evidently very different. In 
Colombia, the government has not been pressured to come to the table as it was in El 
Salvador. The United States designed a whole strategy, according to its interest to promote 
and to force the dialogue. This strategy was based among others, on democratization and 
human rights issues, which has had different impact in the two cases. As a matter of fact, 
Tlaxcala and Caracas, were the first evidence ofthe conflict" internationalization", which 
is highly criticized by Colombian political analysts, who believed that by doing this, the 
Colombian government is strengthening the insurgents' image. The United Nations has not 
intervened in Colombia, and the United States has not pressure the government to negotiate, 
arguably, because they do not perceived a significant threat to its national interests. 
Colombia has to submit proofs about the F ARC's connection with the narcotraffick, 
as producer, carrier, or protector, in oreder to gain the United States interest and help to 
destroy the guerrillas. Colombian Army has evidence that was submitted to Congress during 
the hearings preceding the decertification. 
From the Guerrillas perspective, in El Salvador, the FMLN was pushed to the 
negotiation table by the drastic political changes in its communist supporters. Logistical 
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support was dramatically reduced and the ideological discourse was vanished. While in 
Colombia, the guerrilla movements maintained a high degree of autonomy, which has always 
been reinforced by the narcotra:fficking organizations. 
We need to keep in mind that the attitudes of the national and international actors 
were highly influenced by the intensity of the military confrontation, and the nature of its 
objectives as described in the previous chapters. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Before we present any argument we need to admit that there cannot be two identical 
societies. There is a wide range of current or potential differences in geography, history, 
value system, and culture in general. Since conflicts are the result of opposing values and/ or 
interests generated within these different societies, it would be fair to say that it is very 
unlikely to find two conflicts with identical characteristics. 
In our study, we have realized how within the societies of Colombia and El Salvador, 
particular socio-political, economical and ideological factors have influenced in different 
ways the patterns of decisions and actions of the main actors. The pattern of civil-military 
relations is one of the most notable difference. In Colombia the military participation in 
) .•· ... ' .· . ', .. ' 
politics was a phenomenom that took place at the end of the last century and at the early 
stages of the current century. In El Salvador the military intervention is a relatively new 
phenomenom which started in 1931. Both countries have suffered, in different degrees, the 
same situation but at different time periods. It is evident that in El Salvador this happened 
at the "wrong" time, given the fact that Democracy was the global tendency and that 
Communism was trying to exploit every possible sign of authoritarism and social injustice. 
Both countries developed powerful insurgent movements, arguably, rooted in the 
popular claims for social justice, democracy and respect for human rights. For many reasons 
these movements evolved in different ways. The actions taken by the incumbents 
governments, and the influence of external actors had different effects in the development 
of the conflicts. 
In El Salvador, in a relative short period of time the FMLN turned into the most 
powerful guerrilla force in Latin America, but was not able to defeat the Salvadoran 
government U.S.-supported strategy, and the efficiency and adaptability of Salvadoran 
armed forces. At the same time the insurgent movement lost its ideological and logistical 
support from the communists countries. The FMLN military structure had to vanish because 
it did not represent the Salvadoran's ideals of getting peace and justice. However the FMLN 
by giving up its military aspiration and communist ideology, turned into a powerful political 
party . The FMLN has kept its name as a way to simbolize, before its members continuity 
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of its existence. But the truth is that the original movement is dead. The military structure 
disappeared and its ideology is not communist anymore but it is contained within a 
democratic frame. 
In Colombia, the armed conflict has lasted for over forty years, but its intensity has 
been relatively low. The way the Colombian government has managed the situation, 
(perhaps by accident, without a defined strategy) has not allowed the guerrilla to develop 
as they FMLN did. Changes were promoted in the political system to counter the 
insurgency's claims. The military was kept out the political decisions, avoiding the 
posibilities to be attacked and weakened from the political arena. The guerrillas have not 
been able to maintain generalized uncertainty, nor have they brought the violence to a phase 
of civil war. 
Since the development and dynamics of these two conflicts are not identical, it 
follows that the processes to end them are also very unlikely to be so. Finishing the conflicts 
would mean the solution of essential opposing interests. These interests are rooted in the 
factors causing the current violence, which happen to be different in both countries. 
We have come to the conclusion that the Salvadoran model of negotiation (ifwe can 
call it that) cannot be applied entirely to the Colombian case. Definitely not every action or 
decision taken by the Salvadoran actors qualifY to be adopted by the Colombians. This 
would be a supreme act of ignorance. However we should not close the possibilities to learn 
and enrich our perspectives from the Salvadoran conflict. 
A. THE FALLACIES OF INTERPRETATION 
Any simplistic interpretation should be avoided. Pretending to conduct simplistic 
comparisons to suggest that identical solutions could be achieved, might generate dangerous 
interpretations from the key actors in the processes. Since Colombia is the country that may 
benefit from the Salvadoran experience, we will present this potential misinterpretations 
from the Colombian perspective. 
1. From the Insurgency Perspective 
A superficial interpretation of the Salvadoran process might create the false idea that 
they can copy the behavior of the FMLN to achieve similar results. In this sense they would 
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want to present similar demands in complex matters as the transformation or disolution of 
the armed forces. Even further, they could try to increase the intensity of the violence in an 
attempt to bring the armed conflict to a phase of civil war. Then they would try to 
internationalize it and pretend to bring in external pressures on the government to achieve 
their political objectives, as the FMLN did in El Salvador. All this, of course would be a 
terrible mistake, because Colombian insurgency does not have the unity, representativeness, 
and international support that the FMLN had. We need to keep in mind that the FMLN 
invested many years of effort to build that impressive net for political and financial support. 
2. From the Colombian Government Perspective 
Another mistaken perception may be encountered. If President Alfredo Cristiani, 
negotiated with the terrorist of the FMLN and made considerable concessions,. he could be 
seen as a weak political leader. He, it could be argued, let the insurgents transform the 
political system setting as bad precedent to other democratic systems. This would not be 
accurate, because Cristiani led a country where the whole political system was being 
transformed, not by the action of the guerrilla force, but a convergence of national and 
international factors. Some transformations were simply the result of the overwhelming need 
to modernize the state, yet the FMLN claims victory for those changes. The conflict and the 
dialogues occurred within the framework of that process of transformation. 
3. From the Civil Society Perspective 
A superficial interpretation of the role played by the Salvadoran society, which 
participated widely during the process of negotiation, might invite the Colombian civil 
society to press a political solution, obligating the government to make the "wrong" 
concession in a desperate effort to end the ongoing bloody confrontation. In this dimension, 
people could trade short term benefits for catastrophic damage of the democratic system in 
the long term. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
There are some important lessons to be considered, related to the guerrillas, the 
armed forces, the international meddling, and the intensity of the conflict. 
143 
1. Evidence supports that in this case, the greater the links that the guerrilla 
forces had with social and political organizations, the more likely it was that 
the guerrillas would contemplate a political settlement that allows them to 
enter the mainstream politics. This is the case of the FMLN, that abandoned 
the military effort, but they were somehow sure that the political arena was 
open its members. As the current events in El Salvador have shown, the 
FMLN had, and took advantage of, the opportunity to bring its political 
agenda to the democratic debate and let the people decide. The Colombian 
guerrilla do not have those links. The opportunity for survival can not be 
placed under the democratic frame, but under indefinite clandestineness and 
alliances with the organized crime. 
2. From the military perspective, we conclude that the greater the participation 
the military have in politics, the more likely it is that the armed forces will 
be weakened by a revolutionary process and the more likely that they will 
have to accept political settlements even against their own corporate and 
personal interests. The evidence also show th~t armed forces can participate 
in the building or strengthening ·of a democratiC system, by keeping three 
essential attitudes: first, to avoid interfering in the political process; second 
to modernize their organization to meet the military challenge of armed 
insurgency and third, not to allow any member to act above the law, which 
they are supposed to defend. 
3. We also found that the more intensely the armed conflict affect the different 
sectors of society, the more likely it is that the society will be willing to make 
concessions and to participate in a process of negotiation. In El Salvador 
every sector in society was deeply affected by the violence. The negotiation 
was a national priority and not just a political act decided by the central 
government. In Colombia there are still sectors of society that feel that they 
do not need to negotiate. It seems that for some people, negotiating would 
bring worse consequences that continuing the conflict. If that should be the 
case in Colombia, it would be appropriate to formalize an strategy to end the 
conflict by other means, not just remain in a reactive situation where the 
guerrillas may be tempted to exercise its initiative. 
4. International meddling can and will influence the attitude of domestic actors, 
especially when the degree of dependence is high. In El Salvador, the FMLN 
was willing to demobilized its military structure only after insuring the 
compromise of the Salvadoran government before the UN, to allow the 
FMLN to be reinserted into the political and social structure, without the 
danger ofbeing destroyed, afterwards as they feared. In Colombia. It seems 
that the insurgents do not want to become a political movement. They either 
know that if they do become a political party, they will not have enough 
support to survive, or they just have found an attractive way of living which 
cannot be replaced by any international meddling or domestic settlement. 
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C. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Negotiations in revolutionary processes should be considered only when they are 
genuine building blocks for strengthening democratic systems. Negotiators need to be aware 
of that negotiations are powerful tools to enhance political and military capabilities of the 
guerrilla movements. However negotiation processes can also be used to obtain serious 
compromises and to discredit insurgents before public opinion. Government should 
recognize when dialogue is a genuine effort to end the conflict and when this is just a tactical 
maneuver to gain time or strength to keep the war going. 
The best way to isolate and defeat insurgents, is not by the means of military actions 
alone. Governments need to identify and to correct structural deficiencies in the systems. 
They need also to legitimaze their actions by creating environments where every sector of 
society is heard, respected and taken care of. 
In both cases it was proved that the more positive changes were made in the political 
system, the weaker the guerrilla movements got, basically due to the fact that the people did 
not support illegitimate claims from the insurgents. However, military actions in the short 
run will strengthen the position of the contenders in the negotiation process. If a the 
government decide to negotiate it must cause enough damage to the insurgent military 
structure to insure credibility and respect. This formula will certainly be applied by the 
guerrilla as the FMLN did in El Salvador and the Colombian guerrilla has started to do in 
1997. The government should carefully apply enough military pressure on the neuralgic 
centers of guerrilla forces, so that they face the dilemma : negotiation or extinction. 
If a government is sure of its legitimacy and prestige they should not be afraid of 
internationalizing the conflict, because the guerrilla will be exposed to international 
criticism. They will also be obliged to accept formal compromises which will make them 
more vulnerable to public opinion. Insuring international political and financial support 
should be a priority for the governments. The FMLN in El Salvador demonstrated how 
important it is to have an international network to insure international political and financial 
support. While Salvadoran government showed us the dangers of not having them. The 
government need to build an international net with official and non official missions to look 
for political and financial support, and to counter the campaigns of disinformation that 
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insurgents are used to conducting. This needs to take into account adynamic attitude of the 
diplomatic missions and the dissemination of literature containing current information to 
influence the public opinion. 
It is necessary to discredit the thesis of military tie. Armed forces are not intended 
to destroy guerrilla forces, but to preserve political systems. Insurgencies are social 
phenomenons rooted in socio-economical and political deficiencies. If these deficiencies 
disappear, the probabilities that the insurgents will lose social and ideological support will 
increase, and they will probably become simply outlaws and delinquents as the 
narcotraffickers. Narcotraffi.c is a variable that only plays in Colombia. If a crime like 
narcotraffic is essential to the Colombian guerrilla movement, because it is its biggest source 
of financial support, it is very unlikely that guerrillas are willing to change this status 
overnight. They will probably not be. willing- to leave their strongholds. These are literally 
"kingdoms" in the jungle. Guerrillas would not go to the cities where they feel like just 
regular people, and where they would probably feel in danger, unless being in the jungle 
becomes more dangerous (which should be the government's objective). 
It is regrettable that there is no formula to solve a conflict with the complexity of a 
revolutionary process. The strategist facing this kind of conflict needs to use his deep instinct 
and experience to make sense out of the complexity of the situation. With this study we can 
only pretend to provide a little more amplitude to the analysis to make sure that the leaders 
do not overlook some essential considerations in the process of making strategical decisions. 
We believe that, for an strategy to succeed, it must first exist. This strategy must be 
conceived and implemented. Doing nothing might be the right strategy, as long as it is a 
genuine decision with perfect understanding of its implications. The worst thing a 
government can do is not to have an strategy to counter the insurgency's, and to be reactive 
during the whole conflict. 
People will always demand peace, people deserve peace. But before a government 
considers negotiating with the enemy, in order to recover the peace, this government would 
need to negotiate with its people the price (assuming they know) they are willing to pay. 
From then on, politicians, the military, and any other actor in the contest, must subordinate 
his interests to the interest of the whole society. That means: In a complex society where 
there are many deficiencies, once those deficiencies have been recognized, everybody must 





APPENDIX A. COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES' REPORT ABOUT 
GUERRILLAS' INVOLVEMENT IN NARCOTRAFFIC* 
CONTENT: 
1. Information about drug traffic 
2. Guerrilla Financial Information. 
3. Copy of a handwritten document about coca paste general 
entries of guerrilla squad XV. 
*This document was presented in March 1997 to the U. S. Congress' Anti-Narcotics 
Committee by General HAROLD BEDOYA PIZARRO, Commanding General of the 




(CARTEL DE LJ\:S FAR C) 
COI.OMBIA. 6 
INFORMATION ABOUT DRUG 
TRAFFIC 
1. NARCO-TERRORISM GROUPS 
(fHE FARC CARTEL) 
A. ..~que~e:haciaevidentedesdetiem- A·. lthoqgh ~he obvious link ~etween .~Pri atnis que los Vinculos entre Ia sub::·"'· subversive groups and drug traffic was 
. vers~6ri. yd narcotrafico eran un he- . . . factually evident from a long time ago, 
cho, es en 1982; cuando se produce «?l primer the first document produced by the FARC (stan-
documento escrito pot las FARC (Fuerzas ~r- ding for Communist Revolutionary Armed 
madas Revolucionarias Comunistas) que mencio- Forces) which mentions this subject openly came 
na el tema. Este documetito corresponde a Ia Sep- into the light in 1982. This document was 
tima Conferencia Naciorial Guerrillera, en ella se elaborated during the Seventh National Guerrilla 
da como ·concepto frente al problema del Conference and it·contains the guiding principles 
narcotrifico_ que las C(tadrillar (org!lnizaciones assumed by the cuadrillas (guerrilla squads 
guerrillerasde IOOrniembrosaproximadamente),: conformed by approximately one hundred ... 
· • · , deberian "mantenerun eqtiilibrio entre Ia produc- · · bombatants) in front of the .drug traffic issue; Hi~ 
cion de coca y cultivos de economiafamiliar" y cuadri/lar are ordered to «preserve the balance 
reali.Zar un especial trabajo de masas con los cui- ·between the production of cocaine and the eco-
tivadores de hoja de coca con e1 prop6sito de nomiafamiliar (family consumption) crops" and 
ganarlos para Ia revoluci6n. carry out a special indoctrination work among 
El equilibria de producci6n, no obedecia a 
Ia preocupaci6n de las FARC por el coslo de Ia 
cimasta familiar de los campesinos cultivadores 
de hoja de coca. quienes dada Ia confianza en Ia 
comercializaci6n del producto, sus buenos pre-
cios, etc. habian dejado casi totalmente los culti-
vos tradicionales dandose el caso que en muchos 
sectores de·los territorios nacionales Ia yuca, el 
platano y ademas productos de ·consumo regio-
nal que anteriormente se cultivaban en todas las 
fincas, se traian ahora por avion desde el interior 
del pais. 
Esta situacion representaba un problema a 
Ia organizaci6n guerrillcra especialmente cuan-
do concentraba un gran numero de hombres. · 
Son muchos los casos en los que se presen-
taron combates entre el l?.jercito y grupos anna-
dos·, principalmcntc de las f-ARC, dcdicados a 
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cocaine-leaf raisers to have them on the side of 
the revolution. 
Such a concern about the balance in the 
products cultivated was not originated in the 
FARC's interest to protect the peasants' economy. 
The starting end of the string was the trend among 
the countrymen to nearly abandon the production 
of traditional crops to produce cocaine leaf 
because of their great confidence in the easy 
marketing of the product, the good prices they 
used to get, and some other advantages which 
made that some !ood items -yucca, p!citano, etc-
and other consumption goods which once used 
to be produced locally -in the regions which were 
known as los IC'rritorios nac:iouales (literally, the 
national territories, i.e., the farthest territories 
fi·om the see of the Central Government) were to 
be brought by airplane from the central regions 
of the· country. 
,.:€~ 
~-.mrr. t~~~;~J ~~~~~-------------------------------------~---------------------------
defender laboratorios de narcotraficantes. Estos 
les pagaban el impuesto acordado, mientras que 
los pequenos cultivadores y comerciantes esta-
ban obligados a cancelar elllamado gramaje, can-
tidad de dinero que deben aportar por cada gra-
mo de coca que se produzca. Los cabecillas de 
las cuadrillas de las FARC nose contentaron con 
los dineros que recibian por este eoncepto y de-
ciden entrar.en el negocio de ·Ia droga y es asi 
como Jac<>bo Arenas (lider ideol6gico de esa or-
ganizaCi6n, ya fallecido), ordena robar a los 
. narcotraficantes; en uno de los casos una cuadri-
. ·ila de las FARC roba mas de 200 kilos de coca a 
Carlos Leder ( caso que Leder mencion6 en una 
entrevista televisada por un noticiero nacional). 
En los mapas Nos. 1 - 2 - 3 y 4 podemos 
apreciar Ia coincidencia existente entre las zonas 
con cultivos ilicitos y la·ubicaci6n de los gri.tpos 
narco-subversivos. 
El diario "EI Mercurio", de Santiago de 
Chile, en su edici6n del domingo 25 de febrero 
de 1996, publica un articulo del senor Miguel 
Posa·da -director del Centro de Analisis 
Sociopoliticos-; que se refiere a Ia alianza exis-
'tente entre el narcotrafico y los grupos terroris-
tas. 
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Such a trend posed a big problem for the 
uerrilla organization because a great number of 
men were concentrated in the coca leaf 
production labor. 
A significant number of combats between 
the army troops and illegally armed groups, mainly 
the FARC squads, has involved guerrilla units 
whose main task is. to. protect and d.efend· 
laboratories belonging to diverse kinds oF drug 
traffickers who pay a previously fixed tax to the 
guerrillas. Petty raisers and traffickers have to 
pay the so-called gramqje -·a given amou~t of 
money ·paid per each gram of cocaine produced-
The FARC squad heads were not fully satisfied 
by the money they obtained this way, so they made 
up their mind to take on the drug ·business by 
themselves and Jacobo Arenas (ideological leader 
of the organization) sent orders to steal the 
merchandise from the traffickerS. Thus, in only 
one case reported, a FARC squad took over two 
hundred kilograms coke from Carlos Leder. 
Leder himself spoke about the incident in a 
television interview for a news program. 
On maps I - 2 - 3 and 4 we can appreciate 
the existence with in the zones the culture of illicit 
drugs and the different locations ofnarco-guerri-
lla groups. · . 
The daily newspaper "EI Mercurio" from 
Santiago Chile, in their edition of 25 february 
1996, published an article from Mr. Miguel Po-
sada. Director for Center for Analysi$ on Social -
Politics; in which he referenced the alliance 
between the narco-traffickers and the terrorist 
groups 
2. ~INANZAS DE LA GUERRILLA 
E.·.  stos d. ~cum.entos, alg··. u.~o. s .escritos a ... maquma, otros .en computador y . . : . otro~ .tantos :11!-arttisc.rito~ son prue-
.bas .de irrefutabl~'valo{ijue:iri~.-·eomolas 
FARC ·se han• ciJri~eltido'~nSirit~ARTEL. · · 
. .. ·.·.::.·· 
Se observa alii que se- dedicaron no solo 
como err los primeros tiempos a cebrar el gram_aje 
y el impuesto por seguridad a l~boratorios, sino 
·que poseen sus propias zonas.de cultivos de hoja 
de coca, sus cocinas de proces8mientos, sus la-
boratorios de purificaci6n, sus pistas y Ia 
comercializacion en 61 exterior. 
COI.OMIJIA. 17 
2. GUERRILLA FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION 
T he doctiments seized along with this ma~eihl, some ·of which were typ~~#~ ~p_m~ other$ ~puter­printe~. · and.ff,¥-~Ai~qng:~tft~rs hand Written, 
oon5titute vill~ab~e ~aitd~i['refutable-evidence to 
demonstrate 'ihat'titf,F'AR.c have ·really turned 
into a r~ CARTEL:, • 
:-·.: 
. These documents let· u~ ~ee the transition 
made from charging the grama)e fee and a safety 
tax on account of the protec~ion given to the 
laboratories in the early period to the owning of 
areas devoted ~o. producing coca leaves, 
. · · proyessing cocinas (small laboratories), landing-
En septiembre de 199 5 en el balance de Ia strips, and a net to market the drug abroad. 
reunion plenaria de! estado mayor del bloque sur, 
· 
reunion a Ia que asistieron los cabecillas de .las In September, 1995, in the balance made 
cuadrillas 2,"3, 13, 14, 15, 49 y 61, las ·cuales after the plenary meeting oftheSouthem Block 
deliriquen en Caqueta, Huila y Putamayo; emit en Staff(Annexed 1), the commanders of the second, 
ordenes a sus secuaces, las que incluyen: "se co- third, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, forty-ninth, 
brani por kilo de .base$ 25.000 y de_ crista! $ and sixty-seventh squads that perform th,eir cri-
35.000 (hace 10 afios se viene cobrando $ 5.000· minal acts through,out the territories of the 
menos y Ia deyaluaci6n sigue creciendo )" (Anexo Departments of Caquet~, Huila, and Putumayo 
No.1). En cumplimiento de esto transmiten a las sent orders to their comrades in order to: "charge 
cuadrillas sus "planes financieros" que no son otra $25,000.oo per kilogram cocaine paste and 
cosa que las instrucciones por escrito a un grupo $35,000.oo per kilogram cocaine crystal (Starting 
de bandidos para que reunan din eros con destino ten years ago, amounts $5,000.o<i lower have 
a Ia organizaci6n delic'tiva mediante Ia coordina- been charged, and the devaluation process goes 
cion con los mafiosos, los dueiios de laborato- on)". To make their plans operational, the Staff 
rios, comisionistas (recolectores de pasta de coca Commanders sent to their squads what they 
que trabajan por comisi6n a los dueiios de los considered to be their "financial plans'' -a set of 
laboratorios), cultivadores de coca, ganaderos, written instructions for the guerrilla combatants 
comerciantes y toda aquella persona o entidad to ·h_elp gather money tb support their 
que realice actividades econ6micas en Ia region. revolutionary cause- by coor-dinating their 
Esta coordinaci6n establece Ia cantidad de dine- actions with drug mafia membcrl>:·laboratory 
ro que deben aportar por periodo de tiempo o owners, commission agents (cocaine paste 
cantidad de producci6n, el incumplimiento del collectors who work on a commission basis for 
acue_rdo a que se llegue da como respuesta de the laboratory owners), coca leaf raisers, cattle 
las FARC, Ia pena de ri1llerte. raisers, business people and any other person 
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cifra sirve para realizar un calculo de lo que reci-
biria Ia organizaci6n en el transcurso de un aiio. 
Tomando como referencia estos ingresos y 
teniendo en cuenta que la cuadrilla 15 contaba 
·con dos comisiones financieras: la comisi6n del 
"Caguan" y Ia del "15". Multiplicamos por dos 
Ia cantidad de dinero que recibe.JJor afio cada 
comision para tem~r una apreciad6n de cuanto 
reciben aproxiinadamente por cuadrilla y nos da-
rla una cifra de US$ 1 0'500~000 do lares este di-
nero corresponde solamente-al recibido por eon~. 
cepto d~ coca sin contar con los secuestros, 
boleteos, extorsiones y los llamados impuestos 
etc. El bloque recibiria US$73'500.000 d6lares 
y las FARC en total US$ 514'500.000 aproxi-
madamente. (Grafica No. 1) 
Estas cifras son bastante aproximadas a Ia 
realidad si se analiza que existen frentes del car-
tel de las FARC que reciben mucho mas dinero 
como lo son los ubicados en el departamento del 
Guaviare, Vichada, Guainia y Vaupes. 
Un informe del "pleno del estado mayor 
del bloque sur"(Anexo 9) realizado en el Ca-
queta traza como objetivo obtener mediante re-
tenci6nes de canicter econ6mico (secuestros) 
ocho mil doscientos millones de pesos, US$ 
8'200.000 aproximadamente. Ademas mencio-
na que las cuadrillas 14 y 15 en solo dos activi-
dades ftnancieras obtuvieron US$ 2'016.500, los 
que entregaron a los cabecillas de las FARCy en 
octubre de 1995 tenian US$ 1 '442.000 por en-
tregar como parte de Ia cuota de los 4 millonrs 
de do lares que por rase (periodo de tiernpo de 6 
meses) elllamado estado mayor de las FARC les 
habia impuesto. . 
bn Ia agenda manuscrita (Anexo I 0) del ca-
becilla de Ia cuadrilla I 5 (alias Arturo Medina), 
menciona que esta posee entre otros elementos 
de infi·aestructura: 
COLOMBIA lB 
STATEMENT information con-tained therein 
usually corresponds to cocaine and, in some other 
cases, to collaboration, i.e., the tax imposed on 
the traders; stall-keepers, and any-other inhabitant 
whose eurrent activity does not have anything to 
do with drug trafiic. Another piece ofinfonnation 
. -quays- records the fees charged on canoe and 
launch proprietors ~ho operate along the rivers. 
Only one of the commissions in charge. of 
·developing .the "financial plan" gathered US 
$1'750,000.00 in a four month lapse as appearing 
in the Caguan Overall Income Roll (Annexed 
8): The projection for a whole year indicates that 
this commission would obtain as much as US 
$5:,250,000.oo. Thes~ figures are just an indicator 
of the amounts of money picked up by the gue-
rrilla organization during a year. 
Based" on ;the figures co~mputed for the 
Fifteenth Squad, which had two financial 
commissions -the Caguan commission and the 
15th commission-, that is, multiplying for two 
the amount of money received by each 
commission, we obtain a rough figure of US 
$10'500,000.oo per squad which is the money 
picked on account of cocaine production alone. 
This does not include the money received as 
payments for kidnappings, boleteo (compulsory 
contributions demanded by means of written no-
tes or holetas), extortion operations, and taxes, 
etc. Altogether, the block income sums up to 
US $73'500,000.oo and theFARC reaches a great 
total US $514'500,000.oo approximately 
(Graphic No. I) 
These ligures are rather rough because the 
FARC cartel has many different fronts whose 
incomes differ notoriously. Some of them gather 
even more money than the ones analyzed here; 
take for instance the guerrilla units operating in 
the Departments ofGuaviare, Vichada, Guainia, 
and Yaupes. 
In a report entitled "P!cna1·y to the 
South('nt Bloc!< Starr· (Annexed 9) sent rrom 
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frente 30 de las FARC comprimida y envasada 
en recipientes metalicos en los que se simulaba 
exportaci6n de pifia para ser enviada a Alemania. 
Se ha detectado que el bloq~e sur ha im-
puesto el cultivo de Ia amapola en 18 municipios 
del Huila, destruyendo 18.800 hectareasde bos-
_.que alto andino. El Ejercito en.. el riles de marzo 
ha destruido 88.5 hectareassembmdas de 635.000 
matas de amapola. 
Para las actividades de prote.cci6n de labo-
ratorios las FARC vienen empieando campos mi-
. nados, francotiradotes, una excelente red de co~ 
municaciones, asi como hostigamientos y 
emboscadas a Ia fuerza publica y ataque a 
aero naves, lo que les ha permitido derribar a vi o-
nes y helicopteros, todo esto da merito para cali-
ficar a las FARC como el cartel del narcotratico 
mas grande, poderoso e i~·portante del pais.(Ver 
fotografias anexas). 
Los demas grupos guerrilleros tambien tie-
nen participaci6n en est as actividades que les arro-
jan importantes sumas de dinero como se calcula 
en el cuadro No. 2. 
Con parte de estos dineros financian orga-
nizaciones encargadas de divulgar sus plantea-
mientos y realizar un trabajo de manejo de ima-
gen a nivel internacional como es el caso de 
Mexico y Ginebra. 
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COI.OMJJIA 19 
In January, 1996, a communication was 
intercepted. The message sent by an attorney 
representing some people who are members of 
the Cali Cartel to an unknown listener said that 
the FARC Thirtieth Front and the heads of the 
C'ali Cartel were planning ajoint effort to commit 
terrorist acts against government facilities and 
officials (Annexed 13 ), 
During the month of February, a number of 
military operations were launched against the 
FARC Thirteenth Front -named after Cacica La 
Gqifana (a XVIth Century indian chi"et)-
(Annexed 14- Map No.6) in the southern region 
of the Department ofHuila. In the course of these 
actions, several financial plans similar to the ones 
seized from the Fifteenth Squad were found; this 
is a clear proof ofthe activities that the guerrilla 
organizations are canying out concerning poppy 
crops and opium processing (Annexed 15 - 1 6); 
likewise, a system of communication code keys 
referring to cocaine paste and poppy was seized 
(Annexed 17), as well as over 40 tons marihuana 
belonging to the Thirtieth FARC Front. It is 
worthy remarking that the marihuana seized was 
compressed and packed in metallic containers in 
an effort to disguise the drug load as a·pineapple 
shipment to be exported to Germany. 
As a result of the operations in the area, it 
has been discovered a measure imposed by the 
FARC Southern Block which obliges peasants to 
cultivate poppy fields in eighteen differen! 
municipalities in the Department of Huila; this 
has brought along the destruction of 18,800 
hectares of High Andean Forest ( 18) During 
the month of March, the army destroyed 88.5 
cultivated hectares where 635,000 poppy plants 
were sown. 
The FARC organization uses many different 
mechanisms to protect their laboratories and 
cultivated fields. They have mined huge land 
strips, they have sharp-shooters corps. they have 
established an excellent conununicationnetwod 
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Every organization within the FI\1LN had a separate military structure, its 








"Felipe Pefia Mendoza" Battalion Group 
"Rafael Arce Zablah" BRAZ Brigade 
"Rafael Aguifiada Carranza" Battalion 
"Luis Adalberto Diaz" Battalion 
"Carlos Arias" Battalion 
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GUAZAPA 
PC 
MAP OF EL SALVADOR 
FMLN'S WAR FRONTS 
Source: Department oflntelligence C-II Joint Staff ofEl Salvador's armed forces. 
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Table E.l Military Casualties. 
---·--- ------- --
KILLED IN ACTION WOUNDED IN ACTION MISSING IN ACTION ASSASSINATED 
OFF DUTY 
YEAR OFFICERS ENLISTED OFFICERS ENLISTED OFFICERS ENLISTED BOTH TOTALS 1 
CATEGORIES 
1981 14 561 35 64 2 1 38 715 
1982 22 1000 64 1800 I 173 15 3075 
1983 15 1309 43 1900 3 346 20 3636 
I 
1984 29 874 35 1502 0 166 105 2711 
1985 4 543 41 2051 0 61 5 2705 
1986 7 439 10 389 0 20 36 901 
0\ 
1987 17 556 57 2337 0 24 71 3062 
1988 15 542 60 2281 0 7 13 2918 
1989 26 1006 133 3604 0 14 36 4819 
1990 23 655 93 2599 0 6 712 4088 
1991 16 423 34 1614 0 0 36 2123 
1992 0 6 0 19 0 0 47 72 
1993 INA INA INA INA INA INA 40 40 
TOTAL 188 7,353 570 20,096 4 818 1,174 30,203 
















APPENDIX E. SALVADORAN HUMAN LOSES 
Table E.2 Civilian Casualties 
I YEAR I KILLED I CAPTURED/DISAPPEARED I TOTALS 
1980 10,000 INA 10000 
1981 5,000e 1,045 1050 
1982 4,419 1,336 5755 
1983 2,375 332 2707 
1984 1000e INA INA 
1985 9* INA INA 
1986 167* INA INA 
1987 143* INA INA 
1988 178* INA INA 
1989 1,500e INA INA 
1990 62* INA INA 
1991 75* INA INA 
1992 332* INA INA 
1993 188* INA INA 
TOTAL 10506 2713 13219 
These numbers are based on the different authors cited through the text. Most authors agree that the 
total number of civilian casualties add about 60,000. 




APPENDIX E. SALVADORAN HUMAN LOSES 
Table E.3 Salvadoran Guerrillas Casualties. 
YEAR KILLED IN WOUNDED IN CAPTURED SURRENDERED TOTALS 
ACTION ACTION 
1979 1000e 500e INA INA 1500 
1980 2000e 900e INA INA 2900 
1981 2539 453 109 230 3331 
1982 2225 469 53 125 2872 
1983 2040 387 79 212 2718 
1984 1637 605 369 945 3556 
1985 1030 590 304 283 2207 
1986 649 600 81 184 1514 
1987 878 565 14 32 1489 
1988 1000e 500e INA INA 1500 
1989 2500e 900e INA INA 3400 
1990 900e 500e INA INA 1400 
1991 lOOOe 500e INA INA 1500 
TOTAL 19398 7469 1009 2011 29887 
Source: Department of Intelligence C-II Joint StaffOfEl Salvador's armed forces 
e= This estimates were based on the experience ofLCDR Palacios Luna who studied many 
official and non official reports in his tour as the head of the planning office of the 
"Operations" Department C-III of the Joint Staff in the period 1994-1995. 
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YEAR KIDNAPPING TERRORISM 
1976 55 262 
1977 71 251 
1978 54 326 
1979 29 147 
1980 44 202 
1981 99 287 
1982 136 342 
1983 167 165 
1984 299 458 
1985 286 624 
1986 180 412 
1987 259 279 
1988 709 677 
1989 781 829 
1990 1717 577 
1991 1320 926 
1992 1282 1104 
Table F.1 Data for Terrorism and Kidnapping Tendencies 
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APPENDIX G. COLOMBIAN GUERRILLAS' ACTIONS 
Table G.l Guerrilla's Actions 
ANO 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 TOTAL 
FARC ELN FARC ELN FARC ELN FARC ELN FARC ELN FARC ELN 
TYPE 
SMALL TOWNS 6 4 2 5 27 4 
ASSAULTS 
AMBUSHES 43 31 29 18 42 16 
ATTACKS TO 73 52 41 23 61 15 
MILITARY 
INSTALLATIONS 
CHECK-POINTS 87 52 30 19 116 85 
KIDNAPPING 546 254 260 191 180 149 
TERRORISM ( 1) 224 178 38 159 94 161 
TOTAL 979 571 400 415 520 330 
Source: Army Intelligence Report. March 1997. V1a F .AX 
(1) It includes attacks to petrolewn infrastructure. 
14 2 29 5 
22 12 37 10 
54 27 78 51 
45 29 54 33 
261 270 292 41 
57 112 117 205 
453 452 607 345 
Table G.2 Killed and Wounded in Guerrillas' Actions 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
KILLED 
* ARMED FORCES 311 319 243 263 436 85 
*POLICE 465 263 117 182 150 38 
* GUERRILLAS 1432 1210 909 800 853 236 
*CIVILIANS 2080 1436 1119 870 739 88 
SUBTOTAL 4288 3228 2388 2115 2178 447 
WOUNDED 
*ARMED FORCES 623 446 565 444 660 157 
*POLICE 106 326 369 254 250 47 
*GUERRILLAS (1) 
*CIVILIANS 802 886 416 534 402 82 
SUBTOTAL 1531 1658 1350 1232 1312 2~6 
7 1 106 
9 2 271 
12 16 503 
4 6 560 
45 60 2549 
21 18 1384 











*Source: Army Intelligence Report. March 1997. Via FAX (1) This figure in not in records. Guerrillas usually take wounded with them. 
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APPENDIX G. COLOMBIAN GUERRILLAS' ACTIONS. 
Table G.3 Captured and Surrendered Insurgents (1992-1997) 
GRUP 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 TOTAL 
0 
. <--i< H> ~" < FjA\ rlc ..... c•77:;s 
·•··s :_s .2_ .... 
FARC 439 27 813 135 708 80 738 55 909 104 149 12 3756 413 
ELN 355 23 653 47 721 12 675 25 654 18 120 2 3178 127 
EPL ... 130 47 234 27 143 6 100 2 79 301 4 690 383 
. 
.M ... 19 15 I 10 7 9 I 41 2 
OTHE .•..••• I75I 5 1720 2 2107 2 2006 1171 187 8942 9 
RS 
... 
TOTA 2675 102 3435 212 3689 100 3526 82 2822 424 460 14 16607 934 
L ····· 
* C= Captured S= Surrendered Source: Army Intelligence Report. Marc 1997. V 1a FAX. 
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APPENDIX H. VIOLENCE AND PEACE IN COLOMBIA (1978-1992) 
GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE PEACE OFFICIAL GUERRILLAS 
EVOLUTION. POLICY. PEACE STRATEGY. 
TURBAY * Repression *No talks. * M-l9leadership for 
(1978-1982) * M -19 urban presence * Ineffective Amnesty. peace. 
*MAS (1981) * Tactical meaning for 
peace. 
BET AN CUR * Paramilitarism * National Dialogue * Negotiations to wide 
(1982-1986) Growth. * Peace Commission political space. 
* First war against * Truce Agreements * War preparation 
narcotraffick. (NoELN). (growth) 
* Political violence * Establishment and *War economy. 
(UP). military opposition. 
,·1-
BARCO * Narcoterrorism * Peace Policy * Guerrilla Coordinator 
(1986-1990) *Dirty war institutionalization Board. 
* Increasing of the * PNR: marginal and * FARC: dialogue and 
fight against the poor zones. fighting. 
guerrilla; actions * Peace Initiative * M-19: demobilization. 
against economic *Negotiation with M- * EPL, PRT, MQL 
objectives. 19. demobilized also. 
* Processes with EPL, * ELN: no to talks. 
PRT, MQL started. 
GAVIRIA * Narcotraffick's * End ofEPL, PRT, * Military struggle as 
(1990-1992) violence reduced MQL negotiations. the way to gain weight 
* Growth of guerrilla * Talks with drug lords. in the negotiations. 
activities. * More flexible * Internal discussion 
* Dirty war continues scheme to negotiate on the validity of arm-
withCGSB. ed struggle. 
* Strategy against * Efforts to channelize 
violence. social unrest. 
* Civilian Minister of 
Defense. 




APPENDIX I. CARACASTALKS. DWFERENCESBETWEEN 
COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT AND GUERRILLAS. 
GOVERNMENT II GUERRILLA {CGSB} 
Hostility. 
*Those activities derived from regular guerrillas' *Stop actions against civilians (state terrorism. Bombing, 
operations (terrorism, kidnapping, armed recruitment, shooting, checkpoints, arbitrary detentions, forced 
extortion, threats) and those derived from military disappearances, kidnapping, tortures, billeting, blackmail, 
confrontation (checkpoints, supplies control) violations, supplies control). 
Verification. 
*Demands defined settlement for the guerrillas, to be *Settlement is not necessary 
possible. 
Process Evaluation. 
*Negotiators should not be part of the Evaluation *Evaluation Commission should be in the negotiation 
Commission '' table. .. "' 
Paramilitarism. 
*Government confirm its policy against para- military. !.Government should report to the country state actions 
It renews its compromise to: against paramilitary groups. 
1. Submit reports of actions against paramilitary 2. Official announcement that paramilitarism promotion 
groups. is not government's policy. 
2. Investigate the possible guerrilla's report. 3.1mmediate actions against paramilitarism. 
3. Accord with the CGSB specific actions in areas 4. Explanation to public opinion of the document the 
cleared by guerrillas. CGSB will present about the subject. 
4. Other subjects would be considered in point 3 ofthe 5. Creation of an international commission to investigate 
agenda. paramilitarism in Colombia. 
6. Purification of the armed forces members who were 
involved with the paramilitary groups. 
7. Regulation banning foreigners to instruct paramilitary. 
8. Suspension of the military immunity (fuero militar) to 
avoid impunity in human rights violations. 
9. Review of military doctrine about national security. 
Kidnapping. 
*Immediate release of kidnapped citizens by guerrillas, Compromise to find solutions to kidnapping made by 
without concessions by the government. guerrillas 
Captive Military. 
*They are not prisoners of war. Immediate release. It would be necessary to discuss the army treatment to 
captured guerrillas and accord a procedure code. 
Guaranty for guerrilla's spokespersons. 
*It would apply in the design of a located cease-fire. *It would apply in any type of cease-fire. 
Public Force presence. 
*In located cease-fire, its presence is not negotiable but 1. Government should retire offensive detachments. 
the stay conditions 2.Cease-fire does not mean that small towns would be 
without police. 
3.In cease-fire situation, both-side troops cannot be in the 
same place. 





APPENDIX J. PRESIDENT VIRGILIO BARCO'S 'INITIATIVE FOR PEACE' 
PLAN. 
SECTION IV. REGIONAL TALKS FOR LIVING TOGETHER 
Regional conflicts and unrest are very often easier to identify in their causes, in their 
implications, and in their components. Therefore, many factors different from subversive 
actions are usually actual causes of violence. Among them one can mention common 
delinquency, terrorist groups with different inspirations and objectives, and the conflicts for 
controlling productive resources such as land and mines. Regional talks should be oriented 
toward these different causes of violence. 
People living in areas affected by disturbing situations must assume, with 
responsibility and civilian courage, the appropriate solutions for living together. Political 
and social forces have criteria and initiatives that can certainly ccmtribute to eradication of 
those. disturbing factors. That collective solidarity can isolate those peopie that use violence 
-any type of violence- to impose or suppress political ideas, to protect interests, 
patrimonies or privileges, or to defend by themselves in an illegal or illegitimate way. 
Actions and Procedures. 
1. Simultaneously with the initiation of the development of phases considered in the 
Peace Initiative, regional authorities will continue looking for feasible solutions to local 
disturbing factors, using regional agreements. 
2. The government will establish mechanisms for institutional coordination at the 
highest level, through which it compromises to receive and process the possible solutions 
to specific cases of regional violence. These talks should be a sound expression of the 
citizenry against violence. Government expects open and sincere participation of the 
spokespersons of the political parties and movements, of the Church, of labor unions, of 
peasants, industrialists, indigenous, merchants, cattle's raisers, and overall, participation of 
all political and social forces of the regions. 
3 . The government through its agents, that is, governors, intendants, and 
commissaries\ will facilitate the achievement of those talks. Attorney General's Office 
should cooperate with regional authorities. 
4. Ministries of Govemment2, National Defense, and Justice, the presidential 
Advisors for Defense, Promotion and Protection of the Human Rights, and Reconciliation, 
Normalization and Rehabilitation, and the DAS3, have everything ready to endorse the 




1. Before the approval of the new Constitution in 1991, Colombia's political division 
included 23 departments, 5 intendancies, and 5 commissaries or national territories. The 
new Carte established 33 departments. 
2. This Ministry changed its name in 1994 to Ministry of the Interior. 
3. It stands for Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (Security Administrative 
Department). It is the equivalent of the American FBI. 
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APPENDIX K. THE SALVADORAN NEGOTIATION MEETINGS (1984-
1992)1 
1. President Duarte's Negotiation Period (1984-1989) 
a. The meeting of La Palma ( 15 October 1984). 
On October 8, 1984, President Duarte's speech to the United Nations delineated a peace 
initiative, and invited the FMLN-FDR to the first in a series of peace talks of October 1984 .Duarte's 
Peace initiative had two objectives: to discuss a detailed negotiation process that would incorporate 
the FMLN combatants into El Salvador democratic system and to invite the left to participate in the 
upcoming elections. Duarte's initiative came about after a series of proposals and mediation offers 
made by various national and international actors between 1981 and 1984. The outcome of this 
meeting was the creation of a mixed negotiating commission responsible for the analysis of the peace 
proposals presented by both parties, the development of a mechanism by wich all segments of the 
Salvadoran society could be incorporated into the peace process, and the study of a plan by which 
peace could be reached in a short time. 
b~ The meeting of Ayagualo (30 November 1984) 
During the initial meeting, the government and the FMLN presented their basic demands. 
The government proposed steps to humanize and reduce the level of conflict. President Duarte asked 
for the elimination of assassinations, kidnaping, threats, attacks in rural and urban cities, and reprisals 
against the families of government and armed forces personnel. He also demanded an end to the 
sabotage and destruction of private property, commercial and industrial establishment, and 
government property. 
As a counterproposal, the FMLN-FDR presented their Propuesta Global de Soluci6n 
Politica Negociada para laPaz (Broad Proposal ofNegotiated Political Solution for Peace)in which 
they outlined three separate phases. Phase one called for the creation of political condition and basic 
individual rights to fmd a negotiated solution, an agreement to promote human rights, the elimination 
of United States influence, and arms buildup. 
Phase two demanded the suppression of hostilities against the insurgents, the participation 
of the FMLN-FDR in the government, a discussion regarding the cease-fire agreement, and the return 
of thousands of FMLN refugees. Finally, phase three called for constitutional reforms, a 
reorganization of the armed forces, and the announcement and scheduling of national elections. 
With the framework of this negotiation meeting, the FMLN returned to the countryside and 
restructured its revolutionary strategy. The FMLN developed a new strategy that allowed its guerrilla 
units to confront the armed force in terms of a conventional war. In 1984, the FMLN organized its 
combatant units around military-strategic areas in which the FMLN' s general Command planned to 
concentrate their military actions. The FMLN' s strategy of organizing mass demonstrations became 
a second priority for the command. Despite the increase in logistical support from· Cuba and 
Nicaragua, guerrilla units felt harmed by the armed force. The united states supplied the training and 
the weapons to direct effective military operations against the FMLN concentrations. 
Evidently, the guerrillas could not afford to fight in a conventional war. Therefore, the 
FMLN formulated a new military strategy that aimed to use mass demonstrations in conduction with 
military actions, as was done in the early 1980s. With these activities, social agitation, increased from 
1984 to 1986 and the peace talks were stopped. 
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c. The unsuccessful meeting of Sesory (19 September 1986) 
This meeting was a new negotiation attempt but it failed due to the absence of the FMLN' s 
delegation. In late 1986, the FMLN presented a new negotiation strategy to the Salvadoran media 
called "Political offer of the FMLN-FDR"(Oferta politica del FMLN-FDR). Here, the left demanded 
a search for the means of conflict resolution, an opening of political participation in the government, 
a cease-fire, and the respect for human rights. During this year, the FMLN developed a new war 
strategy called Counter-Offensive (Contra-Ofensiva) which established action lines for its military 
and mass organization. With the use of political and labor movements, the counter offensive was 
framed in a deepening of the military activities and mass demonstrations. These mass activities had 
the goal of creating an environment of insurrection in the capital, and then carrying out violent 
actions. These types of actions increased in 1987 but the government neutralized them. This caused 
the FMLN to suffer a blow in its actions lines, and obligated the mass demonstrations tactic to 
accelerate. Due to the loss of the armed forces presence around the country, the FMLN grew stronger 
here. 
By early 1987, the FMLN-FDR general strategy was divided into two main alternatives: The 
Extended Popular War and the Negotiated Agreements. Each of these alternatives had different 
characteristics. The extended Popular War had the military objective to obtain force accumulation. 
The Negotiation alternative became a parallel strategy to the military and the mass actions. The 
involvement of the FDR in this strategy was to achieve political integration to win popular 
integration to win popular elections in 1989. Evidently, in 1987 the FMLN was committed to a 
military solution and the FDR preferred a negotiated solution to the armed conflict. This division 
prevailed throughout the negotiation process during Duarte's peace talks. 
By mid-1987, two political events took place in the country that had great relevance for the 
political structure. First, on May 26, the FMLN-FDR announced a double proposal to President 
Duarte and the High Command of the Armed Force that outline the idea of political solution. Second, 
on August 7, The Agreements of Esquipulas II 2 (Los acuerdos de Esquipulas) were signed by the 
Central American presidents. These agreements contained new elements that influenced the peace 
talks. The most relevant were: a debate initiative with all unarmed national groups of political 
opposition with those that had accepted the amnesty. The creation of a National Reconciliation 
Commission that would verify all aspects of the reconciliation process, and would also monitor 
the fulfilment of the agreements related to the amnesty, the cease-fire, the democratization process, 
and the upcoming elections. Finally, the agreements called for the cessation of aid to irregular forces. 
d. The meeting of San Salvador (4-5 October 1987). 
The peace talks between the government and the FMLN-FDR resumed in the headquarters 
of the Catholic Church. In this meeting , both parties agreed to create two commissions to seek and 
prepare accords related to a cease-fire process and other aspects of Esquipulas II. There were no 
concrete agreements between both parties at this point and another meeting was schedule to continue 
the discussions. 
e. The meeting of Caracas (21-23 October 1987) 
in this meeting, the government and the FMLN-FDR did not come to an agreement. By 
October 21, delays existed when both commissions discussed the norms by which to carry out the 
cease of fire. As a result, a new meeting was schedule to be held in Mexico on 22th. The FMLN 
though, ceased the peace talks due to the assassination of the non-governmental Commission of 
human rights representative. The government delineated a policy of nonviolence, pardon and 
forgiveness.· The rebels were urge to accept the arrangements and the spirit of Esquipulas II, a cease-
fire and amnesty, to disarm and to incorporate in the political democratic process. On the other hand, 
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the FMLN-FDR demanded a government reorganization that incorporated all social sectors that 
favored a political solution. This newly organized government would promote the conditions for free 
elections. 
In Esquipulas II, the Central American presidents established a period of 90 days for the 
agreements to emerge. The purpose of this measure was to search for El Salvador's reconciliation, 
but concrete results were not obtained. However, despite the limited improvements of the peace talks, 
the government promoted an amnesty and a unilateral cease-fire that went into effect on 5 November 
1987. The FMLN also declared a unilateral cease-fue. 
In 1988, the FMLN-FDR introduced a new proposal called Diplomatic Offensive (Ofensiva 
Diplomatica). This proposal sought to increase international support in favor of the FMLN, and to 
prevent ARENA's victory in the presidential elections of 1989. By the beginning of 1989, the 
FMLN, had redefmed its military strategy and the possibilities of a new military offensive were 
evident. 
On January 1989, the FMLN, before the presidential elections of March, presented a proposal 
aimed at converging the elections into a contribution to the peace process. They asked to postpone 
the elections to September 15, 1989, and demanded the following: an end to the repression by the 
armed force; the keeping of the armed force in their headquarters; the integration of the Democratic 
Convergence( a leftist Party, an FMLN supporter) to the Central Electoral Council; and the 
promulgation of a new electoral code. They also demanded the right of voting to those Salvadorans 
living outside the country. If these demands were answered, the FMLN promised to respect the 
activities of the political parties, to declare a two-day truce before and after elections, and to accept 
the electoral result of September elections. 
In this framework, the government accepted the FMLN-FDR demands except for the 
postponement of the elections. This answer motivated the FMLN to stop and boycott the presidential 
elections. This action did not succeed, though, due to the response of the vast majority of the 
population who went to the polls. This popular response motivated the FMLN to promote and end 
to the armed conflict through a political settlement, and to retreat from its military commitment. In 
March 1989, President Duarte passed the government to the newly elected President Alfredo 
Cristiani. 
2. President Cristiani's Negotiation process (1989-1992) 
a. The meeting of Mexico ( September 1989) 3 
At this meeting, the FMLN-FDR, through Commander Joaquin Villalobos, announced its 
proposal called Proposal to achieve Democratization (Propuesta para encontrar la 
Democratizaci6n). It also called for the cessation of hostilities and the lasting peace in El Salvador. 
This proposal had three important components: an observance of a cease-fire starting on 15 
September 1989; an initial phase for the incorporation of the FMLN: a defmitive end of the armed 
conflict; and total integration of the FMLN to the political life starting 31 January 1990. 
The government proposed to create a negotiating commission with a permanent character 
whose purpose was to develop activities related to the peace process. At the end of this meeting, both 
delegations signed an agreement called Accords of Mexico (Los Acuerdos de Mexico). In this 
agreement both parties were committed to carry out permanent peace talks with maximum 
seriousness, reciprocal guarantees, and an efficient framework to achieve a conflict resolution. 
b. The Meeting of San Jose (16-17 October 1989) 
Prior to this meeting, military actions on both sides increased throughout the country. The 
FMLN disregarded the agreement to cease sabotage activities, and increased its military campaign. 
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Since the meeting in Mexico, the debate was full of tension, political violence, and urban terrorism. 
Acts of sabotage increased in the capital and the FMLN developed against what they called the 
repressive actions of the ARENA government and the Armed Force. 
In San Jose, the FMLN arrived with the same negotiation agenda as proposed in Mexico 
along with two additional points: (1) The measures for the auto-purge and the professional education 
of the armed force; and (2) Judicial system reforms. The proposal of the government mentioned a 
cease-fire and the end of sabotage actions. But these topics did not prosper due to the irrational 
procedures presented by both parts to end the armed conflict . After this meeting, violence increased 
dramatically. Meetings schedule for 20 and 21 of November 19890 in Caracas were not held 
because the FMLN launched an insurgent offensive. The FMLN declared publicly that this offensive 
developed because the negotiation process was full of disputes. 
c. The FMLN offensive (11 November 1989) 
This offensive was named "Fuera los Facistas, Febe Elizabeth Vive" (Expel the fascist, Febe 
Elizabeth lives). This offensive had four objectives. First, it aimed to stop the socioeconomic 
programs developed by President Cristiani. Second, it tried to reinforce the FMLN, and finally, it 
attempted to create dissatisfaction against the government.4 
·The armed forces responded quickly to this· armed insurrection and managed to control the 
situation. The FMLN failed to reach their objective for two primary reasons. First, they never had 
to support the population. Second, the combatant units of the FMLN were not prepared to fight in 
the streets of San Salvador. The Salvadoran people clearly announced to the FMLN that they were 
tired of the war. Civil society demanded that the FMLN incorporate itself into the political process 
of the country, and to resolve the armed conflict over the negotiating table. This popular reaction 
obligated the FMLN to resume the peace talks with the government. 5 
d. Debate Efforts after the Offensive 
It was fair to think that the effects of this offensive would create a hostile climate among the 
negotiating parties. However, President Cristiani proposed to begin the peace talks in December of 
1989 under one condition-that the FMLN stop all terrorist actions against the civilian population. In 
Costa Rica, the presidents of Central America expressed their total support for the government of EL 
SALVADOR and condemned the FMLN for their offensive. Within a setting of international 
negotiation proposals, both delegations requested the participation of the United Nation in the peace 
talks. With the participation of the United Nations, the peace talks developed in a different 
framework. This new dialogue framework evolved from the impact that the offensive had on all 
Salvadorans, the acceptance of the peace talks by the U.S. Government, the mediation of the 
Secretary-General of the U.N. Javier Perez de Cuellar, the flexible proposals of the FMLN, and the 
pressure from national and international organizations. 
After 10 years of civil war, the FMLN sensed that a negotiated solution was the only viable 
way to end the armed_ conflict. Thus, the FMLN called for the establishment of a social, political , 
and economic regime that would assure the fulfillment of the will of the Salvadoran people. The 
objective of this regime was to maintain and to reproduce a democratic system with the consensus 
of the Salvadoran people. With this framework, the government and the FMLN resumed the peace 
talks. 
e. Meeting of Geneva 04 April1990) 6 
In this meeting, the Salvadoran government and the FMLN establishment an agreement. The 
purposes of this agreement was to end the armed conflict by a political route in a short period, to 
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encourage the democratization of the country, to guarantee the respect for human rights, and to 
reunify the Salvadoran society. 
The initial goal was to achieve political agreements that would cease the armed confrontation 
and all activities that jeopardized the rights of the population. These agreements were to be verified 
by the United Nations and approved by the security Council. The medium-term goal was to establish 
the guarantees and necessary conditions for the incorporation of the FMLN combatants to the civil, 
institutional, and political life of the country. The methodology was that the government and the 
FMLN would develop a dialogue between both parties with the mediation of the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations or his representative, and that the Secretary-general would assure that the peace 
talks were contributing to the success of the negotiation process. The government and the FMLN 
would assure that their representative had the authority to discuss and formulate agreements. 
The conditions of this agreement were that the government and the FMLN agreed on a 
private peace process. The Secretary-General or his representative was the only private peace 
process. The Secretary-General or his representative was the only authorized person to provide public 
information. The Secretary-General, in discreet form, would maintain confidential communication 
with the U.S. Government, with members of the United Nations, or with other organizations that 
could contribute to the success of the peace talks. The government and the FMLN agreed that the 
national political -parties and social organization had an important role in the . consolidation of the 
peace. Both parties identified the need to establish and maintain consultation mechanisms with such 
organizations. 
f. The Meeting of Caracas (16-20 May 1990) 
For this meeting, the agendas of the government and the FMLN continued to be the same. 
However, they outlined a new perspective : the total search for a negotiated solution. Both parties 
continued to promote their efforts to promote their efforts to achieve of the armed conflict through 
negotiations. 
g. The meeting of Oaxtepec, Mexico ( 19 June 1990) 
This meeting centered on the purge of the armed forces that later became a strategy of the 
FMLN to promote a stalemate in the negotiation process. The government accepted this proposal 
contingent upon the demobilization of the FMLN units. The fundamental issue of this meeting was 
not to reduce but to purge the armed forces. The FMLN viewed this condition to be necessary for the 
democratization of the country 7. 
The purge of the armed forces became a preoccupation for some national and international 
political sectors, especially the U.S. congress. This topic was the most controversial of the agenda, 
and was the reason that greater advances in the negotiations failed to take place. 
h. The negotiation proposals in San Jose I, II and III( July-September 1990)8• 
In San Jose I (Costa Rica), the government proposed a transformation of the Armed force's 
doctrine and their new role in the democratic system. The government also accepted and supported 
the judicial process surrounding the investigation of several assassinations that occurred in previous 
years. 
The FMLN continued to emphasize the topic related to the purging of the armed forces. Its 
intention was to stop the corruption of military officers and the taking of command posts by officer's 
tandas (graduating class). The government provide assurance that the purging og the armed forces 
would take place aster the FMLN had been disarmed and demobilized. The meeting ended with a 
signed agreement establishing the mechanism to monitor human rights under the United Nations 
through an organization later known as ONUSAL. 
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In San Jose II and III, the FMLN again stressed the disappearance of the anned forces. 
Concrete agreements were not obtained and this failure caused the debate to lose credibility. This also 
contributed to the continuation of the anned confrontation. Despite the frustration of these meeting, 
both commissions considered that the negotiation process should continue. 
•· The offensive of November 1990. 
Despite presidents Cristiani's speech to the United Nations (October 1990) to continue with 
the peace talks, the FMLN launched a new military offensive in November. This had a lower level 
of intensity and duration than the one in 1989. The FMLN argued that this offensive had the purpose 
of re-energizing the negotiation process. Again, the FMLN' s military offensive did not achieve its 
objectives for lack of support from the population due to this anned insurrection, the negotiations 
stopped and the peace process was put in danger. However, the secretary general of the United 
Nations brought both parties to the negotiations table. Between December of 1990 and January of 
1991, he held private meetings, the Secretary General announced that the peace talks would resume 
immediately. 9 
. j. · Th~ meeting of Managua (March 1991 ). 
By the early 1991, the FMLN understood that its Marxist-Leninist goals could not be reached 
by means of force. Moreover, the FMLN presented in Managua, before the Commission of the 
European Economic community and the foreign relation Ministers of Central America, an initiative 
to accelerate the peace talks. This proposals discussed the anned forces, constitutional reforms, and 
a cease-fire. This peace initiative was accepted by the government, and the process continued without 
major problems. 
k. The meeting of Mexico (April1991) 
In this meeting, both sides agreed reforms to the Constitution that related to the anned 
forces, the judicial system, human rights, and the electoral process. These reforms were presented 
to the Legislative Assembly after the agreement was reached in Mexico. An execution calender or 
time line was also created to ratify these reforms. Several items related to the anned force were left 
pending due to the refusal of the FMLN to go on with this its disannament and demobilization. 
In this meeting, the truth Commission was created whose responsibility was to investigate 
the most prominent acts of violence since 1980. The Commission was to be formed with three 
civilians appointed by the Secretary General of the U.N. and accepted by both negotiating parties. 
There were four major agreements at this meeting. The first agreement concerned the 
subordination of the Armed Forces to Civilian power; the creation of a State Intelligence 
organization; the restructuring of the military justice regulation; and the proposing of laws that relate 
to paramilitary groups, recruitment and public security forces. 
Second, the judicial system must be organized along with the laws related to the form of 
choosing the Supreme Court Judges. The election of these judges would be approved by two thirds 
of the Legislative Assembly. Third, human rights laws would be based on the agreements signed in 
San Jose I. A National attorney for the defense of the human rights would be appointed and would 
be elected by two-thirds of the Legislative Assembly. Forth, the electoral system would be 
restructured. The Inter-party Dialogue Commission would be created to address these reforms, and 




I. The meeting ofCaraballeda, Venezuela (May 1991) 
This meeting was continuation of the previous one. However, it tried to give more emphasis 
to those pending topics related to the armed forces and to the cessation of the armed conflict. The 
meeting concluded with a few advances; but, it showed the will of both parties to arrive at a solution. 
m. The meeting of Queretaro, Mexico (June 1991). 
Once again the topics were discussed were related to the armed forces and the cease-fire. In 
relation to the Armed forces, the government said that they would be reorganized to fit in the new 
Salvadoran democratic system. The government again recognized that the armed forces would be 
subordinated to civilian authorities, and that the agreements related to this topic were necessary for 
the pacification of the country. Based on this, the FMLN took an apparently flexible attitude, 
agreeing to discuss those topics already mentioned. However, they only discussed those aspects 
dealing with public security forces, and the cease-frre. Other pending topics were a source for later 
discussion. 
n. The meeting ofMexico(July 1991). 
, The FMLN again ·continued to extend the course of the negotiation by evading the final 
agreements on topics related to the armed forces and the and ceased-fire. The FMLN argued that 
there were specific points in the topics of the armed forces and the cease-fire that had not been 
resolved. At the end, the FMLN brought a new topic for discussion that broke the agenda presented 
in Caracas. In sum, this meeting was unsuccessful. 
o. The meeting of New York ( 21 September 1991) 
After a stagnation of the peace talks created by unrealistic demands of the FMLN in Mexico, 
the negotiation process resumed through the exigency of the United Nations. However this time it 
included the participant of the Secretary-General of the U.N. and President Cristiani. 
Cristiani was present solely to have an interview with the Secretary-General, given that his 
governmental commission would meet with the commission of the FMLN. The agreements of New 
York changed the plan settled on in Caracas and were based on the negotiation process, the cease-
fire, and the disarmament and demobilization of the FMLN. Both parties only discussed those topics 
related to the negotiation of political agreements, the cease-fire , and the terms of the negotiation 
process. At the end, both commission decided that a date for the cease-fire must be predetermined 
in a short period. 
In sum, it was agreed to create the National Commission for a Peace Consolidation 
(Comisi6n Nacional para Ia consolidaci6n de Ia Paz, COPAZ), to purge the armed forces, to reduce 
the armed forces, and to create a Civilian National police force (Policia Nacional Civil, PNC)11 
Anew document, known asAcuerdos de Nueva York (Agreements ofNew York), was also 
signed. The issues addressed in this proposal were the armed forces, the judicial system, the electoral 
system, and the ratification of constitutional reforms. These agreements also called for the conditions 
of a cease-fire, the political participation of the FMLN, the implementation of the peace agreements, 
and the participation of FMLN's ex-combatants in the CNP. The FMLN agreed to drop its 
commitment to end the armed conflict by the force. 
p. The meetings of Mexico (November 1991) 
Thc:t negotiations began with the discussion of the public security doctrine and structure of 
the CNP. In these meetings, there were agreements of previous topics presented in other meetings. 
During these meetings, the FMLN announced to the government commission that its armed units 
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would not surrender their weapons to any one. Such an attitude obviously denied the will of the 
FMLN to end of the armed conflict. 
The agreements of Geneva clearly established that the purpose of the peace talks was to end 
the conflict by means of a political debate; something that could not be achieved while the FMLN 
maintained its military structure. The FMLN, throughout the peace talks, used its military apparatus 
every time its general interests were threatened, to promote its position on certain issues. 
q. The meetings of New York (16 December 1991) 
The goal of this meeting was to reach a fmal agreement to end the armed conflict. With the 
presence of the Secretary General, the meeting was a success. His presence gave dynamism to the 
negotiation process. Obviously, the Secretary General of the UN wanted to fmish the peace talks 
before his term was over (31 December 1991 ). 
In this meeting, President Cristiani came to join the peace effort. His participation also 
accelerated the peace talks so that an agreement could be reached before the last day of 1991. 
r. The meetings of New York (31 December 1991). 
Here, the end of the armed conflict came with the signing of the document known as 
Acuerdos de Nueva York (Agreements of New York). In the agreements, the government and the 
FMLN conflict. The agreements also reflected the commitment of both parties to sign the Cessation 
of the Armed Confrontation of El Salvador (Cese del Enfrentamiento Armado de El Salvador CEA). 
The agreements also called for an end of the FMLN' s military apparatus, the incorporation of its 
combats to the socio-political system, and reduction of the armed forces. 
Some commitments before the singing of the CEA were established. The government and 
the FMLN would meet again from the 5th to the lOth of January 1992 to negotiate the execution 
calendar of agreements. If agreements did not exist by January 10, the U.N. would formulate a 
strategy to settle unresolved matters before he 15th of January. Finally, the formal signing of the 
CEA would be held on January 16 and it would be carried out from 1 February 1992 until 31 
October 1992 12. 
Despite the peace Accords of New York, FMLN's middle level commanders announced 
that they would not surrender their weapons to an international organization under the condition that 
they obtain power within the structure of the government. This event did not take place and the 
negotiation process continued as schedule. 
s. The meetings of New York (06-10 January 1992) 
In this meeting, a document was signed known as New York II. It included the details of the 
agreement signed on 31 December 1991 that would allow the fmal signing on 16 January 1992. The 
FMLN behaves negatively and accused the government of using the armed force to intimidate its 
combatants scattered around the country. This attitude delayed the negotiation process until 12 
January. 
t. The final meeting of Mexico (16 January 1992) 
In Chapultepec, Mexico, the government of El Salvador and the FMLN signed the fmal 
document know as Los Acuerdos de Paz (The Peace Accords). These accords outlined the peace 
talks, the process of the FMLN's demobilization, the reincorporation of the FMLN, the constitutional 
reforms, the demobilization of the armed forces, and the economic and political opening of the 
country und~r the supervision of ONUSAL. 
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